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INTRODUCTION
The debate, in short, is really not so much about a multira-
cial box as it is about what race means-and what it will
come to mean as the society approaches the millennium.'
For the past several years,2 there has been a Multiracial Category
Movement (MCM) promoted by some biracial persons' and their par-
ents for the addition of a "multiracial" race category on the decennial
census.4 The stated aim of such a new category is to obtain a more
1. ELLIS COSE, COLOR-BLIND 23-24 (1997).
2. See Linda Jones, Mixed Race and Proud of It, GANNE-r NEws SERVICE, Nov. 20, 1990,
available in 1990 WL 4984634 (reporting that mixed-race proponents lobbied unsuccess-
fully for a separate racial category in the 1990 census). Although the Multiracial Category
Movement (MCM) was unsuccessful in its effort to add a multiracial category to the 1990
census, it did persuade the congressional subcommittee on Census, Statistics and Postal
Personnel to hold a series of hearings in 1993 to explore the sufficiency of current racial
classifications and the possible need for a multiracial category. See Review of Federal Measure-
ments of Race and Ethnicity: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Census, Statistics and Postal Person-
nel of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 103d Cong. (1993) [hereinafter
Multiracial Hearings]. The U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) held hearings
of its own one year later. Office of Management and Budget, Hearing on Directive No. 15:
Public Hearing on Standards for Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity (July
18, 1994). Thereafter, Congressman Thomas Petri (Wis.-R.) sponsored a bill to mandate
the inclusion of a "multiracial" and a "multiethnic" category in all federal data collection
forms. The bill was referred to the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee
on Feb. 25, 1997. See H.R. 830, 105th Cong. (1997).
3. "Biracial" is used in this Article to refer to those individuals who claim a social
identity based on their status as mixed-race persons. In contrast, the term "mixed-race"
refers to the entire population of persons with parents of different races irrespective of
biracial identity.
4. Bijan Gilanshah, Multiracial Minorities: Erasing the Color Line, 12 LAW & INEQ.J. 183,
184 (1993). The MCM has targeted the census racial classifications in order to obtain
"official recognition [of mixed-race Americans] as a distinct, powerful social unit." Id. at
184.
On the state level, the MCM has lobbied successfully for implementation of a multira-
cial category on local data-collection forms in Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
and Ohio. See GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-135 (1994) (requiring a multiracial category on state
forms used for reporting racial data to federal agencies); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/2-3.111 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring multiracial category on all forms used by the State
Board of Education to collect and report on data that contain racial categories); IND. CODE
ANN. § 5-15-5.1-6.5 (Michie Supp. 1997) (requiring a multiracial category in certain forms,
questionnaires, and other documents used by public agencies); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 37.2202a (West Supp. 1997) (requiring public agency forms and questionnaires that re-
quest racial information or classifications to include a multiracial category); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3313.941 (Anderson 1997) (requiring a multiracial category on school district
forms that collect racial data); see also Doug Stanley, Census Bureau to Test Revised Race Cate-
gories, TAMPA TRIB.,June 4, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL 10230771 (observing the admin-
istrative addition of a multiracial category to Florida's school enrollment forms and
computers during a routine Department of Education update in 1995). Similar legislation
is also pending in Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Texas. See MD. ANN.
CODE art. 41, § 18-310 (1997) (authorizing a temporary task force to study the possible
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specific count of the number of mixed-race persons in the United
States5 and to have that tallying of mixed-race persons act as a barom-
eter and promoter of racial harmony.6 As proposed, a respondent
could choose the "multiracial" box7 in lieu of the presently listed ra-
cial classifications of American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian or Pa-
cific Islander, Black,8 White, or Other.9 The census schedule also
addition of a multiracial category on state forms); S. 252, 181st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass.
1997) (proposing the addition of a "multiracial" category on forms used by local school
systems); H. 259, 1997 Reg. Sess. (N.H. 1997) (proposing mandatory inclusion of biracial
and multiracial options on state forms that collect racial data); S. 1069, 74th Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Tex. 1995) (proposing mandatory inclusion of a multiracial category on state forms
that collect racial data). In addition, Harvard University applications for admission in-
cluded a multiracial category for the 1992-93 academic year. Elizabeth Atkins, W4hen Life
Isn't Simply Black or White, N.Y. TIMES,June 15, 1991, at C1, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Nyt File.
5. Gilanshah, supra note 4, at 186 (stating that an accurate determination of the size
of the multiracial population is difficult to make because the Census Bureau does not
officially recognize a multiracial category).
6. See id. at 197-98 (asserting that government recognition of a multiracial category
may lead to more interracial group cooperation because multiracial individuals will be
better able to serve as "negotiators" in interracial conflicts).
7. MCM proposals vary from simply adding a multiracial box to the present classifica-
tion list, to the more complex proposal of having the multiracial box followed by the addi-
tional question of the respondent's "component" information-the identification of each
parent's race. See Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 265 (statement of Norma V. Canti,
Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education). The OMB considered
and recently adopted an alternative proposal of checking more than one racial category.
Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62
Fed. Reg. 58,782, 58,788-90 (1997) [hereinafter Revisions to Directive No. 15]; Recommen-
dations from the Interagency Committee for the Review of the Racial and Ethnic Standards
to the Office of Management and Budget Concerning Changes to the Standards for the
Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 36,874, 36,885 (1997)
[hereinafter Recommendations to OMB]; see also Steven A. Holmes, People Can Claim One or
More Races on Federal Forms, N.Y. TimEs, Oct. 30, 1997, at Al, available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Nyt File. Other proposals have been made to reform census racial classifications, but
those proposals are beyond the scope of this Article. See Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2,
at 266 (statement of Norma V. Canni, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Department
of Education) (commenting on proposals for the addition of a Middle Easterner category,
the transfer of Native Hawaiians from the Pacific Islander category to the Native American
category, and the counting of Hispanics as a racial, rather than an ethnic, group).
8. In this Article, the words Black and White appear capitalized when they refer to
persons whose race is Black or White to denote the political meaning of race and the social
significance of being White or Black as something more than just skin color. AccordVictor
F. Caldwell, Book Note, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1369 (1996) (reviewing CrMcAL RACE
THEORY- THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl Williams Crenshaw et
al. eds., 1995)) (contrasting the Critical Race Theory historical view of race, which ac-
knowledges past and continuing racial subordination, with the formal view of race, which
treats race as "'neutral, apolitical descriptions, reflecting merely "skin color" or region of
ancestral origin'" (quoting ClITicAL RACE THEORY, supra, at 257)).
9. Except for the "Other" category, the aforementioned racial and ethnic classifica-
tions were instituted in 1978 by the OMB in cooperation with the Minority Advisory Com-
mittees of the U.S. Census Bureau for standardized collection of racial data by the U.S.
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includes a separate Hispanic Origin ethnicity question.1" On October
29, 1997, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) adopted
a federal Interagency Committee recommendation to reject the multi-
racial category in favor of allowing individuals to check more than one
racial category."i Some MCM proponents are not satisfied with the
OMB's decision, because multiple box checking does not directly pro-
mote a distinct multiracial identity. 12 These MCM proponents are
committed to continue lobbying for a multiracial category on the
Bureau of Census and all other federal government agencies. See Transfer of Responsibil-
ity for Certain Statistical Standards from OMB to Commerce, Dep't of Commerce, Direc-
tives for the Conduct of Federal Statistical Activities, Directive No. 15, Race and Ethnic
Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,260, 19,269
(1978) [hereinafter Directive No. 15]. The OMB director is authorized to dictate the
methodology of all federal data collection forms. 44 U.S.C. § 3504 (1994). The intent of
the instituted classification system was to meet the data collection obligations required by
federal civil rights laws. See Directive No. 15, supra, at 19,269 (directing federal agencies to
use specified racial categories for civil rights compliance reporting). See infra notes 312-
318 and accompanying text for a discussion of civil rights laws. The Census Bureau has
received special permission from the OMB to use an "Other" race category not listed in
Directive 15. See Recommendations to OMB, supra note 7, at 36,877.
10. There has been some discussion regarding the transformation of "Hispanic" into a
racial category because of the sense that certain Latinas or Latinos whose ancestors are
from Central and South America view their Latino-ness as a race rather than as an ethnic-
ity. See Luis Angel Toro, "A People Distinct from Others": Race and Identity in Federal Indian
Law and the Hispanic Classification in OMB Directive No. 15, 26 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1219, 1223
(1995) (asserting that the census treatment of a Hispanic category as ethnic, rather than
racial, overlooks the racial nature of the subordination imposed on Mexican-Americans
along with the Mexican-American people's own conception of their identity). Although
there is some truth in the notion that hostility against Latinas and Latinos takes the form of
entrenched racism rather than discrimination based upon ethnicity, the use of the com-
prehensive category of Hispanic as a racial category would inappropriately conflate the
separate racial and ethnic identities that are a reality for Latinas and Latinos of African
ancestry who are primarily, but not exclusively, from the Caribbean. See Tanya K. Her-
nindez, Over the Rainbow? Puerto Ricans and the "Multiracial" Category in the Year 2000 Census,
CRiTICAJ. P.R. POL'Y & POL., Aug. 1996, at 1, 6 (concluding that Afro-Latinos "experience
racism based upon their African-linked phenotype," which gives race, as distinct from
ethnicity, a political meaning for them); cf Rosemary C. Salomone, The Ties That Bind: An
Interdisciplinary Analysis of Gender, Ethnicity, and the Practice of Law, 3 VA. J. Soc. POL'v & L.
177, 179 (1995) (positing that ethnicity apart from race also shapes consciousness in soci-
ety). But see Adolph Reed Jr., Skin Deep: The Fiction of Race, VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 24, 1996,
at 22, available in 1996 WL 11170163 (viewing race and ethnicity as part of the same contin-
uum of social hierarchy, where groups that are most debased are considered races, and
groups that are accorded greater social acceptance are deemed ethnicities).
11. Revisions to Directive No. 15, supra note 7, at 58,786; Recommendations to OMB,
supra note 7, at 36,937. The Interagency Committee recommendation, which the OMB
adopted, is as misplaced as the multiracial census category proposal itself. See infra Part
IL.D (arguing that multiple box checking and the multiracial category misperceive the so-
cial significance of race).
12. Barbara Vobejda, Census Expands Options for Multiracial Families, WASH. POST, Oct.
30, 1997, at All, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wpost File (quoting Project RACE Presi-
dent Susan Graham as stating, "OMB is trying to erase 'multiracial' from the vocabulary").
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2010 census.'" Further, an OMB official has indicated that the issue
of a multiracial category might be reconsidered with an increase in
mixed-race persons.1 4 Yet, the significance of the MCM extends be-
yond the actual decision of whether and how mixed-race persons
should be counted.
The discourse surrounding the advocacy for a census count of
mixed-race persons has social and legal ramifications apart from the
limited context of revising a census form. 5 The principle underlying
this Article is that the law should be understood in terms of its social
consequences. From a legal-realist perspective, it is important to scru-
tinize the neutral discourse characteristic among those proposing a
legally mandated mixed-race census count. Such analysis exposes its
moral and political significance and ramifications.1 6 "[L]anguage...
can powerfully evoke and enforce hidden signs of racial superiority,
cultural hegemony, and dismissive 'othering' of people."1 7 The power
of discourse arises from its ability to construct a public narrative and
then obstruct counter-explanations for social reality. 8
Multiracial discourse contends that a mixed-race census count is
necessary because race has become too fluid to monitor.1 " The theory
13. All Things Considered: OMB and Race (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 29,
1997), available in 1997 WL 12834140.
14. All Things Considered: No to Multiracial (National Public Radio broadcast, July 8,
1997), available in LEXIS, News Library, Tnpr File.
15. See Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and
Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33, 79 (1994) ("A method of discourse
[itself] can subordinate.").
16. See Note, Legal Realism and the Race Question: Some Realism About Realism on Race
Relations, 108 H-Av. L. REV. 1607, 1607-08 (1995) ("[T]he Realist project [is] an attempt to
expose 'moral and political discourse' within supposedly neutral legal discourse .
(footnote omitted)).
17. TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE D.A4u: WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY IMAGINATION
x (1992); see also Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itselfy: Deconstructing the
Violent Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 15, 25 (1993) (ex-
plaining that "a status quo legal narrative" is a social mythology that assumes the validity of
a racial pre-narrative of presumed inferiority, which, if unquestioned, becomes a founda-
tional notion and transforms itself into a social truth).
18. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African American/
Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1581, 1585
(1993) (stating that narratives both filter and construct a reality).
19. Cf Racially Mixed Americans: The Facts Challenge Traditional Categorizations, MINORITY
MARKETS ALERT, Mar. 1, 1993, available in 1993 WL 2918051 ("Current Census Bureau
tracking of racial categories is becoming less meaningful as the nation develops a more
multicultural/multiracial character."). The increase in children from interracial marriages
and the increase in non-White immigration to the United States are the principal reasons
extolled for why distinctions in race have become more nebulous. See id. The 1990 census
reported 1.5 million interracial married couples. Eunice Moscoso, Mixed-Race Americans
Want New Census Category, ATLANTA CONST., July 21, 1996, at A12, available in 1996 WL
8220406. In addition, the census reported 2 million children under the age of 18 who
1998]
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posits that the inability to identify psychologically with just one racial
category is inherent to mixed-race persons alone and that the growing
number of mixed-race persons demonstrates the futility of racial cate-
gorization as a practice.2" For instance, MCM proponents often refer
to the growing numbers of persons who choose the "Other Race" cate-
gory to support the premise that the racial categories are inadequate
for mixed-race persons.21 The multiracial narrative of modern race
being more fluid than in the past corresponds with and reinforces the
color-blind jurisprudence presentation of race as devoid of mean-
ing.22 Thus, "multiracial discourse" has an immediate meaning as the
rhetoric deployed in the campaign for a specific count of mixed-race
persons,23 and a more expansive meaning as the approach to race that
views the increasing diversity of society as deconstructing and tran-
scending race. 24 Multiracial discourse misconstrues the meaning of
were mixed-race (i.e., of a different race than one or both parents). See Haya El Nasser,
Panel: "Multiracial" Census Label Unneeded; Suggests Allowing Multiple Checks in Race Categories,
USA TODAY, July 9, 1997, at 3A, available in 1997 WL 7007256. In 1994, 63.6% of legal
immigrants were from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZA-
TION SERV., DEP'T OFJUSTICE, 1994 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 21, 27-28 tbl.C & tbl.2 (1996).
20. See Angela Ards, The Multiracial Movement Raises Questions About Political Black Iden-
tity, VILLAGE VOICE, Feb. 11, 1997, at 36, available in 1997 WL 7917408 (asserting that racial
categories are becoming "increasingly inadequate" to reflect the nation's diversity).
21. Cf Jones, supra note 2 (noting that multiracial-category proponents were "[w] eary
of marking the box that says 'other'"). Yet, Latinos and Latinas are the persons who over-
whelmingly choose the "Other Race" category. Id. at 172 (statement of Sonia Pirez, Senior
Policy Analyst, National Council of La Raza). Studies of why 40% of Latinos and Latinas
choose the "Other Race" category reveal that for some, "race and culture are fused" so that
their cultural differences from White and Black Americans inform their view of themselves
as a distinct cultural race "within which they may be white or black or various categories in
between." Clara E. Rodriguez, Race, Culture, and Latino "Otherness" in the 1980 Census, 73
Soc. Sc. Q. 930, 931 (1992). It is interesting to note that upon the Census Bureau's fol-
low-up of 1980 census "Other Race" respondents, census enumerators classified 90% of the
respondents as White. Id. at 933.
22. Color-blind jurisprudence refers to the recent body of Supreme Court precedents
that promote the ahistorical view that racial classifications have been the cause of racism.
See Conference, Race, Law and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and the American Dilemma, 45 AM.
U. L. REv. 567, 586 (1996) (discussing the so-called color-blind ideology of the Supreme
Court). This Article employs Ian F. Haney L6pez's general definition of race "as a vast
group of people loosely bound together by historically contingent, socially significant ele-
ments of their morphology and/or ancestry." Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of
Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HAiv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 7
(1994).
23. The immediate definition of multiracial discourse encompasses the proposal for a
multiracial category and alternate proposals for the counting of mixed-race persons, such
as the multiple-box-checking recommendation recently adopted by OMB. See supra note 7.
24. Multiracial discourse promotes the equating of increasing numbers of mixed-race
persons with an escape from racial difference and thus the problems of race. See, e.g.,
Jerelyn Eddings, Counting a "New" Type of American: The Dicey Politics of Creating a "Multira-
cial" Category in the Census, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 14, 1997, at 22, 22-23 (stating that
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race used in the group measurement of racial disparity, with an indi-
vidual-focused assessment of fluid cultural identity.25 Such a view of
race negates its sociopolitical meaning26 and thereby undermines ef-
fective legal mechanisms to ameliorate racial discrimination.27 In fact,
the MCM can be viewed as a metonym for the more general color-
blind approach to race evident in recent Supreme Court cases.2 8
Both the immediate and expansive meanings of "multiracial dis-
course" are interrelated and involve a highly politicized discourse. Ac-
cordingly, this Article shall question the assumptions that underlie
both levels of meaning in order to assess the continuing significance
of the racial classifications that multiracial discourse challenges. 29
This analysis reveals that although multiracial discourse may seem be-
nign and appealing on a humanitarian level,30 its implementation will
produce counter-egalitarian results in the struggle for racial equal-
ity.3 The MCM's campaign for color-blind treatment of racial hierar-
"the government might, in effect, create a group that is quintessentially American-em-
phasizing the melting pot quality of the population rather than the distinctions" because
"the concept of multiracialism fits [President Clinton's] goal of creating a country that
transcends racial division").
25. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
26. The sociopolitical meaning of race can be defined as the substantive view of "histor-
ical-race" which "embodies past and continuing racial subordination" combined with "sta-
mus-race," which acknowledges race "as an indicator of social status." Neil Gotanda, A
Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REv. 1, 4 (1991).
27. See Martha Minow, Not Only for Myself: Identity, Politics, and Law, 75 OR. L. Rzv. 647,
662 (1996) ("To identify fluidity, change, border-crossing, and unstable categories is not to
deny the real force and power that some people have accorded group labels and catego-
ries, to the clear detriment of others.").
28. See Conference, supra note 22, at 568 (discussing a "new jurisprudence" in which
the Supreme Court shows a movement toward color-blindness and away from racial
preferences).
29. In general, references to the rhetoric surrounding the advocacy for a multiracial
category shall be denoted herein as MCM assertions, and the term "multiracial discourse"
shall refer to the more expansive definition of the concept that views the increasing diver-
sity of society as deconstructing and transcending race.
30. Upon being questioned about the request for a multiracial census category, Presi-
dent Clinton responded, "I wouldn't be opposed to that. That's the first time I ever heard
it, but it makes sense.... I can't see any reason not to do it." President's Remarks and a
Question-and-Answer Session with the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Dallas,
Texas, 1 PUB. PAPERS 474, 483 (Apr. 7, 1995). This Article attempts to provide the Presi-
dent and the public with the legal reasons why a multiracial category and other mixed-race
census count proposals will have adverse consequences.
31. See Ards, supra note 20 (stating that some national civil rights organizations, such as
the NAACP, fear that a multiracial category will dilute black political representation and
influence, because the use of such a category would result in "massive black flight from the
race"); Carl M. Cannon, Census Faces Racial Issue, BALTiMoRE SUN, June 29, 1997, at IA,
available in 1997 WL 5518631 (observing that civil rights organizations are "worried that
new ways of counting race will dilute the political strength of minorities-and contribute
to the erosions of recent economic gains made by blacks and Latinos"). Yet, the counter-
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chy cloaks the racial significance of ostensibly race-neutral laws, as the
Supreme Court's recent movement toward color-blind antidiscrimina-
tion jurisprudence has done.3 2
Because of the manner in which the census context highlights
the dangers of multiracial discourse to racialjustice efforts, this Article
will focus upon the census as a well-known paradigm for the way racial
classifications function. In particular, to demonstrate the folly of
color-blind approaches to race issues, the author enlists the debate
centered on the demand for a census count of mixed-race persons.
Because the census is the cornerstone of the federal statistical sys-
tem, 3 the battle over the reform of the census racial classifications is
significant and far-reaching.34 The census reflects in large measure
egalitarian results of multiracial discourse extend beyond the confined question whether
the census count of racial minorities will be diminished. This is because the discourse
promotes a distorted vision of the meaning of race that can only misinform efforts to ad-
dress racial privilege and hierarchy.
32. See supra note 22.
33. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("The actual Enumeration shall be made ... within
every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as [Congress] shall by Law direct.");
13 U.S.C. § 141 (1994) ("The Secretary [of Commerce] shall ... every 10 years... take a
decennial census of population... in such form and content as he may determine ....");
Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 247 (statement of Thomas C. Sawyer, Chairman,
House Subcomm. on Census, Statistics and Postal Personnel) ("[I]t is from [the census
data that] wide-ranging public and private information systems are built on every level.").
34. There is a growing body of literature regarding the different aspects of the MCM.
See RUTH COLKER, HYBRID: BISEXUALS, MULTIRACIALS, AND OTHER MISFITS UNDER AMERICAN
LAw 8-9 (1996) (comparing perceived race categorization problems to categorization
problems faced by individuals of varying genders, sexual orientations, and disabilities); Gi-
lanshah, supra note 4, at 204 (advocating a multiracial category for the 2000 census to
legitimize the existence of multiracial Americans); Carol R. Goforth, "What Is She?" How
Race Matters and Why It Shouldn't, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 107-08 (1996) (concluding, upon
analysis of the MCM, that racial classifications should be abolished); Christine B. Hickman,
The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95
MICH. L. REv. 1161, 1169-70 (1997) (opposing a multiracial category because of its ability
to undermine cohesion of the Black community, which was achieved by the reappropria-
tion of the One Drop Rule as a move of empowerment); Alex M. Johnson Jr., Destabilizing
Racial Classifications Based on Insights Gleaned from Trademark Law, 84 CAL. L. REv. 887, 893-
94 (1996) (proposing that the Black community be treated as an ethnicity in order to avoid
the negative consequences of a racial label); Kenneth Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and
Group Portraits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REv. 263, 289 (1995) (arguing that
self-identification as part of a racial group may legitimize "the very racial category that has
served as the instrument of group subordination"); Kenneth E. Payson, Check One Box:
Reconsidering Directive No. 15 and the Classification of Mixed-Race People, 84 CAL. L. REv. 1233,
1290 (1996) (promoting a multiracial category to dismantle the "dividing lines of race");
Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 47 STAN.
L. REv. 957, 987 (1995) (asserting that a multiracial category helps avoid balkanization by
race); cf Toro, supra note 10, at 1223 (concluding that the Hispanic ethnicity classification
should be recast as a racial category). See generally Luther Wright, Jr., Note, Who's Black,
Who's White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualizing the United States's Definition of Race and Racial
Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REv. 513 (1995) (proposing to mandate the use of racial classifi-
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the nation's struggle over how human beings will be known politically
in a racially stratified society. 5 "The debate over a multiracial cate-
gory reveals an intriguing aspect about how we conceptualize race. "36
An examination of multiracial discourse reveals that multiracial-cate-
gory proponents misperceive the meaning of race relevant to the cen-
sus inquiry by conflating a cultural approach to race with a
sociopolitical approach to race. 7 Therefore, this Article analyzes the
widespread legal ramifications of the MCM and assesses whether the
MCM's proposal effectively advances its stated goal of promoting ra-
cial equality. 8 After analyzing the legal import of multiracial dis-
course, the Article determines that the MCM misperception of race
and its fluidity inadvertently furthers the progression of color-blind
jurisprudence in direct contravention of the MCM goal of promoting
racial equality. Part I provides background and identifies the motivat-
ing forces behind the MCM as a color-blind movement. Part II cri-
tiques the MCM for its adverse effects upon racial justice efforts in
furthering the manner in which color-blind jurisprudence disregards
actual experiences of racial discrimination in the promotion of White
supremacy. 9 Part III proposes a race-conscious classification system,
which reflects the sociopolitical nature of race, to monitor racial dis-
crimination more effectively and to dislodge the force of multiracial
discourse.
cation on birth certificates and include a biracial category to dissuade individuals from
later attempting to change their racial designation). Other legal commentators have dis-
cussed multiracial identity in other contexts. See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, Note, Black Iden-
tity and Child Placement: The Best Interests of Black and Biracial Children, 92 MICH. L. REv. 925,
959 (1994) (reasoning that the needs of biracial children call for child placement determi-
nations to be based on their mixed heritage); Julie C. Lythcott-Haims, Where Do Mixed Ba-
bies Belong? Racial Classification in America and Its Implications for Transracial Adoption, 29
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531, 531 (1994) (arguing that the existence of multiracial children
undermines the validity of race-matching in adoption placement). In contrast to the ex-
isting literature, this Article explores the color-blind nature of the MCM's discourse and its
consequent advancement of White privilege.
35. Cf VIRGINIA R. DOMiNGUEZ, WHITE BY DEFINITION: SOCIL CLASSIFICATION IN CRE-
OLE LouIIANA 3, 162 (1986) (asserting that the racial stratification in present-day society is
evident in the widespread understanding that Whites automatically receive a higher social
status).
36. Michael Omi, Racial Identification and the State: The Dilemmas of Classification, 15 LAw
& INEQ. J. 7, 19 (1997).
37. See infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
38. See Jon Michael Spencer, Just What We Don't Need: Another Racial Classification,
WAsH. Posr, Jan. 22, 1997, at A23, available in 1997 WL 2247441 ("[T]he acknowledged
ideal of the multiracial advocates themselves is the attainment of a nonracial society.").
39. For an explanation of the term "White supremacy," see infra note 122 and accom-
panying text.
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I. THE BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION OF THE MULTIRACIAL
CATEGORY MOVEMENT
It seems to me that the popular assumption that a child is
owed a specific identity reveals as much or more about the
needs and privileges of adults than about the needs, rights or
ontological reality of human young. In particular, this as-
sumption reflects adults' own socially created needs for con-
texts that do not deeply threaten their own wishes for
communities of like-minded persons who can share and ap-
preciate their identities.4 °
The MCM has been described as "a movement that is not entirely
based upon the question of racial mixture per sd' in that its focus is
upon the presumed classification needs of Black biracial persons.41 In
fact, the principal proponents of the multiracial category are
"monoracial 42 Black and White parents of biracial children.43
40. Anita L. Allen, Does a Child Have a Right to a Certain Identity?, reprinted in ROSALIND
EKMAN IL.DD, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS RE-VISIONED: PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS 98, 100 (1996).
41. Lewis R. Gordon, Specificities: Cultures of Amefican Identity-Critical 'Mixed Race', 1
Soc. IDENTITIES 381, 382 (1995). Accordingly, this Article will deploy a Black-White histori-
cal focus in its analysis of the legal consequences of multiracial discourse. The Black-White
historical focus of this Article is not an unconscious failure to look beyond the African-
American context when analyzing race relations, although this is a particular danger within
academic discussions of race. See Berta Esperanza Hernndez Truyol, Building Bridges-
Latinas and Latinos at the Crossroads: Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REv. 369, 432-33 (1994) (criticizing legal analyses that inadvertently overlook the diver-
sity of ethnicities and races while purporting to discuss entire communities of people of
color). Nor is the Black-White focus of this Article based upon the presumed unique appli-
cation of the United States "One Drop Rule" to persons of African ancestry. The One
Drop Rule categorizes a person as Black by virtue of any generational connection to Afri-
can ancestry. See F. JAMES DAVIS, WHO IS BLACK?: ONE NATION'S DEFINITION 4-6 (1991)
(explaining the interchangeable terms of the "one-drop rule," the "one black ancestor
rule," the "traceable amount rule," and the "hypo-descent rule"). This Article views all
hostility towards non-White persons as a manifestation of the One Drop Rule. See, e.g.,
Peggy Pascoe, Miscegenation Law, Court Cases, and Ideologies of "Race" in Twentieth-Century
America, 83 J. AM. HIsT. 44, 49 (1996) (noting that miscegenation laws targeted not just
persons of African ancestry, but also American Indians and Asian Americans, including
Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, East Indians, and Filipinos).
42. The term "monoracial" is employed by multiracial-category proponents to describe
persons who are not of mixed-race backgrounds. See, e.g., Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2,
at 125-26 (statement of Carlos Fernindez, President, Association of MultiEthnic Ameri-
cans) (proposing reforms to include multiracial categories for persons who belong to more
than one race so that those persons will not have to select a "monoracial" category). The
term is a misnomer in the sense that few residents of the United States can claim a "pure"
ancestral background. See Linda Mathews, More Than Identity Rides on a New Racial Category,
N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1996, at A7, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (positing that
between 75% and 90% of Blacks can be considered "mixed-race" insofar as their ancestral
backgrounds often include persons who have been socially acknowledged as White or
some race other than Black). In addition, the MCM's use of the term "monoracial" inad-
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The initial impetus for the MCM was the discomfort many White-
Black interracial couples felt when choosing racial classifications for
their mixed-race children on educational data collection forms.44 Yet,
vertently furthers the notion that the census racial classifications represent scientifically
determinable categories, rather than sociopolitical descriptions that reflect our nation's
racial caste system. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
43. See Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 262 (testimony of Norma Cantfi, Assistant
Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education) ("I think that adding a [multira-
cial] category would be a positive response to the biggest customer that our office serves,
and that is the parents of children."); Payson, supra note 34, at 1235-36 ("Those advocating
[a multiracial category] are largely multiracial persons, parents in interracial unions who
advocate on behalf of their mixed-race children .... ."); Mathews, supra note 42 ("'It's the
parents of many multiracial children who have the identity problem, not the children
themselves.'" (quoting a former MCM proponent)). In fact, of the persons testifying
before the congressional committee in favor of the multiracial category, at least three were
self-identified monoracial parents of mixed-race children. Multiracial Hearings, supra note
2, at 105, 158, 159.
44. Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 126 (testimony of Carlos Fernndcez, President,
Association of MultiEthnic Americans) (discussing parental concern with choosing a racial
category for multiracial children in public schools). Thus, even though the multiracial
category is presented as a mechanism for ostensibly ensuring the self-esteem of biracial
children, it appears to be more of an attempt to bolster the self-esteem of the parents of
biracial children. SeeJON MICHAEL SPENCER, THE NEW COLORED PEOPLE: THE MIXED-RACE
MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 87 (1997) (explaining that the multiracial identity movement "has
to do with the self-esteem of these interracially married white parents"); Mathews, supra
note 42 (asserting that parents have "complex motives" for supporting a multiracial cate-
gory, including a desire to "minimize" a child's Black heritage). In addition, the MCM
believes that biracial children need a multiracial category to bolster their self-esteem in a
racially divisive society. SeeJones, supra note 2 (discussing a study that found that biracial
children who identified with the race of only one parent were uncomfortable with that self-
identification and felt "more 'whole'" when they came to identify themselves as biracial).
This belief rests upon the fallacy that non-White "monoracial" children do not struggle
with their racial identity after confronting society's pejorative views of non-whiteness. In-
deed, Dr. Kenneth and Mamie Clark's renowned study of Black children revealed that, at a
young age, Black children express preferences to be White and to have white dolls in reac-
tion to their observations of societal racial preferencing. See Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie P.
Clark, Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOL-
oGy 169, 169-78 (Theodore M. Newcomb & Eugene L. Hartley eds., 1947). To posit that
only biracial children struggle to come to terms with the social meaning of race enshrines
the image of mixed-race children as "tragic ... mulatto[es]" who are incapable of under-
standing the political nature of race. NAOMI ZACK, RACE AND MIXED-RACE 129 (1993).
Turning to the census in particular, Ellis Cose noted:
Whether the census should be used as an occasion for such statements [of per-
sonal identity] (or, for that matter, should be seen as a solution to feelings of low
self-esteem or racial estrangement) is another subject altogether. Suffice it to say
that those who go to the U.S. Bureau of the Census searching for psychological
deliverance are looking in the wrong place and are bound to be greatly
disappointed.
CosE, supra note 1, at 24; accord Ards, supra note 20, at 36 ("'It's not the role of the govern-
ment to make people feel good.'" (quoting Professor Kwame Anthony Appiah, who op-
poses the multiracial category because he believes mixed-race persons are not
discriminated against as multiracial)).
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the MCM demand for a multiracial category is usually presented in
terms of its disapproval of all forms of racial classification. For exam-
ple, Susan Graham-a White mother of two Black-White biracial chil-
dren, the Executive Director of Project RACE (a national organization
advocating on behalf of multiracial children), and one of the princi-
pal advocates for the availability of a multiracial category-states that
true progress would be the eradication of all racial classifications.45
Similarly, Carlos Ferndindez, former President of the Association of
MultiEthnic Americans, has also argued that his preference is that "ra-
cial and ethnic classifications should be done away with entirely. 46
These statements reflect the general view among multiracial-category
proponents that the use of current or any racial classifications is a
form of discrimination in that the focus it places upon race diminishes
the humanity of the individuals it purports to represent.47 The MCM
advocates describe their movement as an instrumental step toward the
"dream of racial harmony," as opposed to the creation of "one more
divisive category. "48 The MCM frequently posits that multiracial per-
sons are a "unifying force"49 on the theory that multiracial persons "as
a group may be the embodiment of America's best chance to clean up
race relations."5" Thus, proponents value a multiracial category for its
45. Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 120 (written testimony of Susan Graham, Exec-
utive Director of Project RACE). The MCM also views the "Other" racial category on the
census as unacceptable: Use of "an 'Other' category ... would be the worst possible alter-
native" as it negates claims to any part of the racial or ethnic categories listed before it. Id.
at 166 (testimony of Carlos Fermindez, President, Association of MultiEthnic Americans).
46. Id. at 127 (testimony of Carlos Fernndez, President, Association of MultiEthnic
Americans); accord Mathews, supra note 42 (expressing the belief of multiracial-category
proponents that racial distinctions themselves would disappear in a color-blind society);
Marilyn Reinhardt, Multiracial People Must No Longer Be Invisible; Diminishing Us All, N.Y.
TIMES, July 12, 1996, at A26, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File ("[T]he logical
extension of challenging our existing systematic racial categorization is to press for its elim-
ination . . ").
47. See Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 168 (testimony of Maj. Marvin Arnold,
Ph.D.) (opining that America should arrive at a point where race no longer matters).
48. Id. at 169; accord Payson, supra note 34, at 1290 (asserting that mixed-race persons
may be able to "build bridges" between divided racial communities and should thus be
accorded a separate racial classification).
49. See Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 171 (testimony of Carlos Fermindez, Presi-
dent, Association of MultiEthnic Americans).
50. Ramona E. Douglass, Multiracial People Must No Longer Be Invisible, N.Y. TIMES, July
12, 1996, at A26, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File. This understanding presents
biracial persons as natural ambassadors of racial harmony because of their innate "bicon-
ceptualism." See Gilanshah, supra note 4, at 198 (stating that "multiracials possess unique
credentials for mediating racial conflict"). However, such an understanding negates the
extent to which all other non-Whites also maintain biconceptual realities in their roles as
daily border-crossers and negotiators in the White world. See Melissa Harrison & Margaret
E. Montoya, Voices/Voces in the Borderlands: A Colloquy on Re/Constructing Identities in Re!
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perceived shift away from the rigidity of racial classifications,5" which
some perceive as a cause of racial hostility.52 The hope is that the
multiracial category will act as an acknowledgement of the fluid and
nebulous character of race and hence its meaninglessness as a group-
ing of persons." In effect, MCM proponents implicitly wish to use the
multiracial category as a mechanism for moving toward a color-blind
society that will effectuate racial equality.54 Thus, the demand for a
multiracial category is less a race-conscious recognition of all the races
with which a particular person identifies, than it is a mechanism for
questioning the use of any system of racial classification.55
The implicit color-blind vision56 of the MCM is also reflected in
what I term the "symmetrical identity demands" of the White parents
Constructed Legal Spaces, 6 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 387, 398-99 (1997) (describing the man-
ner in which an individual who interacts with a person of another race experiences a
"biconceptual reality"); Hickman, supra note 34, at 1258 (arguing that the presentation of
mixed-race persons as born racial ambassadors negates the capacity of "monoracial" per-
sons who have been and who continue to be directly engaged in the work of racial justice).
51. See Ards, supra note 20 (discussing the views of parents who believe that absence of
a multiracial category denies mixed-race children an opportunity to be counted).
52. See Goforth, supra note 34, at 11 (opining that racial classifications "increase the
perception of differences among the races, which aggravates the racial tensions plaguing
this country").
53. But seejohn powell, Who Thought of Dropping Racial Categories, and Why?, POVERTY &
RACE, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 12, 12 (noting "the fact that race is [acknowledged as] socially
constructed does not establish that race lacks meaning or force," or that redistributive
remedies ought not be based on race).
54. Cf Gilanshah, supra note 4, at 199 (advocating government recognition of mul-
tiracials for the benefit of blurring color lines and thus reducing racial animus). But, given
the great significance accorded to race in our society, such color-blind goals are mis-
guided. See infra Part Il.A.
55. Consider one MCM proponent's assertion:
I contend that society should embrace, as a transitory vehicle, multiple racial cate-
gories that expressly recognize and acknowledge products of mixed-race unions
as distinct from both blacks and whites. I assert that this will have the effect of
creating a type of "shade confusion" which will eventually destroy the black/white
dichotomy that currently exists, ultimately reducing race to a meaningless cate-
gory, as it should be.
Johnson, supra note 34, at 891; accord Goforth, supra note 34, at 10 (relating a personal
experience where the author, a White mother of an adopted White-Black biracial child,
reported her support for the multiracial category as well as her preference for abolition of
all racial classifications).
56. One scholar explains "the colorblind approach" as follows:
All racial classifications are deemed suspect because racial categories are viewed
as inherently racist .... Supporters of this response would have us believe that
cultural meanings 400 years in the making will disappear if we prohibit reference
to those meanings in public law and policy. Although the colorblind approach
makes explicit racial categories unlawful, this does not mean they no longer exist,
nor does it change their meaning.
Charles R. Lawrence III, Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, For-
ward to Symposium, Race and Remedy in a Multicultural Society, 47 STAN. L. REv. 819, 836
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who predominate among the MCM's spokespersons.5 7 The "symmet-
rical identity demand" is the appeal for all racial aspects of a child to
be acknowledged in that child's public assertion of racial identity:
"I'm part of this kid, too, no matter who he looks like." 58 As one par-
ent of multiracial children testified in a recent congressional hearing,
without a multiracial category, biracial children are forced to "choose
one parent over the other."59 One can empathize with the parental
impulse to have their familial connection to their children publicly
reflected in the collection of racial data.6' However, claims to differ-
ent racial ancestries are not socially symmetrical in effect.61 That is to
say, what the parents of biracial children may fail to perceive is that
while the political acknowledgement of White racial ancestry can be
beneficial to the individual child, it also unfortunately reinforces soci-
etal White supremacy when society places greater value on White an-
cestral connections than on non-White connections.62 "Whiteness is
an aspect of racial identity surely, but it is much more; it remains a
concept based on relations of power, a social construct predicated on
(1995) (footnote omitted). Another scholar critiques the color-blind theory along the
same lines:
The claim made by the proponents of colorblindness ultimately becomes an
argument about the worth of race relative to other categories of oppression.
Those who believe that colorblind policies will be effective are contending that
these other categories (class, income, age, status, etc.) are better measures of dis-
advantage than race. I would argue that this contention is generally not true. If
we eliminate poverty, we will not eliminate racism for the precise reason that
racism was not the focus of the attack. Indeed, we will not even eliminate the
intersections between race and class in such situations, because they are likely to
be resistant to purely class-based attacks.
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and the Intersectionality of Oppression: Policy
Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 162, 180 (1994).
57. Cf SPENCER, supra note 44, at 88 (stating that interracially married Whites are prob-
ably the persons behind the multiracial movement).
58. Mathews, supra note 42; accord LIsE FUNDERBURG, BLAcK, WHrrE, OTHER: BiRAcIAL
AMERICANS TALK ABOUT RACE AND IDENTITY 331 (1994) (commenting that a White mother
desired her biracial child to self-identify as White); Michael K. Frisby, Black, White, or Other,
EMERGE, Jan. 1996, at 48, available in 1996 WL 15657617 (explaining the views of a multira-
cial category proponent, Susan Graham, who is the White mother of a biracial child).
59. Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 160 (testimony of Maj. Marvin Arnold, Ph.D.).
60. See Allen, supra note 40, at 100 ("I want to suggest that typical parents-and indeed
all adults who take responsibility for children in typical western societies-want their chil-
dren either (1) to share much of their identities or, failing that, (2) to have an insider's
appreciation for their identities.").
61. See Gotanda, supra note 26, at 6 ("The socially constructed racial categories white
and Black are not equal in status.").
62. Cf id. ("[T]he classification white signifies 'uncontaminated' European ancestry
and corresponding racial purity.").
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white dominance and Black subordination."6 Thus, the symmetrical
identity demand can also function as a claim to having biracial chil-
dren inherit all of the privileges of White status, which White parents
logically would like to extend to their children as protection from ra-
cism against non-Whites. 6' In short, the insistence on symmetry in
racial categorization is color-blind in its refusal to acknowledge the
sociopolitical nature of race. 65
In demanding a separate mixed-race category, the MCM miscon-
strues race as solely a cultural identification. 66 Specifically, such a de-
mand presupposes that there are "pure-Black" experiences, which
make a person authentically Black, and inversely, that the lack of such
authenticating cultural experiences makes a person "less Black. 67
Part of what drives the push for a separate racial category is the desire
to reflect more accurately the cultural experiences of biracial Blacks
living in an interracial context.68 Although there may be a cultural
component to the identification of persons who have been socially
segregated into insular communities and who have a history of varied
cultural ties to different African countries and tribes, such cultural
manifestations are not uniform across the African diaspora.69 For in-
63. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709, 1761 (1993). "With
whiteness, as with American Express, membership has its privileges." K. Anthony Appiah,
The Multiculturalist Misunderstanding, N.Y. REV. BooKs, Oct. 9, 1997, at 30, 30.
64. See Haney L6pez, supra note 22, at 41 n.155 (avoiding condemnation of those who
"strive to envelop themselves and their loved ones in the protective mantle of Whiteness"
in this "violently racist society").
65. See infra notes 325-344.
66. A cultural approach to race refers to race as a community with "broadly shared
beliefs and social practices." Gotanda, supra note 26, at 4.
67. See Leonard M. Baynes, Who Is Black Enough For You? The Stories of One Black Man
and His Family's Pursuit of the American Dream, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 97, 128 (1996) (explain-
ing how the cultural experiences of Caribbean Blacks differ from other African Americans'
cultural experiences). The paradox of concerns with racial authenticity can best be high-
lighted with the following example: Jessye Norman is a Black opera singer who devotes her
creativity to a European art form and, as a consequence, may socialize primarily within
White communities; however, Ms. Norman's association with European culture cannot di-
minish her status as a Black woman.
68. The MCM concern is focused upon biracial persons living in bicultural, interracial
households rather than the larger community of mixed-race persons. Cf Ards, supra note
20 (referring to a study that indicates that 75% to 90% percent of African Americans are
biracial).
69. W.E.B. Du Bois's personal experiences reflect this lack of uniformity:
Living with my mother's people I absorbed their culture patterns and these
were not African so much as Dutch and New England. The speech was an idio-
matic New England tongue with no African dialect; the family customs were New
England, and the sex mores. My African racial feeling was then purely a matter of
my own later learning and reaction; my recoil from the assumptions of the whites;
my experience in the South at Fisk. But it was none the less real and a large
determinant of my life and character. I felt myself African by "race" and by that
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
stance, the cultural attributes of the insular Black community in New
York are not equivalent to the cultural attributes of insular Black com-
munities in Oaxaca, Mexico or in Loiza, Puerto Rico. The uniformity
of Black social identification throughout the Black diaspora is by vir-
tue of the fact that a Black person is viewed as distinct because of
appearance, ancestry, or both, 70 and not because of any commonality
in culture. 71 The OMB's recent decision allowing mixed-race persons
to be counted with a "check-all-that-apply" system of racial classifica-
tion 72 also mistakenly construes race as cultural identification. If race
were primarily a form of cultural identification, then an option to
check more than one box would be appropriate for those persons
reared within a mixed-cultural context. But race is a group-based ex-
perience of social differentiation that is not diminished by a diverse
ancestral heritage. Further, the OMB decision may result in the divi-
sion of a multiple-race response into shares;73 therefore, it is ill-suited
to a collection of race data for measuring social differentiation. 4
token was African and an integral member of the group of dark Americans who
were called Negroes.
W.E. BURGHARDT Du Bois, DUSK OF DAWN 115 (Transaction Pub. 1992) (1940).
70. Cf id. at 153 ("'But what is this group; and how do you differentiate it; and how can
you call it 'black' when you admit it is not black?' ... I recognize it quite easily and with full
legal sanction; the black man is a person who must ride 'Jim Crow' in Georgia."). This is
the sociopolitical meaning of race that Du Bois describes. See supra note 26 for a formal
definition of sociopolitical race.
71. The distinction between race-as-culture and race-as-politics minimizes the salience
of the observation that some multiracial families are thought to be living culturally within
"multiracial communities." Gotanda, supra note 26, at 4 (describing differences between
race-as-culture and status-race considerations of political hierarchy). Historically, most
mixed-race Blacks were commonly raised solely within the community of the Black parent
and in the absence of contact with White familial connections. Arguably, this phenome-
non occurred because family members were "disowned" by their White familial connec-
tions, while they were welcomed by Black family members. See FUNDERBURG, supra note 58,
at 25, 29, 60, 65-66 (comparing the experiences of mixed-race Blacks who were raised in
multiracial communities and those who were raised in Black neighborhoods with limited
exposure to their White heritage). Furthermore, locality-based social research can inquire
into the hypothesis that multiracial communities are developing. Given the important role
of the census in racial-data collection, see Part II.D, such an inquiry can be conducted
outside the framework of the decennial census. See Recommendations to OMB, supra note
7, at 36,940 (stating that when a population is concentrated in certain states, it may be
more advisable to collect data at a local level). But see Payson, supra note 34, at 1289 (advo-
cating the census as a forum for building a community of mixed-race persons).
72. Revisions to Directive No. 15, supra note 7, at 58,786.
73. See Vobejda, supra note 12 (noting that the 0MB has yet to decide how race data
will be tabulated under the new "check-all-that-apply" system, but that OMB officials have
stated "that the numbers would be published in such a way that people are not double
counted").
74. See Recommendations to OMB, supra note 7, at 36,874 (acknowledging that racial
categories were needed to monitor access to social and economic opportunities "for popu-
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The federal Interagency Committee and MCM concern with ra-
cial-cultural authenticity75 is not necessarily shared by all mixed-race
persons.76 Contrary to the MCM posture, the community of biracial
persons is not a monolith. There are a great number of biracial per-
sons whose racial identity is rooted in blackness because of the polit-
ical meaning of race in this society. The perspective of biracial
persons with respect to issues of racial identification in general, and
the presumed need for a multiracial category in particular, can vary
greatly from the perspective of monoracial parents. 77 For example,
when interviewed, one biracial person noted, "It took until I was
twenty for my mother to understand that I identified black. That was
lation groups that historically had experienced discrimination and differential treatment
because of their race or ethnicity"). One commentator noted:
My own suggestion would permit individuals to check as many boxes relevant to
race and ethnicity as seem relevant. Total or regional responses can be divided by
the actual number of people counted by the census. The resulting fractions will
help remind anyone using census information of its sources in self-identification
and of the roughness of its truths.
Minow, supra note 27, at 687. However, viewing the resulting fractions as deconstructing
the stigma of race overlooks the failure of similar classification schemes in other countries.
See infra notes 114-141 and accompanying text (analyzing the Latin American approach to
race and racial subordination).
75. See, e.g., Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 134 (statement of Carlos Fernindez,
President, Association of MultiEthnic Americans) (asserting that current classifications do
not truthfully identify mixed-race persons).
76. See, e.g., LISA JONES, BULLETPROOF DIVA: TALES OF RACE, SEX, AND HAIR 28, 53-66
(1994) (mixed-race author who identifies herself as Black expressing concern about the
desirability of a multiracial category); Deborah Waire Post, Reflections on Identity, Diversity,
and Morality, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY. THE CUTTING EDGE 419, 419-20 (Richard Delgado
ed., 1995) (mixed-race author affirms that "[m]y decision to identify myself as a black
person is not exclusively a matter of descent .... I prefer to believe that I am who I am, a
black woman, because I made an ethically and morally correct choice with respect to my
identity"); Janita Poe, Multiracial Category on Census Interests "Others," CHI. TRIB., July 11,
1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 3566909 ("[I]t's not going to solve the race issue. I think
it's much deeper than that." (quoting a mixed-race resident of Chicago who does not
agree that requiring a person to choose more than one racial category will assist people in
altering their racist preconceptions)). In fact, very few self-identified biracial persons at-
tended the first demonstration in Washington, D.C., scheduled by and for biracial persons
who aimed to call attention to the need for a multiracial census category. See Moscoso,
supra note 19 (reporting that thousands of biracial persons were expected to attend a July
20, 1996 demonstration but that only 200 mixed-race persons ended up attending).
77. See FUNDERBURG, supra note 58, at 27, 48, 320 (asserting that the experiences of
parents in defying racial conventions-e.g., by entering into interracial relationships-are
not parallel to those of biracial children navigating their identity in a racially stratified
society); see also Tanya Kateri HerAndez, The Interests and Rights of the Interracial Family in a
"Multiracial" Racial Classification, 36 U. LOUISVILLEJ. FAM. L. (forthcoming 1997) (manu-
script at 5-7) (arguing that biracial persons have less of an interest in the proposed multira-
cial category than do their monoracial parents). Although there are college organizations
that focus upon the concerns of biracial persons, they were curiously absent from the Mul-
tiracial Hearings.
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very hard for her. She looked at it as these were her kids, and so we
were Jewish and we were black .... It was very hard for her to under-
stand-that. ' '7' Although their number is overstated by the MCM, there
are biracial persons who favor a multiracial category to alleviate the
psychological pressure of living in a racially stratified society.
79
Notwithstanding the well-meaning desire to mitigate the pain of racial
bias, it should be noted that "monoracial" non-Whites share the same
desire to escape the burdens of being socially differentiated by virtue
of their race. The anguish experienced by targets of racial bias is not
a dynamic peculiar to the "culture" of mixed-race persons."° The view
of race as culturally based, like the MCM's inadvertent reification of
race as a biological construct,8 1 mistakenly essentializes the concept of
race, 2 thereby precluding honest assessments of the social and polit-
78. See FUNDERBURG, supra note 58, at 112 (interviewing Ren6-Marlene Rambo); accord
supra note 59.
79. Cf Payson, supra note 34, at 1288-90 (arguing that a multiracial category would
enable mixed-race persons to have an official racial identity in a society that places heavy
emphasis on racial categorizations).
80. See supra note 50.
81. The MCM proponents' demand for "accuracy" in racial classification systems reifies
the biological notion of race by presuming that the "mixture" of two pure races produces a
"mixed-race" person. Hickman, supra note 34, at 141-42. This Article does not subscribe to
the view that races are scientifically determined and thus contained in pure forms from
which mixtures then arise. A complete analysis of the sociological versus scientific views of
race can be found in K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMy GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS: THE POLIT-
ICAL MORALITY OF RACE (1996) and in Haney L6pez, supra note 22. Yet, the acknowledge-
ment that race is a social construct, rather than a biologically determined object, has been
viewed by some as a mandate to disregard the social meaning of race. See, e.g., Howard
Winant, Postmodern Racial Politics in the United States: Difference and Inequality, in THE POu-
TICS OF RACE 55, 62-65 (Theodore Rueter ed., 1995) (explaining that neoconservatives
believe that the finding that race is not scientific means that there is no rationale for dis-
cussing race anymore). Others vehemently reject this line of reasoning:
Race, then, is a kind of social fiction; popular misconceptions about genetics as-
sert a fictive biological basis for genetically arbitrary social groupings. And yet
these groupings do indeed have the status of fact: "race" may not be a meaning-
ful biological or genetic concept, but it certainly is a powerful political and social
construct. The Los Angeles cops who stopped Rodney King probably didn't muse
about scientific designations or social mythology before beating him bloody, nor
do such thoughts even fleetingly cross the minds of the legions of white women
who clutch their purses tighter when black men stand near them at crosswalks.
MAUREEN T. REDDY, CROSSING THE COLOR LINE: RACE, PARENTING, AND CULTURE 9 (1994).
Interestingly, the MCM approach to race mixture parallels that used by eugenicists in the
past to 'subordinate persons of color. See infra note 160.
82. The tendency to essentialize involves reducing a complex concept or set of traits to
one categorized experience. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theoy,
42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 585 (1990).
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ical meanings of race that are significant in shaping racial identity.83
This nation's history of racial oppression has particular salience in an
analysis of the MCM, especially given its dominance by Black-White,
mixed-race persons and their parents. 84 As Part II discusses below,
our nation's history of racial subordination has accorded whiteness a
property value in which the parents of biracial children often are un-
consciously deeply invested.85
II. THE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF MULTIRACIAL DISCOURSE
People are not, for example, terribly anxious to be equal
(equal, after all, to what and to whom?) but they love the
idea of being superior. And this human truth has an espe-
cially grinding force here, where identity is almost impossible
to achieve and people are perpetually attempting to find
their feet on the shifting sands of status.86
A. The Reaffirmation of the Value of Whiteness in Racial Hierarchy
In order to understand fully the ramifications of multiracial dis-
course upon the use of racial classifications in law, it is critical first to
examine the MCM proposal in the context of the existing racial hier-
archy. When societal benefits are distributed differentially within a
racial caste system, race takes on the quality of property rights.
87
Whiteness and approximations of whiteness will always be valued in a
society structured on a White/non-White racial continuum.8 Legal
commentators have noted that the White racial classification in the
United States in effect became a form of property right contingent
83. See Paul E. Peterson, A Politically Correct Solution to Racial Classification, in CLASSIFY-
ING BY RACE 3, 3 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 1995) ("Whether or not to classify by race is a
political, not a moral or ethical, question.").
84. See supra note 57.
85. JANE LAZARRE, BEYOND THE WHITENESS OF WHITENESS: MEMOIR OF A WHITE MOTHER
OF BLACK SONS 67, 79 (1996) (recognizing the desire of White parents to protect their
Black children from the effects that the children's appearance have upon racist persons in
society).
86. JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 88 (Vintage Int'l 1993) (1963).
87. See, e.g., Derrick Bell, Property Rights in Whiteness: Their Legal Legacy, Their Economic
Costs, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY- THE CUTrITNG EDGE 75, 81 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995)
(discussing the historical argument for a property right in whiteness); Harris, supra note
63, at 1734-35 (discussing how privileged rights in property were based on race and af-
forded only to Whites, thereby making "whiteness" a thing of value).
88. Although this Article deploys the legal history of Black-White race relations to ana-
lyze the White privilege aspects of the MCM, its assessment of racial subordination is more
expansive. See Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and the Constitution: Beyond the Black and White Binary
Constitution, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 571, 573 (1995) (emphasizing the importance of ra-
cially diverse perspectives in legal analysis).
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upon the White racial label.8" This is reflected in the fact that being
regarded as White is an object of significant value. Indeed, whiteness
continues to be so significantly valued that individuals have in recent
years expended great sums of money by litigating their individual
claims to whiteness,9" by trying to keep non-White corpses out of
White cemeteries, 1 and by seeking compensation for the perceived
harm of having Black babies.92 For much of our nation's history,
White status was a necessary condition for citizenship and naturaliza-
89. One commentator outlines how this property right developed:
Following the period of slavery and conquest, white identity became the basis of
racialized privilege that was ratified and legitimated in law as a type of status prop-
erty. After legalized segregation was overturned, whiteness as property evolved
into a more modern form through the law's ratification of the settled expecta-
tions of relative white privilege as a legitimate and natural baseline.
Harris, supra note 63, at 1714; accord Derrick Bell, Xerces and the Affirmative Action Myth, 57
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1595, 1602, 1608 (1989) (observing that affirmative action policies are
seen as a threat to the "property interests of identifiable whites").
90. An example of the significance that individuals place upon official racial classifica-
tions is that of a family who always lived as and considered themselves to be White. Six
family members attempted to reclassify themselves as White when they discovered that the
Louisiana State Office of Vital Statistics had classified their parents as Black. Doe v. State,
479 So. 2d 369, 371 (La. Ct. App. 1985); Raymond T. Diamond & RobertJ. Cottrol, Codify-
ing Caste: Louisiana's Racial Classification Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 Loy. L.
REv. 255, 256 (1983) (explaining that Doe demonstrates how racial caste informs the defini-
tions of Black and White); cf Derrick Bell, Racial Libel as American Ritual, 36 WASHBURN LJ.
1, 1 (1996) (stating that "[t]oday, racial defamation continues its oppressive role" by pub-
licly depicting Blacks as subordinate); Harris, supra note 63, at 1735 ("The direct manifes-
tation of the law's legitimation of whiteness as reputation is revealed in the well-established
doctrine that to call a white person 'Black' is to defame her."). Plessy v. Ferguson can also be
viewed as a lawsuit concerning a claim to whiteness. In Pessy, Homer Adolph Plessy as-
serted that the refusal to seat him in a White passenger car interfered with his reputation
as a White individual. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896), overruled by Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); cf CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-
HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 152-73 (1987) (analyzing the Plessy case in the context of re-
strictive and affirmative rights arguments); Bell, supra note 87, at 81 (pointing to Plessy's
argument that whiteness is a property right).
91. See DOMiNGUEZ, supra note 35, at 155-57 ("The idea that polluted blood contami-
nates matter is, however, nowhere more evident than in burial practices.... In this sense,
burial is the ultimate expression of the boundaries of social categories and of the special
importance accorded to the purity or impurity of one's blood."); Rick Bragg, Just a Grave
for a Baby, But Anguish for a Town, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1996, at A14, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Nyt File (reporting that upon learning that a buried infant had a Black
father, Georgia Baptist deacons attempted to have the baby's body exhumed from the
church's exclusively White graveyard).
92. See Ronald Sullivan, Sperm Mix-up Lawsuit Is Settled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1991, at B4,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (reporting that a White mother was awarded
approximately $400,000 in an out-of-court settlement for harm suffered as a result of in-
semination with the sperm of a Black man instead of the sperm from her White husband).
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tion.93 In addition, White, female U.S. citizens were automatically
divested of their citizenship upon marriage to a racially barred
applicant.94
Social standing continues to be a significant benefit of whiteness,
regardless of one's socioeconomic level. 5 Whites have been "given
public deference and titles of courtesy because they... [are] white."96
After controlling for differences in education and job training, Whites
continue to earn higher wages than Blacks.97 From an institutional
perspective, the supremacy accorded White status in a racial hierarchy
also benefits industry by defusing class tensions amongst Whites. 98
W.E.B. Du Bois observed seventy years ago that "the white group of
laborers, while they received a low wage, were compensated in part by
a sort of public and psychological wage."99 Movements for formal ra-
93. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1856) (holding that free
Blacks whose ancestors were enslaved could not be considered citizens for federal constitu-
tional protection purposes).
94. Haney L6pez, supra note 22, at 15.
95. See Harris, supra note 63, at 1758-59 ("The wages of whiteness are available to all
whites regardless of class position, even to those whites who are without power, money, or
influence.").
96. W.E.B. Du Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 700 (1935). Adrian Piper, a
self-identified Black woman whose phenotype appears White, notes:
A benefit and a disadvantage of looking white is that most people treat you as
though you were white. And so, because of how you've been treated, you come to
expect this sort of treatment, not perhaps, realizing that you're being treated this
way because people think you're white, but rather falsely supposing that you're
being treated this way because people think you are a valuable person. So, for
example, you come to expect a certain level of respect, a certain degree of atten-
tion to your voice and opinions, certain liberties of action and self-expression to
which you falsely suppose yourself to be entitled because your voice, your opin-
ion, and your conduct are valuable in themselves.
Adrian Piper, Passing for White, Passing for Black, 58 TRANSrION 4, 25 (1992).
97. See Derek A. Neal & William R. Johnson, The Role of Premarket Factors in Black-White
Wage Differences, 104J. POL. ECON. 869, 891 (1996) ("After decades of narrowing, the unad-
justed black-white wage gap has either widened or failed to shrink further since 1980."); see
also MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PER-
SPECrIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 85 & tbl.4.4 (1995) (stating that Blacks lag behind Whites
in both income and wealth).
98. See Harris, supra note 63, at 1760 (noting that members of the White working class
will overlook their own oppression by privileged Whites, because members of the White
working class are nevertheless afforded "a host of public, private, and psychological bene-
fits" solely because they are White).
99. Du Bois, supra note 96, at 700; accord DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS
13 (1991) (discussing how the racial privileges conferred by whiteness can motivate
subordinated and exploited Whites to overlook the reality that they are exploited by other
Whites); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Remediation: An Historical Perspective on Current Condi-
tions, 52 NOTRE DAME LAw. 5, 18 (1976) ("[T] he creation of a black subclass enabled poor
whites to identify with and support the policies of the [white] upper class.").
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cial equality have done little to diminish this hierarchy.' In fact,
even as standards of legal equality have been erected, the intangible
object of whiteness has continued to be valued."0 Thus, the ability of
Whites not to think of themselves in racial terms at all is another bene-
fit of whiteness, in that whiteness is cognitively viewed as the norm and
hence not a race. 102 This is, in effect, another benefit that multiracial-
category proponents logically want to pass on to their children-the
leisure of not having to think about race at all.10 3
Given this ongoing privilege of White racial status, it is important
to examine the role that a mixed-race census count would have in
reinforcing the estimation of whiteness. To be sure, the value placed
on whiteness is not one which exists in a vacuum. Rather, it is an
intrinsic part of an institutional racial hierarchy in which the closer
one can approximate whiteness, the better off one is economically
and socially. 104 This racial hierarchy, which denigrates all connec-
tions to blackness in order to maintain the White ideal,0 5 evidences
100. Although Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), reversed the doctrine of
"separate but equal," id. at 488, it did not address the ways in which systems of White
privilege could be undone. "In accepting substantial inequality as a neutral base line, a
new form of whiteness as property was condoned. Material inequities between Blacks and
whites-the product of systematic past and current, formal and informal, mechanisms of
racial subordination-became the norm." Harris, supra note 63, at 1753.
101. In a study that asked White students how much money would adequately compen-
sate them if they were changed from White to Black, most respondents indicated that $50
million over a person's lifetime or $1 million per year might be adequate compensation.
See ANDREW HACKER, Two NATIONS 32 (1992). Furthermore, the ongoing value of white-
ness has encouraged persons who could assume a White identity to do so in order to ad-
vance in their professional careers. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., White Like Me, NEW YORKER,
June 17, 1996, at 66, 66 (attributing to professional "pragmatism" the esteemed Black New
York Times book reviewer Anatole Broyard's assumption of a White identity throughout his
life).
102. See Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See". White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatoy Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 957 (1993) ("I call this the trans-
parency phenomenon: the tendency of whites not to think about whiteness, or about
norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that are white-specific. Transparency often
is the mechanism through which white decisionmakers who disavow white supremacy im-
pose white norms on blacks." (emphasis omitted)); cf H. HOETINK, CARIBBEAN RACE RELA-
TIONS: A STUDY OF Two VARIANTS 120-26 (Eva M. Hooykaas trans., Oxford Univ. Press
1967) (1962) (discussing society's "somatic norm image"-those White physical character-
istics accepted as the society's norm and ideal).
103. See Spencer, supra note 38 (discussing "multiracial advocates' stated goal of Ameri-
can nonracialism").
104. Harris, supra note 63, at 1713.
105. Id. at 1710-12 (describing the life of a Black woman who tried to hide all indica-
tions of her true identity). Even the term "denigrate" stems from the Latin root
"denigrare," which means to blacken. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DIC IONARY 308
(10th ed. 1996).
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itself perhaps most starkly in the selection of adoptive children. 10 6 In
the adoptions market, White babies are highly prized, followed by
mixed-race babies, with Black babies the least preferred.'0 7 History
demonstrates that, in such a racial hierarchy, those who are mixed-
race will logically assert their White ancestry, while downplaying their
African ancestry, in order to further themselves in the social structure
and flee repression.10 8 Similarly, White parents will seize opportuni-
ties to extend their privilege of whiteness to non-White persons they
care about.10 9
This complicates the MCM assertion that the unique life exper-
iences of mixed-race persons alone justify a separate racial classifica-
tion.1"0 For instance, one White mother of mixed-race children has
106. SeeJan Breslauer, Hues and Cries, L.A. TiMEs, July 7, 1991, at 3, available in 1991 WL
2261294 (discussing color as an important issue in the world of adoption)..
107. See id. (setting forth the order of preference for adopted children as evidence that
the issue of race is salient). The order of preference in adoption is not a simple reflection
of the preference adoptive parents have for children who look like them, because the same
racial order of preference also exists in the transracial adoption context. Perry, supra note
15, at 102-04.
108. See FRANrZ FANON, BLACK SaN, WHITE MASKS 18, 54, 81-82 (Charles Lam
Markmann trans., Grove Press 1967) (1952) (discussing the efforts of persons of African
ancestry to elevate themselves to the level of Whites); cf CARL N. DEGLER, NErTHER BLACK
NOR WHITE: SLAVERY AND RACE RELATIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES 103 (1971)
(discussing the gradations of color and the higher ranking of value attached to those clos-
est to White).
109. See FUNDERBURG, supra note 58, at 326 (interviewing a person who concedes: "I
know a lot of my privilege has come from my white father. A lot of my privilege.... I can't
ignore it because I have had so many benefits from that. And I'm talking institutionally.").
James W. Gordon has theorized that Justice Harlan had a Black half-brother who inspired
his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. James W. Gordon, Did the First Justice Harlan Have a Black
Brother?, in CarIcAL RACE THEORY. THE CUTrINc EDGE 122, 122-23, 137 (Richard Delgado
ed., 1995). Thus, one could viewJustice Harlan's concern for color-blindness as stemming
from his desire to assist a family member to access privileges which he would have other-
wise been allocated but for his mixed-race status. Consistent with this hypothesis of White
families having a concern for the civil rights of mixed-race family members specifically,
rather than an interest in the general proposition of social equality, is the observation that
Justice Harlan's concern with the legal equality of Blacks did not extend to other similarly
situated non-Whites such as the Chinese. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Plessy Myth: Justice
Harlan and the Chinese Cases, 82 IowA L. REV. 151, 156 (1996).
110. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. Although there may be instances in
which the way Black-White mixed-race persons experience racism varies from that exper-
ienced by "pure" Blacks, it should be noted that the racism mixed-race persons experience
flows from their connection to blackness, as opposed to their mixed-race status. See, e.g.,
FUNDERBURG, supra note 58, at 44 (interviewing a biracial person who noted: "maybe I'm
half-white, but people look at me and don't think that.... We're discriminated against-
whether people think I'm Spanish or mixed or black-we're both discriminated against
because of what we look like."); Post, supra note 76, at 420 (reporting that a White mother
encouraged her Black-White biracial child to embrace both White and Black ancestries
and that the child learned the meaning behind asserting Black sociopolitical identity when
called a racially derogatory epithet for the first time). Accordingly, the choice of many
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related the desire to impart to her son the privilege of walking about
the world without being concerned that others will find him racially
threatening and thereby presume him criminal. 1 ' Some White par-
ents are quite forthright about the impulse to preserve this access for
their children:
biracial persons to identify as Black is connected to their direct experiences with racism as
Blacks, as opposed to a blind adherence to the rule of hypo-descent-also known as the
One Drop Rule-in which persons with any Black ancestry are deemed Black. See DAVIS,
supra note 41, at 5. Even those biracial persons who wish to eschew racial categories alto-
gether are also exposed to racism based on their connections to blackness rather than
their mixed-race heritage. See Richard Sandomir, Zoeller Learns Race Remarks Carry a Price,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 1997, at B9, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (reporting that
when the Black-Asian mixed-race golfer Tiger Woods won the Masters in 1997, a fellow
golfer, Fuzzy Zoeller, urged Woods not to request collard greens and fried chicken at the
next year's Champions Dinner).
Similarly, the experiences of racism that middle-class minorities and light-skinned mi-
norities undergo may vary from those of racial minorities who are indigent or dark-
skinned, but the diversity of their experiences does not negate the central source of racism:
animosity against connections to blackness, which are viewed as inferior. See ELLIS COSE,
THE RAGE OF THE PRIVILEGED CLASS 4 (HarperPerennial 1995) (1993). A comparison to
the lack of hostility against persons with mixed ethnic backgrounds, such as WASP-Irish or
WASP-Jewish individuals, bears out the hostility targeted against Black-White mixed-race
persons, because Black-White mixed-race persons are connected with blackness as opposed
to simply being mixed-race:
But there are also crucial distinctions between a Jewish woman becoming
part of an Italian family, an Irish man marrying into a Jewish one, even a white
American of any ethnicity marrying a Nigerian or Jamaican, and a white Ameri-
can marrying an African American. It is a function of racism, the special white
American fear and suspicion of American Blacks ....
[AzARRE, supra note 85, at 45.
Furthermore, the MCM observation that sometimes mixed-race persons are given an
aloof reception by monoracial persons does notjustify having mixed-race persons specially
counted. MCM's reliance upon this observation as a rationale conflates the dynamic of
prejudice (i.e., prejudgments that are based upon arbitrary factors) with that of discrimina-
tion (i.e., denials by an empowered elite, to which Blacks do not belong, of tangible rights
or opportunities). In fact, the prejudgments that Blacks have been said to make about
biracial persons are often reactions to the perceived biracial assertion of an "honorary
White" privilege in a racial caste system, rather than a mixed-race-based prejudice against
biracial persons:
Black[s] reject[] ... "mixed race" students, but this happens... when they insist
on being "mixed"-the white part seemingly offered as a sign of superiority. "If
you consider yourself Black, whatever else you might be ethnically .... it doesn't
matter to anyone what other mixtures you have inside of you."
Id. at 63 (quoting a biracial son) (emphasis added).
111. See REDDY, supra note 81, at ix (suggesting that a black child must "keep his hands
out of his pockets when he is in stores.., lest he be seen as a shoplifter" and "learn how to
talk to the police who will surely stop him when he is out riding his bike"). Black parents
are also concerned about their children being presumed criminal based upon their race.
See, e.g., Deborah Waire Post, Race, Riots and the Rule of Law, 70 DENY. U. L. REv. 237, 238-39
(1993) (expressing concern that her son will be presumed criminal).
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I came to understand, for example, that I had better make
myself highly visible to their mostly white teachers hoping to
mitigate their opinions about Black children being uncared
for and unruly. When the teachers saw a white, middle-class
mother, I incurred the privileges of caste and class many
whites regularly and unconsciously enjoy.112
Color-blind platforms for such protective efforts permit concerned
White parents to extend the supremacist system privilege to those who
are viewed as "practically-all-White" without actually dismantling the
racial hierarchy itself.
Accordingly, the demand for statistical recognition of mixed-race
persons-and acknowledgement of all aspects of an individual's racial
identity-is occurring within a sociopolitical context that values White
ancestry and denigrates non-White ancestry. In such a racial caste sys-
tem, it is impossible to acknowledge mixed-race persons officially with-
out actually elevating the status of those who can claim to be other
than "pure" Black, no matter how egalitarian the intent of the
MCM.113 This same elevation of mixed-race classes is evident in vari-
ous Latin American countries and in apartheid South Africa in ways
that powerfully illuminate the implications of furthering multiracial
discourse in the United States.
114
B. The Dissociation of a Racially Subordinated
Buffer Class from Equality Efforts
In those Latin American countries such as Brazil, Cuba, Colom-
bia, Panama, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, where sizable communities of
Blacks reside, 15 and where Whites are a numerical minority, a favored
112. LAzARRE, supra note 85, at 47.
113. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
114. Although South Africa and Latin America are used in this Article as illustrations,
this phenomenon is not particular to those societies. For reasons which shall be explored
in Part II.B of this Article, mixed-race categories have been recognized by law in other
countries at different points in history. See, e.g., DEGLER, supra note 108, at 239-40 (noting
that early eighteenth-century Jamaican law allocated a special place for Mulattoes);
Timothy M. Phelps, Shades of Black: Haiti's Class Rank is Skin Deep, NEWSDAY, Oct. 3, 1994, at
A17, available in LEXIS, News Library, Newsdy File ("[H]ere [in Haiti], as in South Africa
until recently, the degree of a person's blackness often determines a person's status.").
115. This is in contrast to those Latin American countries, such as Mexico, Peru, and
Ecuador, where indigenous persons are a majority of the population of color, and persons
of African ancestry are fewer in number. Yet, it should also be noted that the Black minori-
ties in such countries are also denigrated. See LESLIE B. RoUT, JR., THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
IN SPANISH AMERICA: 1502 TO THE PRESENT DAY 185-226 (1977) (examining the Black expe-
rience in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador); Calvin Sims,
For Blacks in Peru, There's No Room at the Top, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1996, at Al, available in
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"Mulatto" 116 class has long been recognized as distinct from the
subordinate Black population.' 17 Historian Carl Degler has termed
this phenomenon as the "mulatto escape hatch," which he defines as
the "recognition of a special place for mixed bloods."'1 8 Mulattoes
are accorded greater favors than Blacks, but fewer privileges than the
numerical minority of empowered Whites: "The top jobs in business,
politics and academia are held by those with light skin.... Studies
show that blacks are poorer, less educated and less respected than
whites and mulattoes.""' 9 In turn, the greater opportunities available
to Mulattoes encourage them to dissociate themselves from their Afri-
can ancestry.1 20 Similar to lower class Whites in the United States,
Mulattoes in much of Latin America act as a buffer class between elite
Whites and economically exploited Blacks. 121  This buffer effectively
maintains a system of White supremacy. 122 It is this temptation to dis-
LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (describing Peruvian Blacks' discontent with their menial
jobs).
116. Although the use of the word "Mulatto" to describe mixed-race persons has a de-
rogative etymology, it is used in this Article to reflect accurately the terminology used for
mixed-race persons in Latin America and in the United States during certain historical
periods to be discussed herein. SeeJACK D. FORBES, BLACK AFRICANS AND NATIVE-AMERICANS
131-50 (1988) (explaining that the word "Mulatto" became equivalent to the word "hybrid"
in the sixteenth century and that "Mulatto" historically implied such traits as immorality,
inferior physical status, and subservience commonly associated with mules as laboring
animals).
117. Although the Mulatto racial class is distinct in much of Latin America, most schol-
arship has concentrated on the case example of Brazil, which has the largest Black popula-
tion outside of the African continent. Sabrina Gledhill, The Latin Model of Race Relations, in
CARLOS MOORE, CASTRO, THE BLACKS, AND AFRICA app. 1, at 355 (1988) (explaining that
the Latin American model of race relations is structured upon recognition of a Mulatto
class and the premise that miscegenation will solve racial problems); cf Peggy A. Lovell,
Race, Gender, and Devel*pment in Brazil 3 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 7, 7 (1994) ("Brazil is home to
the world's largest population of African descent except for Nigeria."); David L. Marcus,
Melting Pot Coming to a Boil: Brazilians Blur Color Lines, but Racism Stands out Clearly, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 16, 1994, at IA, available in 1994 WL 6103958 (reporting that about
half of Brazil's population is comprised of people with African blood).
118. DEGLER, supra note 108, at 245.
119. Marcus, supra note 117.
120. See id. ("[D]ark-skinned Brazilians are reluctant to call themselves black. To many
blacks the goal is to be 'promoted' out of being black, to join the mainstream."); cf
Anthony W. Marx, Contested Citizenship: The Dynamics of Racial Identity and Social Movements,
reprinted in Supp. 3 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF Soc. HISTORY, CITIZENSHIP, IDENTrIY, AND
SOCIAL HISTORY 159, 177-79 (Charles Tilly ed., 1996) (maintaining that the Brazilian state's
propagation of an image of racially inclusive citizenship hinders racial identity formation
for social mobilization despite the existence of inequality).
121. See infra notes 162-172 and accompanying text.
122. White supremacy is literally the view that Whites and whiteness are supreme to all
else within legal and social structures. See generally Kimber6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Re-
form, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv.
L. REV. 1331 (1988) (discussing the hegemony of White supremacy). More expansively,
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sociate from racial subordination that concerns many about a mixed-
race census count.
1 23
Although mixed-race persons in these societies have been af-
forded greater opportunities, it should be noted that the construction
of a middle-tier racial group is distinct from the phenomenon of
"passing." Passing refers to an individual's "decision" to rely upon his
or her light skin and European features in order to assume the life
and privilege of a White person secretly.124 In contrast, the institu-
tionalization of middle-tier racial categories publicly sanctions entire
groups of persons to access greater opportunities over a subordinate
class of Blacks, while the full panoply of privileges available to Whites
is held out of reach. 12  In racial structures such as those traditionally
existing in the United States, 12 6 passing will be one of the only mecha-
nisms for a qualifying individual to gain full entrance into the world of
the term refers to the system of beliefs that creates and reinforces the existing economic,
political, and social structures' ranking of whiteness as supreme "and [that]convinces the
dominated classes that the existing order is inevitable." Id. at 1351.
123. Arthur A. Fletcher, Chairperson of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, observed:
I can see a whole host of light-skinned Black Americans running for the door the
minute they have another choice. And it won't necessarily be because their im-
mediate parents are Black, White, or whatever, but all of a sudden they have a way
of saying-in this discriminatory culture of ours, they have another way of saying,
"I am something other than Black."
Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 273 (testimony of Arthur A. Fletcher, Chairperson,
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights).
124. See Harris, supra note 63, at 1710 (describing a Black Chicago woman's presenta-
tion of herself as a White woman); cf. HOETINK, supra note 102, at 116, 120 (arguing that
phenotypes closer to whiteness-"the somatic norm image"-increase the number of avail-
able economic and social opportunities). Passing can sometimes be viewed as an involun-
tary decision, in that systems of racial oppression and economic exploitation have often
given passing an "economic logic." Harris, supra note 63, at 1713; accord Melissa Nobles,
"Responding with Good Sense": The Politics of Race and Censuses in Contemporary Brazil
54, 118-19, 192-93 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) ("Brazilians
don't identify as 'blacks' [not] because there is no racism or because they don't know that
they are 'black.' To the contrary, Brazilians do not identify as 'black' mostly because it
defies reason to do so.").
Although this working definition of passing is grounded in the context of Black-White
racial hierarchies, it should be noted that passing has also been a concern for communities
ofJews, as well as gay and lesbian persons, in their attempts to mobilize "assimilated" mem-
bers of their communities. John 0. Calmore, Random Notes of an Integration Warrior, 81
MINN. L. REv. 1441, 1467-68 (1997) (noting that the passing of Jews for White comes at
'substantial psychic costs and loss of identity"); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection
Analogies: Identity and "Passing". Race and Sexual Orientation, 13 HARV. BLAcKLEIER L.J. 65,
67 (1997) (stating that passing is prevalent in gay, lesbian, and bisexual communities); cf 3
ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 770-83 (1996) (detailing the Jewish community's historical con-
cern with assimilation).
125. See infra notes 143-146 and accompanying text.
126. See DOMiNGUEZ, supra note 35, at 121-22 (delineating regions within the contiguous
United States that used alternate racial structures).
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White privilege. 2 7 In racial structures with middle-tier categories,
however, even those who are not light enough to pass for White have a
second option for accessing enhanced economic mobility as a mem-
ber of a buffer class.1 2
8
The censuses in countries with middle-tier racial categories re-
flects the distinct racial structure12 9 and demographic pattern of small
White populations with large Black populations. ° In Brazil, for ex-
ample, in the last four census schedules that included questions re-
garding color, race, or both, the color terms used ranged from White,
Yellow, Brown, and Black." 1 Although the Brazilian census schedules
used the term "color" categories, the color categories utilized corre-
sponded directly with racial categories. 3 2 The Yellow category repre-
sented the inclusion of citizens of Asian descent in Brazil's
population,'33 while "Black" represented persons with African ances-
try, and "Brown" represented persons with mixed Black and White
ancestry.134  The Brown category is somewhat akin to the current
127. See Harris, supra note 63, at 1765 ("Under the operative racial hierarchy, passing is
the ultimate assimilationist move-the submergence of a subordinate cultural identity in
favor of dominant identity, assumed to achieve better societal fit within prevailing
norms."); Gates, supra note 101, at 66 (providing a modern example of passing by high-
ranking Black New York Times book reviewer Anatole Broyard, who felt compelled to main-
tain his assumed White identity until death).
128. See Tanya Kateri Hemndez, The Construction of Race and Class Buffers in the Structure
of Immigration Controls and Laws, 76 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 4-5)
(describing the middle-tier communities' "greater access to economic opportunity than
the masses of the lower class").
129. In Brazil, the fluctuating omission of color and racial census categories has been
viewed as "another instrument of social control... [because] [t]he reality of race relations
is masked, and any information that Blacks could use in their struggle for social justice is
withheld." ABDIAS DO NASCIMENTO, BRAZIL: MIXTURE OR MASSACRE? ESSAYS IN THE GENO-
CIDE OF A BLACK PEOPLE 80 (Elisa Larkin Nascimento trans., 2d ed. 1989) (1979). The first
Black Senator in Colombia's entire history has noted that because few racially categorized
statistics were aggregated, "[ffor a long time, no one wanted to admit there was racial
discrimination in Colombia, [or] that there were even any blacks to discriminate against."
Karen De Witt, Black Unity Finds Voice in Colombia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1995, at A5, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (internal quotation marks omitted). The census sched-
ules in Venezuela, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic have omitted race, color, or
ethnic origin questions. DOREEN S. GOYER & ELIANE DOMSCHKE, THE HANDBOOK OF NA-
TIONAL POPULATION CENSUSES: LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, NORTH AMERICA, AND
OCEANIA 132, 158, 350 (1983).
130. See MARVIN HARRIS, PATTERNS OF RACE IN THE AMERICAS 128-31 (1964) (providing
maps of Black and White demographic patterns in North and South America).
131. Marvin Harris et al., Who Are the Whites?: Imposed Census Categories and the Racial
Demography of Brazil, 72 Soc. FORCES 451, 453 (1993).
132. The only explicit "racial" category on the 1991 Brazilian census was the "Indige-
nous" category for Brazil's native populations. Nobles, supra note 124, at 88-89 tbl.3.1.
133. Id. at 101.
134. Harris et al., supra note 131, at 453.
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United States proposal for a multiracial category in that it is viewed as
an umbrella for counting the many different shades of mixed persons
within the Brazilian population. In fact, the number of shades in-
cluded within the Brown category is extensive. 35 In the 1976 Brazil-
ian census, a supplementary household survey included an open-
ended color question. Respondents described themselves with 136
different colors.'
36
Ironically enough, after decades of utilizing mixed-race catego-
ries, the 1991 Brazilian census was subject to a campaign for the elimi-
nation of the Brown mixed-race color category in favor of a specific
African-ancestry race question.' 3 7 Although the request to eliminate
the mixed-race category did not prevail, the organizers also mounted
a publicity campaign to encourage respondents to move away from
the mixed-race category by checking the Black category instead."3 8
This campaign was entitled "Don't Let Your Color Pass into White:
Respond with Good Sense."' 39 The campaign was motivated by the
concern that Brazilians often lie about their color by selecting a
lighter color because they are embarrassed to have African origins.'4 °
The campaign for greater numbers of persons to accurately check the
Black category was mounted to produce more reliable socioeconomic
data on Blacks and thereby assist in mobilizing a racial justice move-
ment.' 4 ' This is the insidious aspect of middle-tier categories-the
135. Nobles, supra note 124, at 118-19.
136. Id. at 54, 118-19.
137. Id. at 16, 152-53.
138. See id. at I (describing a campaign that "urged Brazilians to self-select a 'darker'
color on their census schedules").
139. Id.
140. Harris et al., supra note 131, at 452-53 (stating that Brazilians identified as "pretos"
or "negros" are subject to strong negative stereotypes, and that some dark Brazilians conse-
quently "identify themselves ... by terms that connote less resemblance to preto types").
141. Nobles, supra note 124, at 150-51. In addition, the campaign also hoped to address
the decreasing numbers of Blacks being counted in the population despite the significant
physical presence of Black majorities. Id. at 179-80. The 1991 census results reflect a slight
increase in the number of Brazilians using the Brown category in comparison to the 1980
census numbers, and a slight decrease in the numbers using the White category. The
Black category maintained roughly the same numbers. Informa46es Estatisticas e Geocien-
tificas, Censo Demografico de 1991 (visited Nov. 17, 1997) <http://www.ibge.org/in-
formacoes/censodem/censo.htm>. Although the quantitative measures of the campaign's
success were negligible, the campaign proponents have claimed a victory in having the
Brazilian census officials publicly state that they will rethink the color categories for the
2000 census to reflect more accurately the numbers of persons of African ancestry. Tele-
phone Interview with Melissa Nobles, Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology (Nov. 6, 1997); cf. Matt Moffett, Seeking Equality: A Racial "Democracy"Begins
Painful Debate on Affirmative Action, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL-
WSJ 3113407 (reporting on the Black-student-led Committee in Favor of Quotas for fed-
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detachment of subordinated persons from concern with racial justice
out of a psychological sense of superiority, notwithstanding their own
consistent experiences of discrimination and prejudice. Middle-tier
census categories in racially stratified societies thus present an inher-
ent threat to racial justice efforts. Merely checking the box has a polit-
ical effect, despite the fact that an individual's phenotype will
continue to determine her daily experiences of racism. This problem
is further exacerbated when Whites feel pressure to accord tangible
benefits to those occupying the middle tier, as occurred in apartheid
South Africa.
Similar to the Brazilian White minority's use of the mixed-race
Brown color category, apartheid South Africa's White minority uti-
lized a middle-tier category for mixed-race persons known as "Col-
oured." The four South African census classifications have
traditionally been White, Bantu (Black Africans), Coloured, and Asi-
atic (East Indians).142 The South African government historically ac-
corded Coloureds greater material advantages than Bantus, such as
higher wages,143 access to employment positions of higher status,
144
and admission to White universities. 145 However, Coloureds received
fewer material benefits than Whites.1 46 Accordingly, a stratified value
system accompanied the racial hierarchy. 147 The Coloureds internal-
ized notions of the racial hierarchy, i.e., that lighter-skinned
Coloureds were presumed to be smarter than darker-skinned
Coloureds. 14  Similar to the Brazilian and United States experience
of racial hierarchy, lighter-skinned South African Coloureds often
passed into the White community with greater access to employment
eral university admissions and the 1996 federal government commission to draft a plan for
Afro-Brazilian compensatory policies).
142. See Sheila T.L. Van der Horst, The Effects of Industrialisation on Race Relations in South
Africa, in INDUSTRIALISATION AND RACE RELATIONS: A SyMposiuM 97, 99-100 (Guy Hunter
ed., 1965).
143. Id. at 122-23.
144. Id. at 131-32.
145. SeeJIM HOAGLAND, SOUTH AFRICA: CIviLIZATIONS IN CONFLICT 105 (1972) (discuss-
ing Coloureds' admission to the White, English-speaking University of Cape Town).
146. See GAIL GERHART, BLACK POWER IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE EVOLuTION OF AN IDEOLOGY
75 (1978) (describing the allocation of different places in social and economic structures
for every racial group); HOAGLAND, supra note 145, at 111 (finding that Coloureds are
resentful about the social and political restrictions they face); Christopher A. Ford, Ad-
ministering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1231,
1277 (1994) (finding that South African benefit-allocation was strongly tied to racial
classification).
147. See Van der Horst, supra note 142, at 123 (finding that the Coloured person in
South African society was considered "a socially and intellectually inferior being" as com-
pared to Whites, and that Bantus were the most inferior of all).
148. HOAGLAND, supra note 145, at 109.
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and educational opportunities.'49 As long as the Coloureds were re-
ceiving these material gains, there generally prevailed among them an
acquiescence to apartheid. 5 ' It was not until the apartheid system
began to deny Coloureds their intermediary-status privileges that they
became interested, as a group, in aligning themselves with the Bantus
and the East Indians. This helped to successfully undermine the foun-
dation of the apartheid system.15 1
The South African departure from the privileging of middle-tier
Coloureds was directly connected to the purposeful increase in the
size of the White population. 52 The 1970 census showed that the in-
crease in the Coloured population was almost double that of the in-
crease in the White population, and demographic projections
indicated that by the end of the century, there would be as many
Coloureds as Whites in South Africa.' 53 Following the release of these
demographic projections, there was a relaxation of immigration con-
trols for White European workers, which, in turn, allowed South Af-
rica to increase its White population.1 54 The transformation of Whites
into a numerical majority, and the use of White working-class immi-
grants as a new middle-tier community, diminished the need to favor
149. See Van der Horst, supra note 142, at 126 ("The increase in the range ofjobs in the
industrial economy, together with colour bars in employment and the improvement in the
educational standard of the Coloured people have increased both the incentive and the
capacity of people of mixed racial origin to 'pass' as whites .... ."); see also Ford, supra note
146, at 1277 ("In such a system it was not uncommon for many individuals to wish to
challenge the classification they had been assigned. For example, a 'coloured person'
could enjoy greater benefits if he could be reclassified as a 'white person.'").
150. See GERHART, supra note 146, at 277-84 (reporting that Coloureds did not mobilize
against apartheid as long as they were enjoying greater incomes and legal rights as an
intermediate group separate from Bantus); HOAGLAND, supra note 145, at 110 (finding that
Coloureds were in a "firm alliance with the white man").
151. See ROBERT FATrONJR., BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOUTH AFRICA: THE DLMECTS OF
IDEOLOGICAL RESISTANCE TO WHITE SuPREMACY 67, 158 & n.12 (1986) (maintaining that the
inclusion of Coloureds within the Black identity was instrumental to the success of the
Black Consciousness movement); LEO KUPER, AN AFRICAN BOURGEOISIE: RACE, CLASS, AND
PoLrrlCs IN SOUTH AFICA 49 (1965) (noting that persons traditionally classified as
Coloureds identified themselves with Whites, because Whites were "at the apex of the sys-
tem of stratification," but that the Coloureds changed their position when they began to
face new discrimination that lead to their alignment with Black Africans); Lawrence, supra
note 56, at 827 (noting that persons classified as Coloureds began to identify themselves as
Black, thereby solidifying the opposition to White supremacy).
152. See HOAGLAND, supra note 145, at l10.
153. Id. at 118.
154. See id. at 110.
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mixed-race persons as a buffer class between the White elite and the
economically exploited Bantus. 55
In contrast, Whites in the United States never needed to create a
biracial middle tier, because Whites always far outnumbered persons
of color relegated to the bottom of the racial hierarchy.' 56 The U.S.
use of the "multiracial-type" categories of octoroon,1 7 quadroon, 158
and Mulatto' 59 in the censuses of 1850-1920 has been described more
as a reflection of the growth of the eugenics movement's ranking of
genetic intelligence 160 than as a serious attempt to institutionalize a
155. Id. ("[A]partheid's relentless destruction of [Coloureds'] bridges into the white
world may, in time to come, drastically alter their firm alliance with the white man, if it has
not already begun to do so."); see also infra note 302 and accompanying text.
156. See HACKER, supra note 101, at 227 (estimating that the White population of the
United States from 1790 through 1990 was always a minimum of 80% of the entire popula-
tion); see also HARRIS, supra note 130, at 128-31 (comparing the United States
demographics to Latin America's small populations of Whites and large populations of
Blacks). It should be noted that within the contiguous United States there has been re-
gional variance in the recognition of mixed-race persons, such as in the case of "Creoles"
in Louisiana. See DOMiNGUEZ, supra note 35, at 121-22 (describing the Louisiana legisla-
ture's formation of a militia corps comprised solely of Creoles). Significantly, this variance
follows the model discussed herein of utilizing mixed-race persons as a buffer class in com-
munities where Whites fear the possibility of becoming a numerical minority. See DAVIS,
supra note 41, at 35 (noting that South Carolina accorded mixed-race persons special status
distinct from "pure" Blacks who outnumbered Whites).
157. An octoroon was defined as one-eighth Black. KATHY RUSSELL ET AL., THE COLOR
COMPLEX: THE POLITICS OF SKIN COLOR AMONG AFRICAN AMERICANS 18 (1992).
158. A quadroon was defined as one-quarter Black. Id.; see also DAviS, supra note 41, at
36-37 (reporting the wide use of the term "quadroon" to describe individuals who were
considered one-fourth African).
159. The term "Mulatto" denotes a person of mixed Black and White heritage. DAvis,
supra note 41, at 6. Written instructions for the census enumerators of the 1870 and 1880
censuses specifically stated, "[The color] column is always to be filled. Be particularly care-
ful in reporting the class Mulatto. The word is here generic, and includes quadroons,
octoroons, and all other persons having any perceptible trace of African blood. Important
scientific results depend upon the correct determination of this class." HYMAN ALTERMAN,
COUNTING PEOPLE: THE CENSUS IN HISTORY 275 (1969) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
160. The eugenics movement developed in the United States by 1895 and continued
decades later. EDWARDJ. LARSON, SEX, RACE AND SCIENCE: EUGENICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 22
(1995). The years 1910 through 1920 saw the publication of a number of articles that
attributed the successes of certain people of color to their possession of White blood. See
e.g., E.B. Reuter, The Superiority of the Mulatto, 23 AM. J. Soc. 83, 87 (1917) ("The most
simple and obvious means of accounting for the observed superiority of the mulattoes is to
deny the equality of the parent races and to attribute the superiority of the mixed-blood
individuals to the fact of a superior racial heredity."). The Census Bureau's stated reason
for discontinuing the use of the Mulatto-type categories after the 1920 census was that by
the 1920s, three-quarters of all Blacks in the United States were racially mixed, and thus,
there was no longer a need to count out Mulattoes separately (despite the fact that those
counted as "pure" Blacks in past census years were also mixed). Gary L. Flowers, New Racial
Classifications in 2000 Census: A Setback for Civil Rights Enforcement?, COMMITTEE REP.-LAw.
COMMIT-EE FOR Civ. RTS. UNDER L., Winter 1994-1995, at 1, 4.
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mixed-race, middle-tier buffer class."' Rather, the United States has
periodically imported White immigrants who effectively served as a
working-class buffer between its own White elite and the non-White
underclass. 162 For instance, when national concern grew about the
increasing number of Mulattoes, appeals for immigrants from Europe
were quickly made.1 6 3 Once here, these White immigrants were en-
Interestingly, the retrenchment of civil rights accorded to Blacks during Reconstruc-
tion and the use of genetic arguments to distance Mulattoes from their African ancestry
parallels the current demand for recognition of mixed-race persons as distinct in the cli-
mate of eroding civil rights and resurging eugenic theories of racial superiority. See RICH-
ARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS
STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE 295-96 (1994) (detailing the propagation of scientifically un-
substantiated theories for racial genetic superiority); MICHAEL LIND, UP FROM CONSERVA-
TISM: WHY THE RIGHT IS WRONG FOR AMERICA 196-97 (1996) (asserting that current
scholarship is based on the eugenic policies of Nazi Germany); THE BELL CURVE WARS:
RACE, INTELUGENCE, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA 3 (Steven Fraser ed., 1995) ("Not since
the eugenics craze of the 1920s has this line of thought occupied a serious place on the
national agenda.").
161. It should be noted, however, that the failure to institutionalize a separate mixed-
race intermediary class did not stop Whites from making micro-level distinctions between
Mulattoes and darker-skinned Blacks based on a greater sense of comfort with those per-
sons of color who more closely approximated whiteness in the midst of the rule of hypo-
descent. RUSSELL ET AL., supra note 157, at 18 (noting that plantation owners initiated the
legacy of recognizing distinctions between Mulattoes and Blacks with the rigid White-su-
premacist social order that accorded light-skinned Blacks "[c]oveted indoor assignments,
including artisan, driver, valet, seamstress, cook, and housekeeper," while dark-skinned
Blacks were relegated to field work).
162. See IRA BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM
SOUTH 231 (1974) ("The influx of Irish and German workers into Southern cities speeded
the exclusion of Negro freemen from many occupations.... With white workers available
in growing numbers, white employers exercised their racial preference in many trades tra-
ditionally dominated by blacks."); KITTY CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE CON-
TROL OF LABOR: 1820-1924, at 3 (1984) ("None of these [European] migrations was truly
spontaneous but was triggered and shaped by state policies.");JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN
THE LAND: PATrERNS OF AMERICAN NATIVISM 1860-1925, at 17-18 (2d ed. 1988) (finding
that, after the Civil War, federal and state governments encouraged European immigra-
tion); JAMES OLIVER HORTON, FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR: INSIDE THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COM-
MUNITY 134 (1993) (reporting that, before and after the Civil War, free Blacks in most
northern cities "faced stiff competition from immigrant workers who generally refused to
tolerate blacks as skilled co-workers"); Hernjndez, supra note 128, at 5 (suggesting that
immigration was used "to fill status gaps").
163. One commentator has noted:
The result was a growing mass of "mungrels and mulattoes," with the inevitable
consequence that "in the course of a few years ... half the inhabitants of the city
will be people of Colour." Along with the revulsion at such matings came appeals
on behalf of immigrants from Europe:
The hardy Irish, and industrious Germans, flying from European bond-
age and settling among us is vastly advantageous, and should be greatly
encouraged.
NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 55 (1995) (omission in original) (citation
omitted) (quoting THOMAS BRANAGAN, SERIOUS REMONSTRANCES ADDRESSED TO THE CITI-
ZENS OF THE NORTHERN STATES, AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES 79, 80 (1805)).
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couraged to support the maintenance of slavery and the racial caste
system it enforced.164 From 1820 to 1920, exactly 29,656,589 Europe-
ans legally immigrated to the United States, constituting anywhere
from 70% to 96% of all legal immigrants admitted.
1 65
Between 1911 and 1950, the systemic desire for greater numbers
of White immigrants informed immigration legislation. 166 The Immi-
gration Act of 1924'67 institutionalized quotas that favored immigrants
from northern and western European nations and barred Blacks.
168
Blacks were barred as immigrants despite the fact that the 1924 quota
system was established with the rationale that preference should be
given to persons whose origins matched this nation's "native born"
population for easier assimilation.169 In 1929, eighty-two percent of
the immigrants allowed into the United States were from northern
and western Europe. 170 The use of European immigrants as a middle
tier in the United States relegated non-White immigrants such as the
164. Cf id. at 97 ("'[T]he poorer class of Irish immigrants in America, are greater ene-
mies to the negro population, and greater advocates for the continuance of negro slavery,
than any portion of the population in the free States.'" (quotingJohn Finch, Notes of Travel
in the United States, reprinted in 7 JOHN R. COMMONS & Assocs., A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 60 (1958))). Later, immigrant labor unions excluded Blacks
from virtually all trades. See Crenshaw, supra note 122, at 1375 ("[I]t was for the precise
purpose of assimilating into the American mainstream that immigrant laborers adopted
these exclusionary policies.").
165. SILVIA PEDRAZA & RUBEN G. RUMBAULT, ORIGINS AND DESTINIES: IMMIGRATION,
RACE, AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 4 (1996).
166. See id. at 7 ("With the passage of... the 1924 Immigration and Nationality Act,
immigration was restricted on the basis of national origins, and quotas were set that fa-
vored the immigrants from northern and western European nations ....").
167. 43 Stat. 153 (1924) (previously codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (repealed
1952).
168. Subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 11 of the Act specifically excluded "descendants
of slave immigrants" from consideration as inhabitants in the continental United States in
1920, which was the basis in subdivision (a) for admitting foreign-born individuals of the
same "nationality." § 11 (a)-(c), 43 Stat. at 159 (previously codified at 8 U.S.C. § 211) (re-
pealed 1952) (emphasis added). The Act has been considered "[t]he most sweeping ex-
ample of national nativistic policy." Berta Esperanza Hernndez-Truyol, Natives, Newcomers
and Nativism: A Human Rights Model for the Twenty-First Century, 23 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 1075,
1093 (1996). At the same time, section 3 of an Act of February 5, 1917 banned all immigra-
tion from Asia. Immigration Act of 1917 § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 875-78 (1917) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 136) (repealed 1952).
169. See A. Warner Parker, The Quota Provisions of the Immigration Act of 1924, 18 AM. J.
INT'L L. 737, 740 (1924) (describing Senator Reed's testimony that "we can easily assimilate
[immigrants] if their origins resemble the origins of the people they find when they get
here" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
170. See PEDRAZA & RUMBAULT, supra note 165, at 8. The national origins quota system
was in place until 1965. The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 abolished the national origins quota system. 1965 Amendments to the Immigration
and Nationality Acts of 1952, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1106 (1994)).
130
1998] "MULTIRACIAL" DISCOURSE
Chinese-who themselves were completely excluded by the Immigra-
tion Act of 1917 171 to the lower status of Blacks.
1 71
In contrast, the persistent recognition of mixed-race classes in
countries such as Brazil'17 paralleled the continued demographic pat-
tern of poor Blacks generally outnumbering Whites. 174 Consequently,
there has been an enduring need in Brazil for mixed-race persons to
act as a buffer between these two classes in order to maintain the
supremacy of a White minority.' 75 It is this same fear of demographic
suffusion in the United States that partially drives the burgeoning
White interest in the multiracial category.'
76
In the 1980s, when discussion of the multiracial category first
arose in the United States,1 77 the public began to draw its attention to
the concern that White men would soon be "the new minority.' 17' By
the 1990s, the media frequently informed the public that the decline
171. 39 Stat. 874 (1917) (previously codified at 8 U.S.C. § 136) (repealed 1952).
172. See supra note 169; cf Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 81, 87 (1927) (rejecting the
claim of a Mississippi-resident businessman of Chinese citizenship, that his daughter, who
was a U.S. citizen, should be accorded the same rights of White children and transferred
from a Black to a White school district).
173. See supra notes 131-136 and accompanying text. As stated earlier, this was not a
phenomenon peculiar to Latin America. See supra note 114. In eighteenth century Ja-
maica, for instance, when the population was 90% Black, a special place was carved out
into law for an intermediary Mulatto class. This 1733 law stated that after the third genera-
tion, Mulattoes "shall have all the Privileges and Immunities of his Majesty's Subjects of this
Island, provided they are brought up in the Christian Religion." DEGLER, supra note 108, at
23940 (internal quotation marks omitted).
174. See FLORESTAN FERNANDES, THE NEGRO IN BRAZILAN SOCIETY 67 (Phyllis B. Eveleth
ed. & Jacqueline D. Skiles et al. trans., Colum. Univ. Press 1969) (1965).
175. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
176. See Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 295 (testimony of Anthony M. Messina,
Associate Professor of Political Science, Tufts University) (asserting that the press periodi-
cally alerts the nation of projected increases in the growth of "minority" populations and
the potential for having the nation "swamped" with people of color).
177. See, e.g., KATHLYN GAY, THE RAINBOW EvFEcr: INTERRAcIAL FAMILIES 24-25 (1987)
(asserting that a mixed-race category will give biracial children the best of both worlds); No
Place for Mankind, TIME, Sept. 4, 1989, at 17, 17 (expressing the difficulty in counting chil-
dren of interracial marriages who do not want to choose just one box on high-school data
forms). The Association of MultiEthnic Americans, a California-based confederation of
interracial groups located nationwide, was founded in 1988 to assist parents of multiracial
children in challenging existing public-school racial classifications. Multiracial Hearings,
supra note 2, at 128 (statement of Carlos Fernandez, President, Association of MultiEthnic
Americans).
178. A New Minority: Male Whites, REc. N. N.J., Aug. 1, 1984, at C17, available in 1984 WL
2433000 (providing government statistics that demonstrate that "[flor the first time in
American history, White men are a minority in the nation's work force"); Report: Number of
Non-Hispanic Whites in Dade County Declined, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 26, 1987, at 2B,
available in 1987 WL 5748117 (reporting that in the first five years of the 1980s, the
number of non-Hispanic Whites in Dade County dropped by 115,000); The Biggest Secret of
Race Relations: The New White Minority, EBONY, Apr. 1989, at 84 (estimating that, by the year
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in the White population had reached "dramatic" proportions.1 79 In
1990, Time magazine reported that, "[s]omeday soon, surely much
sooner than most people who filled out their Census forms last week
realize, white Americans will become a minority group."180 Whites'
alarm about becoming a minority has also expressed itself in polling
data indicating skewed perceptions of the nation's current
demographics and job opportunities.181
The concern with the "browning of America"18 2 has accompanied
increasing consternation with the continued existence of racial repa-
ration programs18 3 and fears of race wars akin to White-minority ante-
2000, Blacks and Hispanics will constitute a majority in nearly one-third of the fifty largest
U.S. cities).
179. See A New Minority: Male Whites, supra note 178.
180. William A. Henry III, Beyond the Melting Pot, TIME, Apr. 9, 1990, at 28, 28; accord
Lawrence Auster, Immigration Gives Birth to Unfree America, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 15,
1991, at A13, available in 1991 WL 7791633 (setting forth a concern that Whites of Euro-
pean ancestry will be a minority in the United States by 2050 and specifically asserting that
the nation's "ability to preserve and transmit ... common heritage [will] depend[ ] on the
continued existence of a majority population that believes in it"); Henry, supra, at 28 ("By
2020, a date no further into the future than John F. Kennedy's election is in the past, the
number of U.S. residents who are Hispanic or nonwhite will have more than doubled, to
nearly 115 million, while the white population will not be increasing at all."); Mathews,
supra note 42 (acknowledging a fear of a White minority by the year 2040).
181. Immigration Facts, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Mar. 26, 1996, at A6, available in 1996 WL
4123093 (reporting a survey showing that White Americans believe that 49.9% of the na-
tion's population is White when in actuality the percentage is 74%, that 23.8% is Black
when in actuality the percentage is 11.8%, that 10.8% is Asian when in actuality the per-
centage is 3.1%, and that 14.7% is Hispanic when in actuality the percentage is 9.5%);
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S ECC 97-98 (1995) (noting the concern of a White
commercial lawyer, voiced at a professional meeting attended mostly by Whites, that
"[n]obody's hiring white guys anymore"). The push to make English the "official lan-
guage" of the nation is an extension of the race-based fear of an impending White minor-
ity; Mark Falcoff, Our Language Needs No Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1996, at A17, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (suggesting that English-only proponents are "kept awake at
night by imaginary perils" of being subsumed by Spanish-language speakers but that these
English-only proponents are not worried about any of the other 150 languages spoken in
United States).
182. See Itabari Njeri, Beyond the Melting Pot: In America, Blending in Was Once the Idea4
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1991, at El, available in 1991 WL 2336718 (labeling demographic shifts
in the United States as the "'browning of America'"); see also Henry, supra note 180, at 28
(describing how "[t ] he 'browning of America' will alter everything in society, from politics
and education to industry, values and culture").
183. See Robert S. Chang, Reverse Racism!: Affirmative Actioi, the Family, and the Dream
That Is America, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1115, 1120 (1996) (postulating that many who
oppose affirmative action are concerned with "[c ] hanges in demographics [that] have cre-
ated the specter of a coming majority of color that threatens to eclipse the numerical white
majority"); Bill Johnson, "Mixed Race" Category Shows Folly of Preferences, DETROIT NEWS, Mar.
22, 1996, at A10, available in 1996 WL 2913337 (estimating that because Whites are soon to
be a numerical minority, society should eradicate racial classifications and end "all group
entitlements").
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bellum fears of slave revolts. 18 4 Thus, the desire of some mixed-race
persons to be recognized as members of a distinct racial group co-
alesces with the systemic motivation to defuse demands for racial jus-
tice and maintain a structure of White supremacy.1 85 Such a posture
resonates with the Latin American use of mixed-race persons to buffer
the numerical minority of Whites from the equality concerns of the
majority of non-Whites. 186
Yet, Latin American race relations are a poor model to emulate.
The recognition of a separate class of mixed-race persons in Brazil has
not led to a genuinely color-blind society, because the desire to avoid
being categorized with a denigrated Black populace has resulted in a
hyper-consciousness of color gradations and phenotypical traces of Af-
rican ancestry. 187 In fact, some Brazilians describe their race relations
184. See CARL T. RowAN, THE COMING RACE WAR IN AMERICA: A WAKE-UP CALL 282
(1996) (maintaining that the arming of White hatemongers who want "to take back
America for the white race" by "bloody racial strife" is inevitable); Thomas Ross, The Rich-
mond Narratives, 68 TEX. L. REv. 381, 402-03 (1989) (suggesting that Justice Scalia has
drawn upon the unconscious fear of past slave rebellions in his condemnation of affirma-
tive action).
185. In fact, one can often view the MCM as a partisan issue, "with conservative Republi-
cans in Congress lining up behind a multiracial category and liberal Democrats defending
the status quo" because of their commitment to race-conscious equality measures. Carl M.
Cannon, Census Faces Racial Issue, BALTIMORE SUN, June 29, 1997, at IA, available in 1997
WL 5518631; see also Scott Shepard, Tensions Mount: OMB Nears Decision on Multiracial Cate-
gory for Census, Cox NEWS SERVICE, July 7, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File
(reporting that Republican House Speaker Newt Gingrich has written the OMB directly to
lobby for a mixed-race census count and that Republican Wisconsin Congressman Thomas
Petri sponsored a bill to institute a multiracial category). The U.S. systemic interest in the
MCM also coalesces with the Census Bureau's recent concern over the expense of continu-
ing to collect racial data and confront ongoing claims that racial minorities are persistently
undercounted. See Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 68 (testimony of Reynolds Farley,
Research Scientist, Population Studies Center, University of Michigan) ("It would be nice if
we had a color-blind society and if we could save money by eliminating the race question
from the census .... "); see also Wisconsin v. City of New York, 116 S. Ct. 1091, 1094-95
(1996) (citing Census Bureau estimates that racial minorities are consistently un-
dercounted in the decennial censuses); Steven A. Holmes, Tentative Pact Will Allow Census to
Test the Sampling Method, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1997, at A2, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Nyt File (noting that Republicans have opposed all but limited testing of Census Bureau
use of statistical sampling because of concerns that formerly undercounted racial minori-
ties would harm them politically).
186. Cf Nobles, supra note 124, at 213 (pointing out that the lack of claims of racial
discrimination in Brazil occurs because race is viewed as irrelevant in Brazil's color-blind
society).
187. See DEGLER, supra note 108, at 102, 207-08 (describing the color consciousness of
Brazilians and their classifications of mixed-race people as Mulattoes, Morenos, or Pardos);
Marcus, supra note 117 (reporting that a White British woman who initially thought Brazil
had an easy mixing of all colors was disabused of that notion when she married a Black
Brazilian and found that "'people nudge each other when we pass'"); cf ADRIENNE RICH,
Disloyal to Civilization: Feminism, Racism, Gynephobia, in ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE 275,
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as "veiled apartheid.""1 8 Brazilian commentators have noted that the
country's Mulatto buffer class is a "'much more intelligent [mecha-
nism] for subjugating a race than South Africa, which used guns."'189
This description is particularly apt when one considers that the pro-
motion of a mixed-race class was motivated by the desire to "whiten"
the country by having Blacks disappear through a mixing of the
races, 19 0 and that the census colors are ranked hierarchically from the
most positively valued color of White to the pejoratively viewed color
of Black.' The whitening ideal "remains encoded and enmeshed in
the language of 'a mixed people' which is generally taken to mean, a
'lighter' if not 'whiter' people."' 9 2 Thus, color-blindness has not led
to a transcendence of race but instead to a reinforcement of a racial
caste system in the one region long touted as a racial democracy. 9 '
Given the Latin American experience with multiracial categories,
with Brazil as the primary example, the MCM should note the risk that
its demands for recognition will be co-opted by Whites concerned
with self-imposed fears of demographic challenges to the hierarchy of
White supremacy.9'4 Long-disputed Latin American attitudes toward
300 (1979) ("I no longer believe that 'colorblindness'-if it even exists-is the opposition
of racism; I think it is, in this world, a form of naivet6 and moral stupidity.").
188. See Marcus, supra note 117 (reporting that the mother of an assault victim believes
that "Brazil has a system of 'veiled apartheid'"). Afro-Brazilian politician Abdias do Nasci-
mento suggests that "'the apartheid of Brazil is much worse than that of South Africa.'"
Nobles, supra note 124, at 166 (quoting Apartheid no Brasil e pior que na Africa, diz secretario,
FoLHA DE SAO PAULO, Aug. 2, 1991).
189. Marcus, supra note 117 (quoting Black Brazilian lawyer Carlos Alberto Medeiros).
190. See GILBERTO FREYRE, THE MANSIONS AND THE SHANTIES: THE MAKING OF MODERN
BRAZIL 418 (1963) (reporting that "it is almost impossible to find anthropologically pure
Africans or Negroes" in Brazil today). When President Theodore Roosevelt toured South
America in 1913, a Brazilian government official assured him that there would be no "'Ne-
gro problem,'" because through mixing "'there would be no Negroes'" in the future. Mar-
cus, supra note 117; accord Gledhill, supra note 117, app. 1, at 355 (noting the "whitening"
ideal of the Latin American race-relations model).
191. George Reid Andrews, Racial Inequality in Brazil and the United States: A Statistical
Comparison, 22 ESTUDOS AFRo-AsIATicOS 47 (1992).
192. Nobles, supra note 124, at 112.
193. Cf GILBERTO FREYRE, THE MASTERS AND THE SLAvEs 83 (Samuel Putnam trans., 2d
rev. ed. 1986) (premising a theory of "racial democracy" upon the claim that racial mixing
results in a racially harmonious society); id. at 182 ("The friction here (in Brazil] was
smoothed by the lubricating oil of a deep-going miscegenation ...."); Anani Dzidzienyo,
Brazilian Race Relations at the End of the 20th Century, in RACE, ETHNICITY & GENDER: A
GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 197, 202 (Samuel P. Oliner & Phillip T. Gay eds., 1997) ("Long held
up as the perfect model of a racially egalitarian society absent of deeply entrenched pat-
terns of racial prejudice and discrimination, Brazil enters the 21st century having to face
up to the fact that it has never been the egalitarian society it has been widely perceived to
be.").
194. One commentator has noted that "a dominant culture can be relatively uncon-
cerned with a subordinated group's definition of itself. . . ." T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A
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race are disconcertingly echoed in U.S. multiracial discourse. For in-
stance, the belief that racial mixture will destroy racism has been fea-
tured prominently in the promotion of a mixed-race census count.195
The multiracial discourse narrative is that mixing away racism will ab-
solve the nation from having to address entrenched racial disparities
in socioeconomic opportunity.1 96 But when racial mixture as a solu-
tion to racial conflict has been promoted in the past, the burden has
been consistently placed upon Blacks to mix.1 9 7 In effect, assimilation
of Blacks into whiteness, not so much mixture itself, has been an un-
derlying goal of miscegenation racial-democracy campaigns in Latin
America.198 And the result has always been the maintenance of White
supremacy. 199
Appropriation of the MCM by disaffected Whites is also a con-
cern, because, as is widely known, subordinated group members will
eventually flee from such classifications when given the choice. °°
Case forRace-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1060, 1083 (1991). Accordingly, when Whites
do take an interest in identity politics, one must question the motivation of the interest.
195. The following assertion is indicative of this discourse: "Since our father was black
and our mother was Jewish, we called ourselves Jewbros. Me and my brothers, the race of
the future. Everybody's going to be brown in the future. The pure blacks and the pure
whites are going to be bred out of the race." STUDS TEREL, RACE: How BLACKS AND
WHITES THINK AND FEEL ABOUT THE AMERICAN OBSESSION 398 (1992) (interviewing Leo
King). Compare a similar assertion: "She [interviewee's mixed-race daughter] carries a
strength that neither of her parents has, because she's the product of our daring to reach
over, because we loved each other. She's the future." Id. at 392 (interviewing Hank De
Zutter); accord Tom Morganthau, What Color Is Black?, NEwSWEEK, Feb. 13, 1995, at 63, 65
("'If your object is the eventual integration of the races, a mixed-race or middle group is
something you'd want to see developing .... The middle group grows larger and larger,
and the races eventually blend.'" (quoting Harvard sociologist Orlando Patterson)).
196. Cf Jim Chen, Unloving, 80 IowA L. REv. 145 passim (1994) (arguing in favor of
interracial marriage and the disregard of race).
197. See FA NON, supra note 108, at 51 (describing the reasons for Blacks' assimilation
into White society).
198. See FREsRE, supra note 193, at xvi (noting that Brazilian Black and White cultures,
once separate and distinct groups, "had their [antagonism] broken by the interpenetration
of cultures and miscegenation"); Thomas E. Skidmore, Racial Ideas and Social Policy of Bra-
zil, 1870-1940, in THE IDEA OF RACE IN LATIN AMERICA, 1870-1940, at 7, 9 (Richard Graham
ed., 1990) (describing the whitening ideal of Brazil's promotion of racial mixture).
199. See supra notes 187-193 and accompanying text.
200. The Chairperson of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights noted:
I know in the Black community, a large number of people who feel that if they
had another choice they would sure exercise it, because they think the economic
opportunities that would flow from being identified as "other," whatever "other"
is, in this culture is an advantage and not a liability.
Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 273 (testimony of Arthur A. Fletcher, Chairperson,
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights). Thus far, experiments with the multiracial category
have demonstrated that Native American and Asian-Pacific Islander numbers tend to de-
crease when a multiracial category is offered. See BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, STATISTICAL NOTE No. 40, TESTING METHODS OF COLLECTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
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While the United States has generally taken a binary White/non-
White approach to racial stratification, 20 1 given its current concern
with the decreasing number of Whites and the consistent White pref-
erence for persons of color who more closely approximate a White
appearance, the United States is still susceptible to acknowledging a
Latin-American-type, mixed-race buffer class.20 2 In addition, the long-
INFORMATION: RESULTS OF THE CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY SUPPLEMENT ON RACE AND
ETHNICITY 74 tbl.7 (1996) (showing those choosing the American Indian category as de-
creasing from 1.06% of all respondents to 0.79% when a multiracial category was offered);
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, POPULATION DIVISION WORKING PAPER
No. 16, FINDINGS ON QUESTIONS ON RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN TESTED IN THE 1996 NA-
TIONAL CONTENT SURVEY 16 tbl.A (1996) (showing those choosing the American Indian
category as decreasing from 0.6% of all respondents to 0.4% when a multiracial category
was offered, and the Asian and Pacific Islander respondents decreasing from 4.0% to
2.7%). Although the aforementioned limited surveys regarding the multiracial category
have not noted much of a decrease in those choosing the Black category, one could pre-
dict a similar decrease in Black numbers if a multiracial category becomes socially accepta-
ble as a middle-tier category. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra, at 74 tbl.7
(illustrating that those choosing the Black category maintained roughly 10% of all respon-
dents regardless of the availability of a multiracial category); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra,
at 16 tbl.A (illustrating that Black respondents decreased from 10.4% to 9.4% when a mul-
tiracial category was offered and a Hispanic-origin ethnicity question preceded the race
categories). Such a prediction is rooted in the historical attraction that middle-tier catego-
ries have for oppressed communities. See BENJAMIN BRAwLEY, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN NEGRO 330-31 (reprinted 1971) (1921) (noting that in the antebellum United
States, light-skinned persons of African ancestry, given their ability to obtain freedom, had
been known to separate themselves from those persons identified as "pure" Black); E.
Ophelia Settle, Social Attitudes During the Slave Regime: Household Servants Versus Field Hands,
in 1 THE MAKING OF BLACK AMERICA: ESSAYS IN NEGRO LIFE AND HISTORY 148, 150-51 (Au-
gust Meier & Elliott Rudwick eds., 1969) (finding that the middle-tier group of Mulattoes,
who were often accorded the elevated status of house slaves, were more likely to turn in
fugitive slaves than were the "pure" Black slaves, who were relegated to the position of field
hands).
201. See Ramirez, supra note 34, at 958 ("When courts and legislatures first created race-
conscious remedies in the 1960s, the United States was seen as a black and white society.").
202. See BRAWLEY, supra note 200, at 331 (contending that as a predominantly White
country, the United States has frequently given mixed-race persons some advantage over
those perceived as "pure" Blacks); FUNDERBURG, supra note 58, at 197, 337 (detailing re-
sponses of biracial interviewees who admit that biracial persons can be extended better
opportunities and can socialize more freely with White persons); HACKER, supra note 101,
at 12 (describing lighter skin color as an advantage in U.S. society); RUSSELL ET AL., supra
note 157, at 125 (noting the likelihood in contemporary U.S. society that lighter-skinned
Blacks will be more often hired and promoted by White employers than equally qualified
darker-skinned Blacks); Leonard M. Baynes, If It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does
Darkness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow Than Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of
the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENY. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997) (manuscript at 3, on file with
author) (stating that darker-skinned persons are subjected to more discrimination than
lighter-skinned persons of color); Robyn Meredith, Power Deal, USA TODAY, June 21, 1995,
at 1B, available in LEXIS, News Library, Usatdy File (reporting that a Ford Foundation and
Russell Sage Foundation report-the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality-found that
race and skin tone make a difference in job placement rates in the United States and that
men who are Black and dark-skinned have their odds for employment reduced by 52%
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standing U.S. habit of utilizing a system of exceptionalism, whereby an
individual Black person may be deemed socially acceptable "because
you are not like the rest of them," ' demonstrates the ability of White
North Americans to make distinctions among subordinated group
members even within a bipolar, hypo-descent framework.20 4 Societal
willingness to make distinctions within a subordinated class is integral
to the construction of privileged middle-tier communities. 2 5 There is
also some MCM willingness for social distinction of biracial persons, as
revealed by some proponents' opposition to a mixed-race census
count that omits an actual multiracial category: "'We need the termi-
nology of "multiracial" in there .... As it is, my children cannot be
multiracial children. My children can be "check-all-that-apply" chil-
dren, and I do not consider that fair."'2 °6
Yet, as previously noted, even without a susceptibility to recogniz-
ing a mixed-race community as an intermediate group above "pure"
Blacks, a mixed-race census count inherendy undermines the MCM's
after accounting for other factors); Erica D. Shelton, Beauty "Ideal'Is All Mixed Up, CHI. SUN-
TIMES, June 11, 1996, at 30, available in 1996 WL 6749749 ("Like color discrimination of
the past, films, television and music videos have contributed to putting a well-intended,
inclusive notion like multiculturalism to poor use. Black models and actresses have grown
in prominence, but a disproportionate number of biracial women have taken center stage
in the entertainment industry."). This is a related but separate dynamic from the color
distinctions that Blacks make within the Black community itself. See Walker v. IRS, 713 F.
Supp. 403, 407-08 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (order) (extending Title VII protection to acts of in-
traracial discrimination); RUSSELL ET AL., supra note 157, at 107-23 (documenting the color-
ism phenomenon within the Black community, wherein lighter-skinned Blacks are often
accorded social favoritism).
203. See Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race Consciousness
in Some Tort, Crimina4 and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. RExv. 269, 278-79 (1994). Kastely
explains:
One dangerous effect of this contemporary form of white racism occurs when
white people treat a few black people as special and worthy of inclusion in domi-
nant cultural and political life, while treating all other black people as Other, as
those who do not conform to the norm of human life, and as unworthy of respect
or concern.
Id.; accord RowAN, supra note 184, at 247-48 (noting that American journalists view General
Colin Powell as an exception-a Black man who "transcended" race and was thus palatable
as a potential presidential candidate).
204. See Thomas F. Pettigrew, New Patterns of Racism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and
1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 673, 684-86 (1985) (discussing the social stratification within the
Black community); see also supra note 110 (defining hypo-descent).
205. Pettigrew, supra note 204, at 685.
206. Elizabeth Shogren, Panel Rejects "Mixed-Race" Census Categry, L.A. TIMES, July 9,
1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 2227486 (quoting Susan Graham, national MCM leader
and President of Project RACE); see also El Nasser, supra note 19 (quoting a multiracial
resident of New Orleans as stating: "'I still think they should have a multiracial category
.... I guess now I would check off Asian/Pacific Islander, I would have to check off white
and black. I would just feel more comfortable with multiracial.'").
1998]
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stated goal of racial equality by hindering victims of oppression from
psychologically identifying with the plight of other subordinated com-
munity members. 20 7 Thus, the proposal to add a multiracial category,
which includes an inquiry into the race of each parent of a mixed-race
respondent, would not be a costless "compromise."2 ° s Furthermore,
the inclusion of parental racial-component information, or an ability
to check more than one racial category, could very well replicate the
antebellum fractional approach to race, which is epitomized by the
categories of octoroon, quadroon, and Mulatto-social groups system-
ically encouraged to dissociate from subordinated Blacks.20 9
Apart from the concern with the advisability of recognizing a
mixed-race buffer community throughout the United States, the
MCM must be wary of advancing its proposal under the banner of
color-blindness, which has served as a veil for the maintenance of
race-based privilege in recent United States case law, as Part II.C dis-
cusses below.
In fact, the simultaneous growth of multiracial discourse and civil
rights retrenchment should alert the MCM to the appropriation of its
identity movement by others more concerned with dismantling social-
justice programs. 210 This phenomenon is particularly well high-
lighted in the development of color-blind jurisprudence. When Jus-
tice Scalia declares that "[i]n the eyes of government, we are just one
207. See supra note 120 and accompanying text; see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1191-94 (1995) (discussing how cognitive psychological
studies suggest that once a group identity is formed, polarization of outgroup members by
ingroup members could be explained by "[the] subjects' motivations and attempts to bal-
ance two competing needs: a desire to enhance their relative social standing by disparag-
ing outgroup members... and a need to preserve a belief in their own unbiased evaluative
fairness").
208. But see Hickman, supra note 34, at 1262-64 (proposing to count multiracial persons
on a line separate from race in order to "celebrate" mixed-race persons in the population).
Although Hickman opposes the inclusion of a multiracial category as a racial classification,
her "separate-line" proposal may inadvertently support the MCM position that mixed-race
persons are symbols of racial harmony that should be celebrated.
209. See, e.g., Payson, supra note 34, at 1282 (favoring the inclusion of parental racial-
component information in the census to "mitigate any incidents of 'defection' from
monoracial categories"); see also supra notes 157-158, 200-205 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing census categories for Mulattoes prior to 1920 and the dissociation of mixed-race
Blacks from other Blacks).
210. Cf Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L.
REv. 1467, 1471 (1996) (arguing that the backlash against efforts to address racial subordi-
nation is advanced by denying the salience of race); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis:
Race Theory and Political Lavryering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821,
828 (1997) (noting "the law's intensifying dissociation from racial justice, or what one soci-
ologist calls America's 'retreat from racial justice'" (quoting STEPHEN STEINBERG, TURNING
BACK: THE RETREAT FROM RAcIALJUSTICE IN AMERICAN THOUGHT AND POLICY 213 (1995))).
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race here[; i]t is American," '211 it is in the context of a case that hin-
ders the federal government's ability to institute affirmative action
programs.
2 12
C. The Continuation of the Color-Blind Jurisprudence Trajectory
In constitutionalizing its wishful thinking, the majority today
does a grave disservice ... to those victims of past and pres-
ent racial discrimination in this Nation whom government
has sought to assist ... 213
Color-blindness is the insistence in law that the government
should never take race into account, regardless of the context in
which race is used.2 1 The MCM's idealization of color-blindness and
its disdainful view of "divisive" racial classifications parallel the
Supreme Court's current trend of viewing racial classifications as a
morally and politically objectionable part of the body of antidis-
crimination law.2 15 In fact, multiracial-category proponents and the
Supreme Court both view the eradication of racial classifications as an
211. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment). Adarand held that federal affirmative action
programs instituted to assist subordinated groups are subject to the same strict scrutiny
standard as acts of discrimination against subordinated group members. Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 227.
212. See id. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("For a classification made to hasten the day
when 'we are just one race,' however, the lead opinion has dispelled the notion that 'strict
scrutiny' is 'fatal in fact.'" (citations omitted)).
213. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552-53 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
214. Aleinikoff, supra note 194, at 1063. Yet, "the color-blind theory of the Constitution
is precisely that-a 'theory,' one of any number of competing theories that seek to inter-
pret the fourteenth amendment's delphic proscription of state action that denies any per-
son 'the equal protection of the laws.'" Randall Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A
Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1327, 1335 (1986).
215. See David Kairys, Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race, 45 Am. U. L. REv. 729,
735 (1996) (attributing to racism the Supreme Court's recent approach to civil rights cases
in which Blacks have attempted to achieve racial justice through race-conscious measures).
A number of commentators view the retrenchment in antidiscrimination law as the result
of the 1980s Reagan-led White backlash against institutions perceived as sympathetic to
Black interests. See Crenshaw, supra note 122, at 1362 n.119 (1988) (noting that the failed
1984 Democratic Party presidential election bid "reflects a perception among whites that
the party is too sympathetic to Black interests"); Jonathan Feldman, Race-Consciousness Ver-
sus Colorblindness in the Selection of Civil Rights Leaders: Reflections upon Jack Greenburg's Cru-
saders in the Courts, 84 CAL. L. REv. 151, 154 & n.19 (1996) (book review) (detailing the
current backlash against civil rights within the court system). It is interesting to note that
the entrenchment in civil rights and the systemic attention to the MCM both date back to
the 1980s.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
end in and of itself, rather than a means for achieving racial justice.21 6
"The truth, however, is that racial justice and colorblindness are not
the same thing."
2 17
Recent cases demonstrate the jurisprudential shift toward pre-
sumed color-blindness,218 which thoroughly denies the historical con-
text of White supremacy and Black subordination, both of which
reinforce race-based privilege and thereby hinder a realistic appraisal
of racial disparity.219 As Part II.D will discuss, the attainment of true
color-blindness is impossible in a society that has historically imbued
race with political meaning. The Supreme Court's stated reliance
upon color-blindness may thus be viewed as a guise for maintaining
the status quo of race-based privilege. 22' This Article discusses four
cases exemplifying the salient jurisprudential move towards a color-
blind approach to educational admissions, 22 voting rights,222 govern-
ment business contracting,223 and the capital sentencing process.224
These cases demonstrate a progression in color-blind jurisprudence
from a desire to narrow the examination of the political meaning of
race to a complete disavowal of the social significance of race.2 25 An
216. Aleinikoff, supra note 194, at 1115 (maintaining that color-blind theory has been
transformed into serving the ultimate goal of color-blindness as a formality rather than a
means of ending material inequality).
217. Culp, supra note 56, at 162.
218. Neal Devins, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena and the Continuing Irrelevance of
Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decisions, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 673, 674 (1996) ("Like a
phoenix rising from the ashes, calls for a 'color-blind society' are again sweeping the na-
tion."); Karen B. Dietrich, Note, Federal Affirmative Action After Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1259, 1292 (1995-1996) ("Adarand further conveyed the increasing
interest of the Court in finally achieving a colorblind society. . . ."). Although one com-
mentator traces color-blind rhetoric back to the 1850s, the current judicial reverence for
color-blindness only dates back to the 1980s. See generally ANDREW KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND
CONSTITUTION (1992) (discussing the evolution of color-blind jurisprudence in the United
States).
219. See David A. Strauss, The Myth of Colorblindness, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 99, 119 ("[T]he
Court has shown no interest in investigating the accuracy of racial classifications.").
220. See id. at 114 (asserting that there can be no "choice between color blindness and
race-consciousness" and that the only choice is "between different forms of race-
consciousness").
221. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996).
222. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), remanded sub nom. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp.
408 .(E.D.N.C. 1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
223. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
224. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
225. Yet, it should be noted that the color-blind jurisprudential movement extends be-
yond the equal protection context. See, e.g., Tanya E. Coke, Note, Lady Justice May Be Blind,
but Is She a Soul Sister? Race Neutrality and the Ideal of Representative Juries, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv.
327, 348 (1994) (observing that the Supreme Court, in Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42
(1992), has manifested "sweeping rhetoric about irrelevance of race to jury selection").
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analysis of the aforementioned contexts indicates that the color-blind
approach, which the MCM propagates, is counterproductive to its
goal of eradicating racism. Four key dynamics distinguish the devel-
opment of color-blind jurisprudence: (1) the removal of the histori-
cal meaning of race from the analysis of racial discrimination; (2) the
removal of societal discrimination from the analysis of racial discrimi-
nation; (3) the judicial view of race-conscious, racial justice efforts as
harmful stereotyping; and (4) the judicial excision of race from racial
discrimination discourse.
1. The Historical Meaning of Race Expelled from Analysis of Racial
Discrimination. -
[W] e remain imprisoned by the past as long as we deny its
influence in the present.226
McCleskey v. Kemp227 was one of the early Supreme Court cases to
champion the color-blind ideal as more significant than the reality of
racial discrimination in the constitutional analysis of equal protection
claims.228 With McCleskey, the Court reinforced the equal protection
standard that a petitioner must prove that the individual deci-
sionmakers in her case acted with discriminatory intent, regardless of
226. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
227. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
228. This is distinct from the interpretation of the dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, as the first
judicial pronouncement of the color-blind ideal. Given thatJustice Harlan's opposition to
the legal segregation of railway cars was rooted in the reality of racial discrimination, the
author agrees with commentator Neil Gotanda, who asserts that Justice Harlan did not
truly espouse a color-blind approach in his dissent in Pessy v. Ferguson. "Every one knows
that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude white
persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches
occupied by or assigned to white persons." Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 557 (1896)
(Harlan, J., dissenting), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also
Gotanda, supra note 26, at 39 (interpreting Justice Harlan's dissent as "a peculiar mix of
historical-race and formal-race" as opposed to the generally accepted view that Justice
Harlan espoused a color-blind constitution); Laurence H. Tribe, "In What Vision of the Con-
stitution Must the Law Be Color-Blind?,"20J. MARsHALL L. REV. 201, 203 (1986) (suggesting
that Justice Harlan's "color-blind ideal, it turns out, was only shorthand for the concept
that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents our law from enshrining and perpetuating white
supremacy"). Furthermore, Justice Harlan's discussion regarding color-blindness was con-
nected to his conviction that Whites held and would continue to hold the dominant posi-
tion in the United States. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The white
race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. . . . So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time.. . ."); accordJamin B. Raskin, From "Colorblind" White Supremacy
to American Multiculturalism, 19 HARv. J.L. & Pus. POL'Y 743, 744 (1996) ("Thus, at its very
inception, the doctrine ofjuridical color-blindness was deemed to be perfectly compatible
with the perpetuation of white supremacy .... .").
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the existence of statistically discriminatory patterns.22 Although Mc-
Cleskey is an equal protection case distinct from the race remedy cases
that follow in this section, it highlights the ways in which color-blind
jurisprudence extends beyond the mainstream discontent with affirm-
ative action programs for people of color.
The McCleskey Court reviewed a petition for habeas corpus that
asserted that the Georgia capital sentencing process was administered
in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 230 In support of this claim, the petitioner
submitted a statistical study ("the Baldus Study") of over two thousand
Georgia murder cases from the 1970s.231 The study demonstrated an
overwhelming connection between the imposition of the death sen-
tence in Georgia and the races of the victim and the defendant.232
Despite the comprehensiveness of the Baldus Study, the Supreme
Court held that the study did not establish that the administration of
the Georgia capital punishment system violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause or the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.233
In the face of consistent data-which showed that on the basis of
race, Black defendants were more likely to receive the death penalty
than were Whites234 and that the lives of White victims were more
highly valued than those of Blacks2 3 5-the Court insisted that the
229. Although Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976), established the individual-
istic discriminatory intent requirement for equal protection claims, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 312-13 (1987), worsened the myopia of the Court's approach to the reality of
racial discrimination by refusing to acknowledge the racist effect of extensive race-based
statistical disparity in sentencing.
230. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286.
231. Id. at 286-87.
232. Id. The Baldus Study indicated that Black defendants who killed White victims
have the greatest likelihood of receiving the death penalty. After taking into account 230
other variables, the Baldus Study found that prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70%
of cases involving Black defendants and White victims and in only 32% of cases involving
White defendants and White victims. The death penalty was imposed almost three times as
often in cases involving Black defendants and White victims (22%) as those involving
White defendants and White victims (8%). The death penalty was imposed least often in
the case of Black victims and Black defendants. Id.
233. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312-13. Commentators have been highly critical of the Mc-
Cleskey decision. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE LJ.
420, 441 (1988) ("The Court's response to the detailed evidence .. .was a labored 'So
what?'"); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1388, 1413 (1988) ("The Court's suggestion that the leg-
acy of Georgia's history shines no light on the Baldus statistics offends common sense; it
makes one laugh-and cry.").
234. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 287.
235. Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Baldus Study "[a] t most indicate [d] a discrepancy that appears to cor-
relate with race .... [But this] discrepancy ... is 'a far cry from [a]
major systemic defect."'2 36 The Court drew this conclusion despite
the fact that the Baldus analysis of 230 other variables237 demon-
strated that "few details of the crime or of McCleskey's past criminal
conduct were more important than the fact that his victim was
white. "238
The Court's imposition of a narrow "intent to discriminate" stan-
dard239 was, in effect, a refusal to acknowledge how the historic appli-
cation of the death penalty was infected by racism. 24" The removal of
historical context from the existence of racism belies the actual nature
of racism and, hence, the political meaning of race. 241 Therefore, the
McCleskey bar to the use of historical racial data in the presentation of
equal protection claims compromises an accurate depiction of race
236. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312-13 (quoting Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 54 (1984)).
237. Id. at 287.
238. Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court stated that "unless historical evi-
dence is reasonably contemporaneous with the challenged decision, it has little probative
value. Although the history of racial discrimination in this country is undeniable, we can-
not accept official actions taken long ago as evidence of current intent." McCleskey, 481
U.S. at 298 n.20 (citation omitted). The Court thus dismissed the continuing effect of
historical bias. Id. at 298-99. Justice Brennan noted his dissatisfaction with the Court's
finding:
Georgia's legacy of a race-conscious criminal justice system, as well as this Court's
own recognition of the persistent danger that racial attitudes may affect criminal
proceedings, indicates that McCleskey's claim is not a fanciful product of mere
statistical artifice.
By the time of the Civil War, a dual system of crime and punishment was well
established in Georgia.
Id. at 328-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dismissal of historical data occurred despite
Justice Brennan's earlier acknowledgement in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per
curiam), that Georgia's then extant death penalty statutes were "pregnant with discrimina-
tion." Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., concurring).
239. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293.
240. One commentator noted:
Sometimes the exposure of the pervasiveness of racialism, and of the racist policy
it entails, can cost too much. Better to pretend that the jury behavior reflected by
the Baldus study is simply "unexplained," to preserve the image of the dispassion-
ate jury, together with the implicit conclusion that the disproportionate sentences
are a coincidence.
Carter, supra note 233, at 446-47.
241. See Peter Charles Hoffer, "Blind to History," The Use of History in Affirmative Action
Suits: Another Look at City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 23 RUTGERS L.J. 271, 278-79 (1992)
(arguing that the Court improperly utilized historical data by not following the mode of
historical analysis that requires a broad examination of social reality when discussing a
particular movement in history).
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and discrimination.242 To the extent that our nation's history of racial
hostility continues to inform the perception and attitudes of persons
empowered to act upon their prejudiced notions, historical back-
ground is relevant. Moreover, history is crucial to an acknowledge-
ment of the social systems that have been established within a biased
framework. Ahistorical analyses of equal protection claims conceal
the existence of racially flawed social systems and the harms which
result from silent acceptance of the status quo and thereby strip polit-
ical significance from race altogether.2 4 Yet, the Court disengages
history from claims of racial discrimination for the purpose of pursu-
ing a color-blind aim.
The ideal of reaching for a color-blind society was held to be
more relevant to the constitutional analysis at issue in McCleskey, than
were the realities of racial discrimination in the application of the
death penalty.2 44 The Court's color-blind ideal is revealed by its desire
to ignore the clear systemic indications of racial bias and its prefer-
ence for searching for an individual with particularized discriminatory
intent.245 In turn, the great esteem that the Court places on color-
blindness obscures the harms stemming from the status quo existence
of race-based privilege in the life-and-death context of the death pen-
alty application.
246
Similarly, the MCM's advocacy for official recognition of a dis-
tinct mixed-race cultural identity is divorced from the historical posi-
tioning of such groups as middle-tier buffers vis-a-vis racial justice
efforts. McCleskey demonstrates that such ahistorical approaches hin-
der the progress of racial justice rather than aid it. By viewing racism
as an isolated phenomenon resulting from the bias of a sole culpable
actor, rather than as a dynamic constructed and influenced by history,
242. See Carter, supra note 233, at 441 ("[T]he problem is not an inability to remember
the past, but an incapacity to integrate the present.").
243. See Alan Davis Freeman, Legqitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination
Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1049, 1054 (1978) (term-
ing the failure of antidiscrimination laws to consider historical data as a "perpetrator per-
spective [that] presupposes a world composed of atomistic individuals whose actions are
outside of and apart from the social fabric and without historical continuity. From this
perspective, the law views racial discrimination not as a social phenomenon, but merely as
the misguided conduct of particular actors." (footnotes omitted)).
244. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 314-19.
245. Id. at 292 ("Thus, to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McCleskey must
prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.").
246. For example, in its analysis of McCleskey's Eighth Amendment claim, the Court was
unperturbed by the fact that the Baldus Study indicated that Whites were more willing to
allocate mercy for White defendants than Black defendants, because, as the Court noted,
such a dynamic expressed the conscience of the community. See id. at 312 ("Apparent
disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system.").
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the McCleskey Court began to separate the sociopolitical meaning of
race from the discourse surrounding the analysis of racial
problems.247  By overlooking the historical content of what race
means, the Court reduced race to a concept too nebulous for legal
analysis. 48 The MCM's promotion of race itself as a nebulous con-
cept will only further the Court's seeming inability to grasp the mean-
ing of race.
2. Societal Discrimination Expelled from Analysis of Racial Discrimina-
tion. -Affirmative action questions the settled expectations Whites
have because they are White; therefore, the affirmative action context
particularly highlights the link between the jurisprudential preference
for color-blindness and its consequent reinforcement of race-based
privilege. 249 In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,250 the Supreme
Court held that the City of Richmond failed to demonstrate a compel-
ling governmental interest to justify an affirmative action plan
designed to benefit persons of color by awarding thirty percent of city
construction contracts to "Minority Business Enterprises."251  The
Court deemed the plan insufficiently tailored to remedy the effects of
prior discrimination, because the City only proffered evidence of "so-
cietal discriminaition"-an inadequate basis for the use of this race-
conscious classification system.25 2 The Court concluded that in order
to justify the use of a race-conscious allocation system, the plan's pro-
ponents had to provide evidence of particularized discrimination.253
The Court's dismissal of the notion of societal discrimination-a sys-
temic phenomenon for which no one person can be singled out as the
perpetrator-disables government from effectively examining and re-
247. See Gotanda, supra note 26, at 44-45 (noting that the Supreme Court treats "particu-
lar manifestations of racial subordination-substandard housing, education, employment,
and income [disparities] ... as isolated phenomena .. ." and thus veils the continuing
oppression of institutional racism).
248. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 316 n.39 ("Finally, in our heterogeneous society the lower
courts have found the boundaries of race and ethnicity increasingly difficult to
determine.").
249. Harris, supra note 63, at 1779 ("[A]ffirmative action de-privileges whiteness and
seeks to remove the legal protections of the existing hierarchy spawned by race
oppression.").
250. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
251. Id. at 498-506.
252. Id. at 505.
253. Id. at 496-97 (O'Connor, J.). Yet, "blindness to contemporary social realities helped
spawn the monstrous lie, propagated by the Supreme Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, that the
segregation of the Negro had nothing to do with racial oppression." Kennedy, supra note
214, at 1341 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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dressing the actual harms of racial discrimination.254 As a result, data
showing that Blacks constituted approximately fifty percent of the resi-
dents in Richmond, but received less than one percent of public con-
tracting funds, 55 became legally insignificant and thus an acceptable
societal condition.256 Furthermore, "the City could not prove that the
parties who benefitted from the set-off were those who had been
harmed by prior discrimination precisely because there had been so few
African-American construction businesses. 2 57
Similarly, the MCM overlooks societal discrimination and is thus
unable to appreciate the political implications of demanding a mixed-
race census count within a preexisting racial caste system. This juris-
prudential parallel with the MCM is best exemplified by Justice
Scalia's myopic statement that "[r]acial preferences appear to 'even
the score' . . . only if one embraces the proposition that our society is
254. The Court's inability to recognize the harms of status quo societal discrimination is
further aggravated by Croson's insistence upon symmetry in the application of strict scrutiny
analysis rather than the more flexible standard of intermediate scrutiny, which was utilized
in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled by Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Metro Broadcasting held that the intermediate standard was
acceptable for evaluating benign race-conscious measures mandated by Congress. Id. at
563; accord Bryan K. Fair, Rethinking the Colorblindness Model, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 81
(1993) (deeming the intermediate scrutiny standard, which the Court utilized in Metro
Broadcasting, to be a sensible approach comparable to that utilized in gender discrimina-
tion cases and stating that "if our Constitution is not required to be gender-blind, I see no
reason that it should be required to be color-blind").
Croson demands that race-conscious efforts for racial justice must be narrowly tailored
to further a compelling governmental interest-just as actual instances of racial discrimina-
tion must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest: "We thus
reaffirm the view expressed by the plurality in Wygant that the standard of review under the
Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a
particular classification." Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 (O'Connor, J.). Similarly, in Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995), the Supreme Court overturned Metro
Broadcasting and held that federal affirmative action programs must be subject to the strict
scrutiny standard.
Yet, the race-neutral application of the strict scrutiny standard, which treats efforts to
redress racial discrimination in the same manner as acts of discrimination itself, completely
overlooks the significance of race in our society and thereby hampers the viability of reme-
dial plans by preferring race-neutral methods that have been proven ineffective. See COR-
NEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 64 (1993) (noting that "without affirmative action, black access to
America's prosperity would be even more difficult to obtain and racism in the workplace
would persist anyway"); see also infta Part II.C.3.
255. Croson, 488 U.S. at 479-80.
256. One commentator suggests that the acceptance of societal discrimination as the
norm is explained by the manner in which lower socioeconomic status rationalizes the
disparity in treatment. See RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? 17 (1996) (observ-
ing that social psychology norm theory holds that an individual's "reaction to another per-
son in distress varies according to the [perceived] normalcy or abnormalcy of his or her
plight").
257. Hoffer, supra note 241, at 274.
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appropriately viewed as divided into races ... ."258 Regardless of
whether the MCM is uniformly motivated by a desire to enhance the
social status of mixed-race children, the Latin American race-relations
model demonstrates that the existence of a racial hierarchy makes it
impossible to implement a decennial tally of mixed-race persons with-
out having the tally systemically utilized as a mechanism for preserving
White status. Croson demonstrates that the MCM's disregard for the
hierarchy of general societal discrimination will hinder the MCM's
ability to achieve the goal of racial harmony.
3. The Judicial View of Race-Conscious Equality Measures as Harmful
Stereotyping. -
Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm
to our society.259
Four years after Croson, in the case of Shaw v. Reno,26 0 the Court's
color-blind trajectory adopted the premise that forthright considera-
tions of racial difference are a form of stereotyping that is just as
harmful as acts of discrimination.261 Shaw entailed a challenge to a
North Carolina congressional reapportionment plan that created two
districts to strengthen the effect of minority votes.26 2 A group of five
White individuals (of whom three did not reside in the relevant voting
districts and thus admittedly suffered no vote dilution) 263 challenged
the reapportionment plan as unconstitutional. 264 After noting the dis-
tricts' irregular cartographical shapes, the Supreme Court articulated
258. Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
259. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993), remanded sub nom. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F.
Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994), reu'd, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996). But see Aleinikoff, supra note 194,
at 1091 (maintaining that the color-blind theory is mistaken when it objects to race-con-
scious remedies on the ground that such remedies may "increase racial stereotyping and
intolerance").
260. 509 U.S. 630 (1993), remanded sub nom. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C.
1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
261. Id. at 657; accord Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)
(holding that all racial classifications imposed by government are subject to strict scrutiny);
id. at 241 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that racial justice programs that utilize race-
conscious remedies "stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority").
262. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633-34.
263. Id. at 637, 641. "Instead, the decision states that these plaintiffs have a right to live
in a colorblind world, where redistricting does not upset their racial expectations." Culp,
supra note 56, at 185. When Shaw reached the Supreme Court again after remand, the
Court held that the plaintiffs who lived outside the districts lacked standing. Shaw v. Hunt,
116 S. Ct. 1894, 1900 (1996).
264. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633-34.
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an unprecedented constitutional claim265 that without sufficient justi-
fication, reapportionment plans creating oddly shaped districts could
not rationally be "understood as anything other than an effort to seg-
regate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race.92 6 6
Absent proof of intentional discrimination, this new constitutional
claim characterizes racial reapportionment made solely for the pur-
pose of strengthening minority voting, as a race-based stigma and a
threat of inciting racial hostility.2 6
7
Shaw thereby undermined the efficacy of section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act26 and its 1982 amendments, 269 which, contrary to the
Court's decision, established race-consciousness. 27 0 By utilizing race-
neutral principles, the Supreme Court equated the severity of racist
gerrymandering for the purposes of instituting racially biased election
practices, with race-conscious affirmative attempts to address patterns
of race discrimination in voting.271 In effect, the Supreme Court ap-
peared to demand that racist practices resolve themselves without any
affirmative acknowledgement that racial bias is at work.2 7 2 "Color-
265. See id. at 667 (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's distinction of Shaw
from UnitedJewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977)).
266. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 652.
267. Id. at 642-43.
268. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1994).
269. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
270. SeeAleinikoff, supra note 194, at 1111 ("The 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights
Act provide the most dramatic example of federal race-consciousness."). In order to en-
sure that electoral changes would not have the effect of abridging minority voting rights,
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 required Southern states to obtain preclearance
from the Attorney General of any proposed changes to voting rules. Voting Rights Act of
1965 § 5, 42 U.S.C. § 1971. The 1982 amendments to the Act expanded its coverage to any
voting measure that resulted in a lessened opportunity for equal voting rights on the part of
minorities, whether or not the state legislature explicitly intended such a result. Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1982 § 3, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
271. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 641.
272. In its insistence upon color-blind principles, the Shaw Court was willing to ignore
the facts that there had not been a single Black member of Congress from North Carolina
since Reconstruction and that White residents persisted in their refusal to vote for Black
candidates. Id. at 659 (White, J., dissenting). Indeed, North Carolina's history of exclu-
sionary voting and political participation accounted for the fact that forty of North Caro-
lina's one hundred counties were still under the mandated federal supervision of section 5
of the Voting Rights Act. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 38 (1986) ("North Caro-
lina has officially discriminated against its black citizens with respect to their exercise of the
voting franchise from approximately 1900 to 1970 by employing at different times a poll
tax [and] a literacy test .... ."); Lani Guinier, What Color Is Your Gerrymander? The Constitu-
tion and White Minority Districts, in THE POLITICS OF RACE: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE
PoLtICAL SYSrEM 226, 227 (Theodore Rueter ed., 1995) (noting North Carolina's history
of voter discrimination).
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blindness is a simple and apparently costless way to forget the racism
in American society."273
Before the Voting Rights Act, redistricting lines had historically
been drawn to create all White-majority districts. 274 Interestingly, the
Court never viewed such race-based redistricting as a debasement of
advantaged Whites; yet, the Court found debasement when two Black-
majority districts were drawn in the name of remediation.275 To state
the case in concrete terms, in the electoral context, the color-blind
approach maintains bloc voting by Whites. 276 . Aside from doing for
Whites what the Court says cannot be done for Blacks,277 this is espe-
cially troubling in light of the empirical fact that Whites who form an
electoral majority only vote for White candidates.278 It also preserves
unchallenged, old-fashioned political gerrymandering, under which
redistricting for facially neutral political purposes ensures that Whites
273. John E. Morrison, Colorblindness, Individuality, and Merit: An Analysis of the Rhetoric
Against Affirmative Action, 79 IOWA L. REv. 313, 358 (1994); see also Fair, supra note 254, at
69 ("[T]he colorblindness model allows us to continue our avoidance of one of this Na-
tion's most enduring problems-the ideology of racial supremacy."). But forgetting ra-
cism is not costless to subordinated non-Whites:
Faith in the colorblind cure contains an implicit acceptance of a significant
cost. The admitted injury imposed by the still-virulent and demeaning social con-
struction of race continues while we wait for the "just-don't-say-it" approach to
work. But this cost includes more than what can be measured by a reckoning of
those cases where racial discrimination is real in fact but not in law.
Lawrence, supra note 56, at 837.
274. Kairys, supra note 215, at 743.
275. See id. at 744 (asserting that the Supreme Court's "conservative majority is creating
what appears to be a white constitutional right not to be represented by an African Ameri-
can as a result of redistricting under the Voting Rights Act, and thereby essentially invali-
dating the Act"); Raskin, supra note 228, at 750 ("What could be wrong with such a district,
unless you assume that white people have a presumptive constitutional right to be in the
majority?").
276. Cf Theodore Reuter, The Politics of Race, in THE POLTICs OF RACE: AFRICAN AMERI-
CANS AND THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 5, 6 (Theodore Reuter ed., 1995) (noting that students of
race and politics often assume race to be "a central variable in American politics").
277. Commentators have aptly described this discrepancy:
The comparisons of Shaw with McCleskey . . . suggest that the Court's own equal
protection analysis may on occasion have an arbitrary component as well. The
comparison suggests that the Court has a tendency to undervalue serious systemic
discrimination experienced by blacks, and a tendency to be more sensitive to mar-
ginal unintended discrimination experienced by whites.
Julian A. Cook, Jr. & Mark S. Kende, Color-Blindness in the Rehnquist Court: Comparing the
Court's Treatment of Discrimination Claims by a Black Death Row Inmate and White Voting Rights
Plaintiffs, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 815, 850 (1996).
278. See Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equality, 77 VA. L. REv.
1413, 1428 (1991) (noting that 55% of White voters would vote for a White candidate over
a Black candidate, regardless of qualifications).
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retain electoral power.279 Shaw preserves White privilege in the name
of symmetrical, neutral color-blindness in that it ignores the asymmet-
rical historical influences and political meaning of race 28 0 -an effect
contrary to the MCM's stated goal of racial justice. 281
The Court's preoccupation with the harm of racial stereotyping
and the MCM's parallel concern with the racial stereotyping of bira-
cial children as Black, "stems from [the belief of some Justices] ...
that 'white' and 'Black' are devoid of political content. '2 2 Thus, the
use of racial classifications is rarely justified, because the categories
are dangerous in and of themselves. 283 Yet, where racism pervades a
political system, disadvantaged groups will tend to form coalitions for
the purpose of group empowerment.284 "If black and white voters
had identical preferences, no one would have an incentive to engage
in race-conscious districting, since the same candidates would win,
and the same laws would be enacted, regardless of the racial composi-
tion of the electorate." 28 5 Yet, the Shaw majority treats the empower-
279. See Feldman, supra note 215, at 161 (arguing that a color-blind approach cannot
overcome political gerrymandering).
280. The Court's defense of race-based privilege in the voting rights context was further
entrenched with its holding in Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 901 (1995), where the Court
concluded that an allegation that race was "a legislature's dominant and controlling ration-
ale in drawing district lines" was sufficient to state a Shaw equal-protection claim. Such a
conclusion was contrary to Shaw, where a specific allegation bore out a reapportionment
scheme so irrational on its face that, withoutjustification, it could be understood only as an
effort to segregate voters racially. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993), remanded sub
nom. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408 (E.D.N.C. 1994), rev'd, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996). Miller's
extension of the Court's seeming unwillingness ever to acknowledge race raises the princi-
ple of color-blindness to such a venerable position that any attempt to redress racial dis-
crimination effectively will be thwarted. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996), is an example
of the thwarting effect of Miller's extension. In Bush, the Court held that Texas's long
history of discrimination against minorities in the electoral process could not justify the
challenged racially drawn district lines, because the contorted shape of the district "de-
feat[ed] any claim that the districts are narrowly tailored to serve the State's interest in
avoiding liability" for vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act. Id. at 1961.
281. See Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 109 (statement of Susan Graham, Executive
Director, Project RACE).
282. Gotanda, supra note 26, at 41 (arguing that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Stewart have refused to ascribe any significance to the interplay between voters' decisions
and race).
283. See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657 ("Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting
harm to our society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our
history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin.").
284. Howard M. Shapiro, Note, Geometry and Geography: Racial Gerrymandering and the
Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 189, 199 (1984) ("Where race is a salient political factor,
group members will act substantially in concert, racial groupings will have an independent
political existence, and a theory of racial group disadvantaging can make sense.").
285. Pamela S. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn of the Century, 50
VAND. L. Riv. 291, 300 (1997). Yet, "virtually no black representatives from the South are
elected except from majority-black districts." Id. at 297. Race has also mattered in the
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ment of racial-coalition formation as equivalent to balkanization.286
The Court's position conflates the solidarity effects of racial oppres-
sion with actual racial bias and obfuscates the actual manifestations of
racial discrimination. The MCM also confuses the solidarity effects of
racial discrimination with racial stereotyping when it disregards a so-
ciopolitical view of race in favor of a cultural view of race. 287
4. The Judicial Excision of Race from Racial Discrimination Dis-
course.-The progression in the Supreme Court's development of
color-blind jurisprudence discussed above laid the groundwork for
the radical Fifth Circuit "race-blind"288  decision of Hopwood v.
Texas. 289 Hopwood reviewed the University of Texas School of Law's
preferential admissions policy for Black and Mexican-American appli-
cants. 29  The Fifth Circuit held, in contravention to the Supreme
context of increased legislative commitment to the interests of racial minorities on the part
of Black and Hispanic members of Congress. See Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Heart and
Phase Transitions: An Exploratory Study of Congress and Minority Interests, 38 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 1729, 1812 (1997) (arguing that Black and Hispanic members of Congress are more
responsive to minority interests than are White members of Congress).
286. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 657 ("Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may
balkanize us into competing racial factions.").
287. See supra notes 65-84 and accompanying text (arguing that the MCM cultural view
of race misperceives race's social meaning).
288. "Race-blindness"-i.e., the argument that "all talk of race should end"-is set forth
as a natural outgrowth of color-blindness. IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE By LAw: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 176 (1996).
289. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), reh'gen banc denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2581 (1996). Hopwood is radical because it is a departure from Supreme Court prece-
dent, and because the case is based upon the Fifth Circuit's own interpretation of the
direction of the Supreme Court color-blind jurisprudence. See id. at 944 ("Justice Powell's
view in Bakke is not binding precedent on this issue .... Indeed, recent Supreme Court
precedent shows that the diversity interest will not satisfy strict scrutiny. Foremost, the
Court appears to have decided that there is essentially only one compelling state interest to
justify racial classifications: remedying past wrongs."); see also Kennedy, supra note 233, at
1440 ("[I]n our political system, decisions rendered by the Justices of the Supreme Court
have a very special moral meaning. The decisions of the other branches chart the lines of
power but, in the eyes of many, the decisions of the Court chart the lines of legitimacy.").
The Third Circuit took a similar maverick, color-blind approach in Taxman v. Board of
Education, 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (in banc), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997), and
cert. dismissed, No. 96-679, 1997 WL 745523 (U.S. Dec. 2, 1997), which held that in the
absence of direct Supreme Court precedent, nonremedial affirmative action plans are pro-
hibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Id. at 1550.
Legislative bodies have also acted upon and extended the Court's color-blind theory with
enactments and repeals. See, e.g., Small Business Jobs Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-188, 110 Stat. 1755 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19, 26, and 42
U.S.C.); Multiethnic Placement Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 5115(a) (1994) (repealed 1996);
California Civil Rights Initiative, Proposition 209 (Nov. 5, 1996), CAL. CONsr. art. I, § 31
(outlawing all racial preferences in state employment, public contracting, and public uni-
versity admissions).
290. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 936.
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Court precedent of Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,2 91 that
race could not be used as even one of a multiplicity of factors in law
school admissions, because it was inappropriate to continue elevating
some races over others to the "detriment" of Whites, even to correct a
perceived racial imbalance in the student body. 92 Even though the
Fifth Circuit essentially circumvented the authority of the established
precedent of Bakke, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in
the Hopwood case.29 3
Just as the Supreme Court has discredited the historical and polit-
ical meaning of race in its recent color-blind jurisprudence,294 the
Fifth Circuit deduced that "one cannot conclude that [the University
of Texas's] past discrimination has created any current hostile environ-
ment for minorities,"29 despite the law school's forceful legacy of dis-
crimination.296 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit, in no uncertain terms,
291. 438 U.S. 265 (1978); see also Hopwood, 84 F.3d at 722 (Politz, C.J., dissenting)
("[T] he opinion goes out of its way to break ground that the Supreme Court itself has
been careful to avoid and purports to overrule a Supreme Court decision."); Aleinikoff,
supra note 194, at 1089 ("Justice Powell's famous 'diversity' argument in Bakke implicitly
acknowledges the reasonableness of some manner of color-conscious decision making in a
world in which race has mattered and continues to matter." (footnote omitted)).
292. The Hopwood court stated:
In summary, we hold that the University of Texas School of Law may not use
race as a factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a diverse
student body, to combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment at the law
school, to alleviate the law school's poor reputation in the minority community,
or to eliminate any present effects of past discrimination by actors other than the
law school.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 962.
293. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. at 2581.
294. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (overruling Metro
Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), with regard to the intermediate level of
scrutiny applied to congressionally mandated "benign" racial classifications); City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (O'Connor, J.) ("[T]he standard of
review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened
or benefited by a particular classification."); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
273 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("[Tihe level of scrutiny does not change merely because
the challenged classification operates against a group that historically has not been subject
to governmental discrimination.").
295. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 953.
296. SeeSweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 639 (1950) (finding that the University of Texas
Law School's denial of admission to an applicant based upon his race violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Judge Stewart, who dissented in the
denial of rehearing en banc in Hopwood, noted the law school's legacy of discrimination:
To divorce the time in which it was legally possible for Sweatt to attend the Law
School from the reality he experienced there is to ignore the very insidiousness of
racial discrimination. It was the vestiges of that discrimination which, far from
being destroyed, thrived and drove Sweatt out of the Law School.
Hopwood, 84 F.3d at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Judge Stewart also noted that one year
after being admitted to law school, Sweatt left "'without graduating after being subjected
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declared war upon any race-conscious affirmative action, so that "if
the law school continues to operate a disguised or overt racial classifi-
cation system in the future, its actors could be subject to actual and
punitive damages." '297 Hopwood's race-blind frustration of racial equal-
ity lends a negative cast to the MCM's desire ultimately to abolish all
systems of racial classification because of their seeming divisiveness.
The four cases discussed above demonstrate that one of the most
problematic implications of the Court's color-blind theories is its ahis-
torical demand for racial symmetry in the implementation of remedial
measures to promote equality.29 The cases show that symmetrical
preclusion of race-based factors in legal analysis results in hierarchical
allocation of privilege across race. Similarly, the MCM advocates ra-
cial symmetry when it demands that biracial cultural identities be su-
perimposed upon the political meaning of race to reflect White
ancestry as well as non-White ancestry.299 What MCM proponents fail
to acknowledge, however, is that their multiracial-symmetry demand is
made within a society in which non-Whites are considered inferior;
therefore, the MCM proposal would elevate those individuals who can
successfully claim some portion of privileged whiteness. The appro-
priation of the MCM by a mainstream interest concerned about the
possible decline in White demographic predominance augments the
potential elevation of biracial persons as a middle-tier buffer against
challenges to White privilege.
The imposition of a theory of racial symmetry upon an already
existing racial caste system renders imbalanced treatment of Whites
and Blacks.300 This is because color-blind theory can make no distinc-
tion between race-based harm to subordinated populations and di-
to racial slurs from students and professors, cross burnings, and tire slashings.'" Id. (quot-
ing Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 555 (1994), rev'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), reh'g en
banc denied, 84 F.3d 720 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2581 (1996)).
297. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 959.
298. See Aleinikoff, supra note 194, at 1105 (stating that the color-blindness theory ap-
plies abstract symmetry); see also supra note 292.
299. Such an argument is implicit in the statements of some members of the MCM. See
ZAcK, supra note 44, at 95-96 (lamenting the fact that successful Black leaders of the Har-
lem Renaissance did not claim a mixed-race identity to reflect their White ancestry in addi-
tion to their Black ancestry).
300. One commentator has noted:
Colorblindness puts the burden on blacks to change; to receive "equal" treat-
ment, they must be seen by whites as "white." Hence, the "compliment" that
some whites pay to blacks: "I don't think of you as black." Colorblindness is, in
essence, not the absence of color, but rather monochromatism: whites can be
colorblind when there is only one race-when blacks become white.
Aleinikoff, supra note 194, at 1081 (footnotes omitted).
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rected race-based approaches to address such subordination." °1 In
fact, some view the insistence on the color-blind approach as a pur-
poseful method for privileging Whites and disadvantaging Blacks in
order to create an apartheid-like system in the United States.3 0 2 Im-
plementation of a mixed-race census count would be a regulatory ex-
tension of color-blind jurisprudence because of its implicit focus upon
race as solely cultural and devoid of political content. Therefore, the
MCM should be wary of becoming the next step in the progression of
a color-blind agenda, which has proven to work against the MCM's
equality goal.
301. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 264 (1995) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) ("The majority's concept of 'consistency' ignores a difference, fundamental to the
idea of equal protection, between oppression and assistance."); WEST, supra note 254, at 64-
65 (stating that given this nation's "historically weak will toward racial justice and substan-
tive redistributive measures.., an attack on affirmative action is an attack on redistributive
efforts by progressives"); Aleinikoff, supra note 194, at 1106 (questioning equal treatment
of race-based reparation measures and discrimination in light of the history of racial op-
pression and continued inequality); Harris, supra note 63, at 1770 (asserting that the pre-
sumption of White innocence with respect to affirmative action programs masks settled
expectations of continued White privilege).
302. See Kairys, supra note 215, at 737, 748 (positing that the Supreme Court's conserva-
tive majority has no legitimate claim to neutrality in race discrimination cases when, for the
purposes of racial equality, it exercises judicial restraint where Blacks are disadvantaged,
and judicial activism where Whites are inconvenienced); Florence Wagman Roisman, The
Lessons ofAmerican Apartheid: The Necessity and Means of Promoting Residential Racial Integra-
tion, 81 IowA L. REv. 479, 499-512 (1995) (reviewing DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993),
which examines the effects of residual racial segregation in the United States as compara-
ble to those of South African apartheid). It should be noted that, given the government's
concomitant commitment to race-conscious, social justice efforts, post-apartheid South Af-
rica's stated goal for a nonracial society is not a color-blind goal. See SPENCER, supra note
44, at 154 (describing the South African government's abandonment of official racial des-
ignations but noting its confirmed use of racially connected factors such as geographical
locations, languages, and last names for purposes of affirmative action).
Many commentators view the Court's current development of color-blind jurispru-
dence as a recurrence of the post-Civil War Restoration/Redemption rejection of the sub-
stantive equality efforts that followed the Reconstruction. See, e.g., Jamie B. Raskin,
Affirmative Action and Racial Reaction, 38 How. L.J. 521, 522 (1995) ("If the m!odern civil
rights movement is indeed America's 'second Reconstruction,' the current period is our
second Redemption-a partial but systematic unraveling of the social progress made by
the civil rights movement." (footnote omitted)); Sondra Hemeryck et al., Comment, Recon-
struction, Deconstruction and Legislative Response: The 1988 Supreme Court Term and the Civil
Rights Act of 1990, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 475, 476 (1990) (noting many parallels be-
tween the late nineteenth-century Supreme Court's retreat from congressional protection
of racial minorities and the recent Court's narrowing of laws and rules enacted to benefit
the same); Derrick Bell, Et Tu, A.C.L.U.?, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1996, at A23, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File (observing that the Supreme Court's recent color-blind ap-
proach echoes the post-Reconstruction period, when the Court used color-blindness to
invalidate legislation intended to protect former slaves).
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Moreover, a mixed-race census count would further eviscerate ra-
cial justice efforts by presenting the presumed classification difficulties
of biracial persons as support for the proposition that race is too bio-
logically indeterminate to classify. 30 3 Specifically, the idealization of a
color-blind society without racial classifications is facilitated by the
multiracial discourse view of race as a dynamic too fluid to be defined
precisely, which, in turn, makes "societal" discrimination too nebulous
to identify or monitor through statistical data collection. 0 4 Yet, race
can only be viewed as indeterminate when approached as a scientific
concept where "pure" races are difficult to identify because of cultural
and historical racial mixtures. In contrast, racial distinctions are not
perplexing when race is instead recognized as a social construct with
political meanings derived from our nation's historical subordinate
positioning of non-Whites.
The danger of the Court's color-blind approach, and of the
MCM's appeal for the same approach in their goal of eradicating ra-
cism, is that it maintains systems of White privilege.30 5 This is what
makes a color-blind approach such an inappropriate tool for combat-
ing racial subordination. 0 6 One commentator notes:
303. Cf Johnson, supra note 34, at 891 (stating that the goal of multiracial categories is
to create "shade confusion," which will eventually destroy the Black-White dichotomy and
reduce race to a "meaningless category").
304. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 220 (viewing societal discrimination as too amorphous to
justify the use of a race-conscious racial justice plan); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 316
n.39 (1987) ("Finally, in our heterogeneous society the lower courts have found the
boundaries of race and ethnicity increasingly difficult to determine.").
305. One commentator has observed:
At the same time that Whites wanted to become color-blind, Blacks were demand-
ing separate admission standards to schools and jobs. Thus the ideology of uni-
versalism must be viewed in the proper context. It is mostly an attempt by Whites
to maintain institutional arrangements which embody the residual results of past
overt racism.
ROBERT STAPLES, INTRODUCTION TO BLACK SOCIOLOGY 261 (1976); accord Feldman, supra
note 220, at 154 (asserting that color-blindness institutionalizes the status quo of White
privilege over Black disadvantage); Gotanda, supra note 26, at 2-3 ("A color-blind interpre-
tation of the Constitution legitimates, and thereby maintains, the social, economic, and
political advantages that whites hold over other Americans."); Harris, supra note 63, at
1768 ("[P]rotection of the property interest in whiteness is achieved by embracing the
norm of colorblindness.").
A separate danger that Neil Gotanda perceives from the widespread acceptance of the
color-blind norm is that "[t]he successful abolition of 'Black' as a meaningful concept
would require abolishing the distinctiveness that we attribute to Black community, culture,
and consciousness." Gotanda, supra note 26, at 59.
306. See Aleinikoff, supra note 194, at 1162 (arguing that color-blind theoretical ap-
proaches to legal analysis of equality claims are "an impediment in the struggle to end
racial inequality"); Gotanda, supra note 26, at 18 ("[T]he nonrecognition [of race] is a
means of avoiding or repressing consideration of the social relations and social context
that are associated with race."); id. at 37 (asserting that a color-blind approach "denies the
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[H]ere is the perversity of color-blindness-to banish race-
words redoubles the hegemony of race by targeting efforts to
combat racism while leaving race and its effects unchal-
lenged and embedded in society, seemingly natural rather
than the product of social choices. If all mention of race,
whether White or Black, remedial or discriminatory, is
equally suspect, the reality of racial subordination is ob-
scured and immunized from intervention. °7
In short, the multiracial discourse engaged in the support for a mixed-
race census count creates the danger of inadvertently supporting the
maintenance of status quo racial inequality.3 "' This danger can be
located in the multiracial discourse conceptualization of race as too
fluid to monitor.30 9 The legacy of multiracial discourse will be its abil-
ity seemingly to validate and reinforce the color-blindness that limits
racial equality. 310
D. Measurement of Racial Progress Hindered
[T] he veneer is very thin. Scratch colorblindness, and white
supremacy comes to the surface pretty quickly."
In analyzing the advisability of a mixed-race census count, it is
particularly important to examine the uses of census racial data. Cen-
sus racial data is principally used to enforce the civil rights mandates
against discrimination in employment,312 in the selling and renting of
homes,3 13 and in the allocation of mortgages.3 14 The U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development also uses racial data to de-
termine where to locate low-income and public housing.315 More
importantly, census racial data has also been used in voting-rights re-
experience of oppression and limits the range of remedies available for redress"); id. at 59
(positing that the color-blind ideal's implicit social goal of assimilation degrades positive
aspects of blackness, because it seeks homogeneity in society rather than diversity).
307. HANEv L6PEZ, supra note 288, at 177; accord Crenshaw, supra note 122, at 1346-47
(noting that color-blindness cannot correct racial subordination it does not recognize).
308. See powell, supra note 53, at 13 ("Without racial statistics .... racism, which is still
very much a part of our society, will be that much harder to identify, that much more
difficult to eradicate, and that much more likely to remain a societal norm.").
309. See supra note 53.
310. SeeAleinikoff, supra note 194, at 1122 ("Race-neutral strategies simply postpone our
society's inevitable rendezvous with its history of racism.").
311. Raskin, supra note 228, at 745.
312. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
313. Id. § 3604.
314. Id. § 3605.
315. Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 267 (testimony of Paul Williams, General Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary for Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity, U.S. Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development).
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districting to improve the political participation of people of color.316
Indeed, the OMB racial and ethnic classifications were devised for the
specific purpose of facilitating the enforcement of civil rights laws and
not for promoting particular cultural identifications for groups of
people. 17 As one commentator noted during the congressional hear-
ings on the multiracial-category proposal: "In terms of our nation's
civil rights laws and programs, the number of self-identified Swedes
may be interesting, but not salient."3 18 Accordingly, the census is an
inappropriate forum for the expression of a color-blind ideal.
The important political implications of racial classifications make
the OMB's recent "check-all-that-apply" option"' as hazardous as the
multiracial category itself. Like the MCM, the OMB overlooks how
government inquiry into race matters. When a person of color exper-
iences discrimination, that experience of racism is not cut in half be-
cause the person is only "one-half Black" or "one-half Asian." Because
the census's race question is a mechanism for monitoring the extent
to which socioeconomic opportunities are stratified by race, it is non-
sensical to divvy up the racial classification response into shares (like
the long-since-repudiated categories of octoroon, quadroon, and Mu-
latto) ,32 when the social experience of race is not perceived in shares.
Furthermore, the comprehensive scope of the OMB "check-all-that-
apply" decision inflates the race-as-culture fractioning of race's polit-
ical meaning. The OMB decision is comprehensive in that any indi-
vidual can check as many boxes as reflect her racial heritage, without
viewing herself as a mixed-race person because both parents are of the
same race.32 This fractured mechanism for monitoring patterns of
racial difference will underappreciate the extent to which socioeco-
nomic opportunities are structured by race322 and therefore function
as a color-blind racial classification system.
316. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1994).
317. See Directive No. 15, supra note 9, at 19,629 (noting that, among other things, racial
classifications were established to monitor civil rights compliance and maintain compara-
ble data across federal agencies).
318. Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 96 (testimony of Henry Der, National Coalition
for an Accurate Count of Asians and Pacific Islanders).
319. See Revisions to Directive No. 15, supra note 7, at 58,789.
320. SeeJOEL WILLIAMSON, NEW PEOPLE: MISCEGENATION AND MULArOES IN THE UNITED
STATES 112 (1980) (explaining that pure Blacks, Mulattoes, quadroons, and octoroons
were counted separately in the 1890 census, that the results were unreliable, and that the
census never again attempted to make such distinctions); see also supra notes 157-159 and
accompanying text (discussing the 1850-1920 censuses, which included a separate Mulatto
category).
321. See Revisions to Directive No. 15, supra note 7, at 58,789.
322. See Stephen Barr & Michael A. Fletcher, US. Proposes Multiple Racial Identification for
2000 Census, WASH. POST, July 9, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 11972903 (identifying
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The fallacy of the color-blind theory is its premise that non-recog-
nition of race is equivalent to the non-perception of race.323 Yet,
"[s] uppressing the recognition of a racial classification in order to act
as if a person were not of some cognizable racial class is inherently
racially premised";324 "[i] n pretending to ignore race, this society de-
nies itself the self-knowledge that is demanded for eradicating racism
and achieving racial justice."325 Color-blindness, in effect, is a denial
that race matters.326  "There is very little difference between black
Americans and white Americans when you go to the bottom of it. But
what little there is, is very important. "327
Color-blind discourse not only masks racial hierarchies that exist
in society and history,32 it entrenches those hierarchies, while con-
tending that racism no longer exists.3 29 Yet, nothing could be further
from the truth.33 ' The ongoing discrimination against Blacks in the
that the significant challenge to civil rights enforcement will depend on how the "overlap"
in races is tabulated by the census).
323. See Krieger, supra note 207, at 1198, 1202 (asserting that natural human cognitive
organization predisposes people to categorize and stereotype by race); David Berreby, Pri-
mary Colors, SCIENCES, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 38, 40 (theorizing that, absent teachings by others,
racial thinking arises in children by age three).
324. Gotanda, supra note 26, at 19.
325. Aleinikoff, supra note 194, at 1125. Another commentator explains:
The eradication of barriers has created a new dilemma for those victims of racial
oppression who are not in a position to benefit from the move to formal equality.
The race neutrality of the legal system creates the illusion that racism is no longer
the primary factor responsible for the condition of the Black underclass ....
Crenshaw, supra note 122, at 1383.
326. See generally WEST, supra note 254. Another dangerous outcome of the color-blind
approach is that it denies that race matters and at the same time insists that the laws of
equality can address any discrimination that "truly" occurs. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 101, 104 (1992) ("The worship of
equality rules as having absolute power benefits whites by preserving a benevolent but fic-
tional self-image, and such worship benefits blacks by preserving hope.").
327. Gerald Early, Introduction to LuRE AND LOATHING: ESSAYS ON RACE, IDENTITY, AND
THE AMBIVALENCE OF ASSIMILATION Xi, xvii (Gerald Early ed., 1993) (paraphrasing the un-
lettered workman in William James's "The Gospel of Relaxation") (internal quotation
marks omitted).
328. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTrING
EDGE 169, 171-72 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) (arguing that the cultural heritage of slavery
and segregation informs the race-consciousness of present-day individuals and leads to a
perpetuation of the racial hierarchy that characterized those races).
329. See id. at 172 ("Anti-black attitudes persist in a climate of denial."); Charles R. Law-
rence, III, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning to Think and Talk About Race, Again,
15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 9 (1995) ("This kind of massive denial is not possible unless
there is also a strictly enforced taboo against speaking publicly about that which we do not
wish to see.").
330. See BELL, supra note 326, at 92, 97 (maintaining that, given the racial reality of the
last three centuries, racism is a seemingly permanent fixture in the United States); Davis,
supra note 328, at 170 (positing that U.S. society commonly regards Blacks as incompetent
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United States economy is well documented. 3 ' In addition, social reli-
ance upon racially biased premises persists, as borne out by the well-
noted and continuing refusal of taxi-cab drivers to accommodate
Black male passengers,3" 2 and the continuing police practice of view-
ing all Black people as criminals.333
The experience of being presumed a criminal until
proved otherwise is one that African-American men, rich and
poor, know too well. Taxis that fail to stop, nighttime pedest-
rians who scuttle away in fear and random roustings by po-
lice and security guards are common events in the lives of
black men-but often viewed as paranoid fantasies by white
Americans, who are generally exempt from the presumption
of criminality. 3 4
While Black men are documented as presumptive criminals,
Black women are derogatorily presumed to be undeserving weffare
recipients.335 Thus, given its correlation with economic and social in-
and reflects "traditional stereotype [s] of blacks [as possessing an] inferior mentality, primi-
tive morality, emotional instability, laziness, boisterousness, closeness to anthropoid ances-
tors, occupational instability, superstition, care-free attitude, and ignorance").
331. See HACKER, supra note 101, at 230-36 (providing empirical data that demonstrates
racial disparities across numerous economic indicators); WEST, supra note 254, at 63
("[B]lack poverty is primarily due to the distribution of wealth, power, and income-a
distribution influenced by the racial caste system .... ."); WILIAMS, supra note 181, at 59
("The power of de facto segregation in all areas of American life is still so strong that very
few African-Americans are not directly affected by poverty, crime, and discrimination.");
Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HtARv. L.
REv. 817, 819 (1991) (demonstrating by empirical research that retail car dealerships sys-
tematically offer substantially better prices on identical cars to White men than they do to
Blacks or women); Trina Grilo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race:
The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other-isms), in CRITICAL
RACE THEORY. THE CUTTING EDGE 564, 569 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995) ("The privileging
of some groups in society over others is a fact of contemporary American life .... This
societal ordering is clear to children as early as kindergarten." (footnote omitted)); Robert
E. Suggs, Bringing Small Business Development to Urban Neighborhoods, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 487, 488 (1995) (noting that racial barriers stifle Black business activity in Black
communities).
332. See Hamil R. Harris, For Blacks, Cabs Can Be Hard to Get; Discrimination Is Elusive
Problem Regulators Say, WASH. PosT, July 21, 1994, at J1, available in 1994 WL 2430870 (re-
porting that despite a lawsuit and 778 complaints in 1993-1994, cab drivers continue to
refuse to pick up Black passengers because they are generally "afraid" of them).
333. The 6:42 from Chappaqua, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1995, at A28, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Nyt File (reporting an incident in which professionally attired Earl G. Graves, Jr., a
Yale- and Harvard-educated senior vice-president of Black Enterprise Magazine, was seized
and publicly searched in Grand Central Station on his way to work because of an anony-
mous letter claiming a much smaller Black man was carrying a gun).
334. Id.
335. See Marlene Cimons, Myths Color Views on Who Receives Aid, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Jan. 29,
1995, at 24, available in 1995 WL 6632029 (asserting that the average American believes
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dicators, race is not, as Justice Scalia and other proponents of color-
blindness insist, an irrelevant characteristic like eye color or hair
shade. 3
36
It is important to note that the racial categories themselves do
not confer stigma upon non-White classifications, but rather racism
informs and stigmatizes the categories. 37 Accordingly, eliminating
the categories would not eliminate racism itself. The differentiation
individuals and institutions make for purposes of self-interest would
still occur. By way of comparison, within the context of gender dis-
crimination, it is not the label "woman" which relegates women to less
pay than men. Similarly, the needed transformation from paternalisti-
cally referring to all women as "girls" did not effect a concrete change
in their economic status with respect to men.33' Labels themselves
cannot "other" a group of people. 3 9 Therefore, simply discontinuing
that the typical welfare recipient is an unmarried Black woman with "lots of children and
no desire to get a job," despite the fact that for the past two decades, the typical welfare
recipient has actually been a rural White person, and the actual number of Black women
on public assistance has decreased significantly); cf. PATRiciAJ. WiLLIAMs, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS 44-45 (1991) (noting that Black women have been presumed to be shop-
lifting at retail stores where they have been denied admission by the use of buzzer systems);
Taunya Lovell Banks, Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman Law Professor, 6 BERU,-
LEY WOMEN'S L.J. 46, 50 (1990-91) (noting that Black women are not insulated by gender
from the fear Whites have of Blacks).
336. See Strauss, supra note 219, at 114 (maintaining that centuries of explicitly race-
based discrimination have imbued a political meaning to race, which correlates poverty
with blackness and thus makes true color-blindness unattainable).
337. See powell, supra note 53, at 12 ("Dropping racial categories from the Census will
not alleviate the racial hierarchy that supports the systems of resource distribution in
American society."). But see John Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the
Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 363, 379 (1966) ("[A]ny legal
classification by race weakens the government as an educative force."); William Van Al-
styne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U. CHL L. REv. 775,
809 (1979) ("[O]ne gets beyond racism by getting beyond it now: by a complete, resolute,
and credible commitment never to tolerate in one's own life-or in the life or practices of
one's government-the differential treatment of other human beings by race.").
338. See Judy Mann, Taking Another Crack at the Wage Gap, WASH. PosT, July 2, 1997, at
D10, available in 1997 WL 11971805 (reporting that, according to the U.S. Census Bureau,
women on average earn $9000 less per year than men).
339. See Piper, supra note 96, at 30 ("[I]t doesn't really matter what term we use to
designate those who have inferior and disadvantaged status, because whatever term is used
will eventually turn into a term of derision and disparagement by virtue of its reference to
those who are derided and disparaged . . . ."). One commentator has observed:
Slaves, when "freed," often referred to themselves by a new name. Similarly, the
Black Muslims, in an effort to change their identities as subordinate in the polit-
ical and social world, changed their names. But renaming cannot be accom-
plished at the surface level of surnames, nor even at the deeper level of social and
political discourse. This is true because the problematic of race is accessible only
at a deeper level-a level that mediates between the social and political, and be-
tween sign and meaning.
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the use of labels or renaming them will fail to suspend racism; indeed,
as this Article has argued, it can actually hamper society's ability to do
so.
3 40 To work effectively toward the eradication of racism, it is essen-
tial to acknowledge the existence and social significance of racial dis-
tinctions.34' In a nation such as ours, where race unquestionably
matters, it is imperative to ground the evaluation of the proposal for a
mixed-race census count within a race-conscious theoretical structure
and with the understanding that recognizing racial hierarchy does not
cause racism.3 42 It is only by asserting a race-conscious narrative of
what race means politically that the negative aspects of multiracial dis-
course can be countered.
III. A RAcE-CONSCIous RACIAL CLASSIFICATION PROPOSAL
Race-consciousness, as advanced by Critical Race theorists, advo-
cates the explicit recognition of race and its meaning in our society.3 4
It is the idea that race matters to one's perception and experience of
(and in) the world, and thus it acknowledges that racial meanings are
not symmetrical.' This Article seeks to clarify the way in which race-
consciousness should emphasize the political aspects of race in legal
analysis as opposed to more diffusive appeals for respect of cultural
diversity. Although cultural diversity is a laudable societal goal, it is an
imprecise mechanism for legally assessing discrimination. Its lack of
precision for the antidiscrimination context arises from the manner in
which cultural approaches to race focus upon personal identity as a
D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self 82 GEO. L.J. 437,
506 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
340. See generally Winant, supra note 81 (maintaining that decontextualizing race ob-
scures tangible racial difference).
341. See generally WEST, supra note 254 (examining the ways in which the experience of
African Americans in the United States is framed by their race).
342. See Aleinikoff, supra note 194, at 1087 (arguing that while "White racism has made
'blackness' a relevant category in our society," this is not the case for "colorblindness
[which] seeks to deny the continued social significance of the category, to tell blacks that
they are no different from whites, even though blacks as blacks are persistently made to
feel that difference"); Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE L.J. 758, 835 (asserting
that Whites have linked identification of race-consciousness with the evils of racism).
343. See Kennedy, supra note 233, at 1424 ("A better way to formulate the meaning of
equal protection in the race-relations context is to... look[ ] beyond the process produc-
ing inequality in the social relations of racially identifiable groups, to the objective indicia
of inequality itself."). See generally CTICAL RACE THEORY: THE CIrTING EDGE (Richard
Delgado ed., 1995) (compiling writings that focus on the ways in which race informs an
individual's experience); CRrIcAL RACE THEORY. THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT (KimberbE Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) (anthologizing essays from Critical Race
theorists). This notion predates the Critical Race Theory movement. See BALDWIN, supra
note 86, at 104 ("Color is not a human or a personal reality; it is a political reality.").
344. See Peller, supra note 342, at 790.
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central feature of racial difference. But it is not the manner in which
an individual may feel kinship with fellow group members and
thereby assert a group identity that causes racial bias. In contrast, it is
the way in which groups are "othered," and thereby racialized that is
manifested in racial discrimination and is thus most salient to meth-
ods for evaluating and monitoring instances of discrimination.3 4 5 In
order to have the law successfully work toward the goal of racial equal-
ity, legal analysis should shift from the discourse of color-blindness to
that of race-consciousness (as more narrowly focused herein) .346 The
proposal that this Part sets forth is rooted in the premise that, in order
to document and hopefully assist in eradicating such subordination,
categories should be reflective of the existing racial and ethnic hierar-
chy rather than constructed from individual cultural identities.
34 7
In an era in which the persistence of racism is increasingly called
into question,3 4 8 there is a vital need for accurate data demonstrating
the correlation between racially subordinated categories and inten-
tionally withheld economic and educational opportunities.3 4 9 As
borne out by the Latin American experience with mixed-race catego-
345. One scholar notes:
The social constructedness of race in America means that no one person
controls it. The category I check on my Census form is not determinative.
Whether I see myself as black, Negro, African American, multiracial, or Other is
only part of the equation. When I visit the suburbs to shop for a house, my race is
important-to my realtor and potential neighbors, as well as to me. The taxi
driver who passes me on the street is not concerned with what was put on my
Census form. Race is not simply a noun; race is a verb. It is what we do in order-
ing our society.
powell, supra note 53, at 13.
346. See Aleinikoff, supra note 194, at 1062 ("[Iln order to make progress in ending
racial oppression and racism, our political and moral discourse must move from color-
blindness to color-consciousness, from antidiscrimination to racial justice."); Crenshaw,
supra note 122, at 1369 ("Exposing the centrality of race consciousness is crucial to identify-
ing and delegitimating beliefs that present hierarchy as inevitable and fair.").
347. Cf powell, supra note 53, at 12 ("Modifying statistical categories to dilute or refract
racial data is ineffectual, unless the desired effect is obscuring the reality of racial dispar-
ity."). But see Payson, supra note 34, at 1286 (contending that the use of a racial classifica-
tion system to reflect racial hierarchy acts to reinforce its existence rather than assist in
efforts to identify and redress discrimination).
348. See BELL, supra note 326, at 92 ("The real problem is that my view-that racism is
permanent-conflicts with and seems inimical to [most others'] world view."); WILLIAMS,
supra note 181, at 40 (arguing that, in light of the silence surrounding racism, activists must
"religitimate" discussions of racial tensions).
349. See Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 96 (testimony of Henry Der, National Coa-
lition for an Accurate Count of Asians and Pacific Islanders):
Until there is adequate testing or sufficient evidence is provided about the exper-
iences of biracial or multiracial persons that are unique to their being biracial or
multiracial, the national coalition asks the Census Bureau not to create a biracial
or multiracial category at this time. It is not clear at this time what is the salience
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ries,3 5 0 a mixed-race census count would interfere with the ability to
draw these correlations by clouding the inquiry into discrimination.3 5'
Furthermore, the absence of a mixed-race census count may allow
more effective monitoring of the discrimination perpetrated against
mixed-race persons. That is because the racial hierarchy tends to view
biracial persons as inferior, not because they are mixed-race, but be-
cause they are non-White.3 52 And it is this facet of the discrimination
against biracials as persons of color that must be measured and ad-
dressed in the struggle for racial equality. 353 Accordingly, the current
racial categories and single-box-checking system should remain intact
to the extent they reflect the ways in which society ranks its
members.3 5 4
Any system of racial classification will be imperfect in its ability to
reflect completely the individuality of each person counted. 355 Yet, it
is not the specific identity of individuals that is at stake in the census
inquiry into race, but the collection of data to assess group-based
of knowing how many biracial and multiracial person there are... [in terms of
our nation's civil rights laws and programs ....
The one factor that multiracial-category proponents set forth as salient and unique to
the identity of mixed-race persons is their need for mixed-race bone marrow donors. See
Douglass, supra note 50 (announcing a bone marrow drive planned for the July 20, 1996
Multiracial Solidarity March on Washington). Yet, the medical literature does not directly
address the special donor needs of biracial donees. Cf Alan H. Goodman, Bred in the
Bone?, THE SCIENCES, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 20, 21 (noting that genetic variations "are greatest
within so-called races rather than among them").
350. See supra notes 115-123 and accompanying text.
351. See Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 193 (testimony of Steven Carbo, Staff Attor-
ney, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund) ("[M]ultiracial categories
do lend themselves a lack of clarity [sic] regarding the motivations of persons who
discriminate.").
352. See FUNDERBURG, supra note 58, at 44 (interviewing a biracial person who noted that
"maybe I'm half-white, but people look at me and don't think that").
353. But see Goforth, supra note 34, at 9-10 ("Moreover, the idea that social reality re-
quires us to recognize the concept of 'race' seems to me an example of circular reason-
ing."). However, Goforth's indictment falters in the face of the actual Latin American
difficulty in addressing racism in a social context that refuses to use consistent racial cate-
gories-that is, when they are utilized at all. See supra note 129. Although light-skinned
"monoracial" Blacks are provided with access to greater opportunities than their darker-
skinned group members, that colorism dynamic could not be measured with a multiracial
category, because mixed-race persons are of all shades and phenotypes.
354. A compulsory single-box-checking system reflects the way in which mixed-race indi-
viduals are treated based on their non-White status. See supra notes 87-103 and accompany-
ing text.
355. See Revisions to Directive No. 15, supra note 7, at 58,788-90 (adopting a census data-
collection system that allows individuals to choose as many racial categories as they feel
apply). However, even this system cannot completely reflect each person's individuality, as
the instrument by its construct will still force individuals to check predefined boxes.
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harms. 56 As such, the focus of a census racial classification system
should be upon the distinctions in race which form the basis of group-
based harms. This needed focus on the politics of difference is not
compatible with the MCM culture-focused identity politics ap-
proach. 357 A race-conscious classification system intentionally empha-
sizes the politics of difference by organizing itself around the ways in
which groups are racially subordinated.
A race-conscious racial classification system is an instrumental
mechanism for monitoring racial discrimination.35 There is a value
in vigilance in and of itself, separate from the existence of race-based
remedies, in that racism is allowed to run rampant when its effects are
concealed from public view. The compilation of statistical data can
act as a social-systems monitor when individuals utilize the data to call
society to account for the entrenched benefits of race-based privilege.
Even if the current scheme of civil rights laws were dismantled, it
would still be important to measure the extent of race discrimination
consistently over time, thereby developing other mechanisms for ad-
dressing such racism.359 For example, even though the McCleskey
356. See Nancy A. Denton, Racial Identity and Census Categories: Can Incorrect Categories
Yield Correct Information?, 15 LAw & INEQ. J. 83, 89 (1997) (arguing that the crucial differ-
ence between individual identity and social identity comes to light in understanding that
the "discrimination and prejudice that the use of the categories is intended to help remedy
are triggered by how society views a person, regardless of how that person defines himself
or herself').
357. Iris Marion Young, Deferring Group Representation, in ETHNICrrV AND GROUP RIGHTS
349, 354-68 (Ian Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., 1997) (delineating the important distinc-
tion between identity politics and the politics of "difference" that enhances society's ability
to address group-based harms through group representation). Identity politics emphasizes
the centrality of personal identities in forming world views. CRAIG CALHOUN, CRITICAL SO-
CIAL THEORY CULTURE, HISTORY, AND THE CHALLENGE OF DIFFERENCE 198, 204 (1995) (con-
tending that identity politics refers to the invocation of race, nation, gender, class, and a
host of other identities as an organizing principle for group politics). It should also be
noted that MCM advocates are not the only persons who conflate race-as-culture with the
sociopolitical meaning of race. Stephen L. Carter, The Black Table, the Empty Seat, and the
Tie, in LURE AND LOATHING: ESSAYS ON RACE, IDENTrIY, AND THE AMBIVALENCE OF ASSIMILA-
TION 55, 66 (Gerald Early ed., 1993) (identifying that the substance of the author's Black
identity is his love of Black people); see also supra note 21 (noting the ways in which some
Latinos and Latinas fuse culture with race when responding to the census race question).
Accordingly, this Article's clarification of the sociopolitical meaning of race in the govern-
ment's use of racial classifications may be useful outside of the multiracial identity context.
Haney L6pez, supra note 22, at 5 (noting that critical race theorists "argue for race con-
sciousness, yet do so without explicitly suggesting what race might be").
358. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994) (outlining the use of census racial data to enforce
the civil rights mandates against discrimination in employment); id. § 3604 (discrimination
in the sale and renting of homes); id. § 3605 (discrimination in the allocation of
mortgages).
359. But seeJudy Scales-Trent, Add 'Multiracial' to the Next Census, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 1996,
at B9 ("Statistical data can help improve the lot of black Americans-but only when white
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equal protection claim was not based upon a remedial statute, 6' the
recognition of race's political meaning in the compilation of statistical
data was crucial for explaining the lack of equity for Blacks in the
criminal justice system.3 61
Given the significant uses of the census racial data and the persis-
tence of racial discrimination, it is important to utilize a classification
scheme built around the political meaning of race 6 2 and make that
focus a prominent feature of the census form's instructions.363
This Article proposes an openly race-conscious, single-box-check-
ing census classification system. Such a system is needed because of
the manner in which the hypo-descent rule"6 seemingly pertains to
all non-Whites in varying degrees, due to the fact that all forms of
non-whiteness are deemed inferior to whiteness.3 61 In fact, acknowl-
Americans want this to happen; the numbers themselves have no independent power.").
Yet, society's refusal to acknowledge statistical demonstrations of racism would only be
compounded by the failure to collect the data at all. See supra note 308.
360. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987) (noting that McCleskey's claim
that the Georgia capital sentencing process violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments was based on a statistical study that purportedly showed disparate treatment of de-
fendants based primarily on the race of their victims).
361. McCleskey's failure to succeed with his equal protection claim has been attributed
to the Court's disinterest in reforming the entire criminal justice system, rather than any
failings in the power of statistical data to demonstrate bias. Carter, supra note 233, at 446-
47.
362. See Haney L6pez, supra note 22, at 38 ("Race is not hereditary; our parents do not
impart to us our race. Instead, society attaches specific significance to our ancestry ... ").
One commentator explains this idea even further:
What joins me to other blacks, then, and other blacks to another, is not a set of
shared physical characteristics, for there is none that all blacks share. Rather, it is
the shared experience of being visually or cognitively identified as black by a white
racist society, and the punitive and damaging effects of the identification.
Piper, supra note 96, at 30-31.
363. See Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 274 (testimony of Norma V. Canth, Assis-
tant Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education) (demonstrating that data
are lost because people are not given adequate instructions on how to fill out the census
forms and for what the information is used).
364. See supra note 41.
365. See supra Part II.A. My proposal is premised upon the centrality of racism against all
persons considered non-White. This premise is distinct from the notion that counting
persons as simply White or non-White would be sufficient for monitoring the existence of
racism. Cf. Nathan Glazer, The Hard Questions: Race for the Cure, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 7,
1996, at 29, available in 1996 WL 9233603 (proposing that the census should only inquire
whether the respondent is Black, because "[r]ace in America means blacks," and explain-
ing that the numbers from the census are used to measure programs combatting racism
against Blacks). A simplification to only White and non-White racial categories would hin-
der the nation's ability to monitor and inform itself about the distinct ways in which various
communities experience racism. For instance, the racism against racial minorities who do
not speak English or speak what is deemed to be heavily-accented English is distinct from
that against persons who do speak English. It is still racism, but the ways in which the
166 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 57:97
edging the political meaning of race is crucial in working toward the
MCM's goal of racial equality, which has thus far been missing from
the discourse of the movement itself.3 6 6
Because a race-conscious classification system can be more effec-
tively tailored to monitor racial discrimination, the current census
classification system needs definitional modification to be more effec-
tive.3 67 For example, the system's ambiguous definitions create confu-
sion in respondents. The current census scheme defines "Black" as
being a person who has "origins in any of the black racial groups of
Africa" and "White" as being a person who has "origins in any of the
original peoples of Europe, North America, or the Middle East. 368
The doctrinal problem with such definitions is that their inadvertent
approach to race as a biological concept makes them perplexing to
implement:
linguistic subordination is implemented may need to be addressed in a different manner
than other racial equality issues. See Mark L. Adams, Fear of Foreigners: Nativism and Work-
place Language Restrictions, 74 OR. L. REv. 849, 864 (1995) (noting that many proponents of
English-only ordinances argue that such laws are necessary to protect the United States'
national unity). In order to develop an effective mechanism for combatting all types of
racism, we, as a society, need to collect information about the various communities that are
viewed as non-White. A variation upon this proposal could be the counting of persons as
simply "socially advantaged" and "socially disadvantaged," which, in its expansiveness,
would have the benefit of including gays and lesbians in the calculus of how our country
benefits and disadvantages its residents. Yet, the benefits of collecting such information
could be obtained by adding a question regarding the respondent's sexual orientation,
without sacrificing the usefulness of racial data.
366. Evidence of the MCM representatives' failure to consider the political meaning of
race is their claim that they have not yet considered whether the multiracial category
should be accorded the same congressional protection as the other racial categories and
the Hispanic origin ethnicity classification. See Multiracial Hearings, supra note 2, at 169
(testimony of Carlos Fernndez, President, Association of MultiEthnic Americans) ("Let's
get the information that reflects reality. What we to do with that later should be, ought to
be a distinct question . . ").
367. OMB's recent decision to permit multiple box checking should also be reversed for
a more accurate reflection of the pervasiveness of racial bias.
368. Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity, 59 Fed. Reg.
29,831, 29,834 (1994). These classification standards are not without controversy:
Some have suggested that the geographic orientation of the definitions for the
various racial and ethnic categories is not sufficiently definitive. They believe that
there is no readily apparent organizing principle for making such distinctions
and that definitions for the categories should be eliminated.
Id. at 29,833. The "origins" approach to defining race also furthers the societal view of
Whites as U.S. natives and non-Whites as trespassers, by limiting to Whites (and Native
Americans) the ability to have "origins in the original peoples of North America." Cf Neil
Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome, "in AsiAN AMERICANS AND THE
SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087, 1095 (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1992) (not-
ing the persistent judicial view of Asians in the United States as presumptively foreign).
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Who among us knows their "origins"? For if you count back
in your own family, doubling the number each generation
(two parents, four grandparents, eight great-grandparents,
etc.) you will find 32,000 possible ancestors during the previ-
ous 15 generations alone. Do you know their "origins"?. 69
I propose a Race-Conscious Racial Classification System that mod-
ifies government data collection forms by dispensing with such vacu-
ous pseudoscientific racial definitions and, instead, employs an
approach rooted in the sociopolitical meanings of race.3 70 This pro-
posal is asserted not as the definitive classification scheme, but merely
as an invitation for developing a classification system organized
around the political meaning of race for more effective use of racial
data. By focusing upon the political meaning of race, a race-conscious
classification system can avoid the distortions of a race-as-culture fo-
cus. The race-as-culture focus invites responses about personal iden-
tity rather than monitoring social differentiation based on racial
ancestry. The following proposal is set forth primarily as a vehicle for
initiating the discussion of the importance of race-conscious racial
classifications, rather than being a concrete model for statistical data
collection. The current list of racial classifications should be accom-
panied by the following explanation (exclusive of footnotes):
Recognizing that there are no such things as scientifically pure
races or ethnicities, and that a person's individual identity can never
be reduced to a single box, this form requests that you indicate 71
369. Scales-Trent, supra note 359.
370. This would be akin to Charles Lawrence's "Cultural Meaning" test. Charles R. Law-
rence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
Rrv. 317, 355-58 (1987) (proposing overt judicial examination of context to assist in recog-
nizing racial meanings and motivations). Thus, the instant proposal acknowledges that
race is a social construct. Accord Jeffrey H. Rutherford, Reexamining Race and Racial Identity
in the United States,. 15 LAw & INEQ. J. 1, 1 (1997) ("The argument that race is a social
construct means that race derives its effective existence primarily from political, social and
cultural underpinnings."). But it would be erroneous to presume, as color-blind theory
does, "that if something is socially constructed it can simply be willed away." john a. pow-
ell, The "Racing" of American Society: Race Functioning as a Verb Before Signifying as a Noun, 15
LAw & INEQ. J. 99, 118 (1997).
371. This proposal maintains that the Census Bureau should continue its use of self-
identification as the method for determining racial categories, because only individual re-
spondents can assess the sociopolitical meaning of race in their lives. If a method other
than self-identification were used (e.g., a third-party "eye-ball" test), a census taker would
not appreciate the racial bias that persons who appear White may experience upon re-
vealing their African ancestry. See Piper, supra note 96, at 30 ("[Mly public avowal of my
racial identity [as Black although appearing White] almost invariably elicits all the stere-
otypically racist behavior that visibly black people always confront. .. ."). Yet, it should be
noted that for purposes of measuring social disadvantage, the self-identification method
has been critiqued as susceptible to fraudulent responses. See Ford, supra note 146, at 1281
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which single race and/or ethnicity you find most politically and so-
cially meaningful. Because the collection of racial and ethnic data is
utilized and compiled for the specific purpose of monitoring discrimi-
nation in society (see attached list of civil rights statutes which rely
upon the Census Bureau collection of racial data),12 this classifica-
tion system focuses upon the ways in which your appearance and
assertion of race affect your treatment by others in society.3m
In order to assess the political role of your racial background
you may reflect upon the following questions. When first interacting
with others, in what ways does your appearance affect the interac-
tion? For instance, an individual who in his or her daily interac-
tions in society finds that others consistently react to him or her as
White or Black,3 74 and modify their behavior based upon that physi-
(asserting that self-identification methods allow White persons who wish to participate in
race-based preference programs to identify themselves as Black, and Black persons who
wish to escape the social derision of blackness to identify as White). Thus, the instant
political-race proposal is no more susceptible to the "reduction" in the number of persons
choosing pejoratively viewed racial classifications because of "false consciousness," than a
biological-race approach lodged in a self-identification system of classification. Cf Dwight
L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralisitic Ignorance, and the Myth of Colorless Indi-
vidualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 2039 (1993) ("In contemporary
America, a man's color still puts him at risk when dealing with the police. If Justice
Thomas ever goes to Los Angeles, he had better bring a phalanx of white Secret Service
agents to protect him from the hard-core racist groups within the Los Angeles Police
Department.").
372. For a list of pertinent civil rights statutes, see supra notes 312-317 and accompany-
ing text.
373. See supra notes 331-336 and accompanying text (discussing discrimination against
Blacks in the U.S. economy).
374. The manner in which an individual whose racial background is rooted in more
than one non-White category is racialized also relates to the ways in which blackness is
always viewed as the most pejorative of all racial attributes. See Gordon, supra note 41, at
382 ("[A]lthough there are people who function as 'the blacks' of particular contexts,
there is a group of people who function as the blacks everywhere. . . the blackest blacks."
(citations omitted)). Thus, even though all non-White persons are viewed as subordinate,
individuals' Black ancestries often can be more determinative of the social roles of their
race. This is borne out by the experiences of Afro-Latinos in the United States who are
discriminated against based upon their ethnicity but are constantly under siege because of
their African phenotype. Cf Juan A. Giusti Cordero, AfroPuerto Rican Cultural Studies: Be-
yond cultura negroide and antillanismo, 8J. EL CENTRO DE ESTUIIOS PUERTORMQUEOS 57,
57 (1996) ("Approaches to the historical experience of Puerto Ricans of color have been
overwhelmed by the urgency of confronting racism .... .").
Interestingly, the MCM focuses on the dilemma of Black mixed-race persons as op-
posed to the mixture of other racial ancestries, such as Native American and Asian ances-
tries, which are viewed as subordinate. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. The
MCM's lack of emphasis on the classification needs of mixed-race individuals who are
rooted in pejoratively viewed communities other than Black may indicate that there is a
small number of such individuals. Accordingly, such individuals could continue to utilize
an "Other Race" classification until the community of Asian/Native-American mixed-race
persons has increased to the point where it can be determined what significance such
racial mixture has within the racial political hierarchy. Although the use of the "Other
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cal assessment, can conclude that his or her White or Black pheno-
type determines the sociopolitical role of his or her racial background,
regardless of how diverse that particular individual's ancestry actu-
ally is. Alternatively, when you share the details of your racial ances-
try, how does that revelation affect your treatment by others? For
instance, where an individual may phenotypically appear White, but
when sharing his or her background with others discloses that his or
her ancestry also includes Blacks and then finds that the listener is
fixated only on the person's Black ancestry, then it would be appro-
priate for such an individual who personally identifies as White and
Black to conclude that the "Black" racial classification reflects the
sociopolitical role of his or her diverse racial background.3 75
The goal of the proposed race-conscious classification system is to
cultivate a more precise understanding of the ways in which race is
socially and politically significant, apart from its role as one of many
factors in personal identity formation. By designing a classification
system that interrogates the political content of race, the collection of
Race" category to list out the specific ancestries of a mixed-race person's identity may
facially appear similar to the proposed multiracial category, its use is not accompanied by
the same middle-tier-buffer dangers to racial equality efforts as is the case with an officially
instituted multiracial category. Furthermore, the retention of the "Other Race" category
would facilitate the analysis of the ways in which new arrivals to the United States are racial-
ized. It is accordingly inappropriate for the federal Interagency Committee to recommend
the abolition of the "Other" category. See Recommendations to OMB, supra note 7, at
36,939. For instance, upon arrival in the United States, the Irish were not considered
White; they were considered a race unto themselves. They were racialized by a "blacken-
ing" of their image. See IGNATIEv, supra note 163, at 76 ("Strong tendencies existed in
antebellum America to consign the Irish, if not to the black race, then to an intermediate
race located socially between black and white."). The Census Bureau has received special
permission from OMB to utilize an "Other" category not delineated by OMB Directive No.
15. See Recommendations to OMB, supra note 7, at 36,880.
375. For example, when interpersonal relationships are altered by the revelation of
Black ancestry in persons whose phenotype does not announce it, the sociopolitical role of
that biracial person's diverse ancestry can be said to be Black. See FUNDERBURG, supra note
58, at 219 (interviewing a biracial person who explained the discrimination he exper-
ienced even though his phenotype did not reveal his African ancestry: "In my own experi-
ence, I've seen dating relationships turn off as a result of prejudice once someone realized
I was black."). Therefore, the choice of the Black racial category for such an individual
would reflect his personal experience with racism and understanding of the sociopolitical
nature of racial classifications, rather than an automatic choice to indicate the race of the
parent who is most marginalized in society, or a political preoccupation with maintaining
the "numbers" of the Black community. Nor will this system of identification be ascribed
by others through the rule of hypo-descent, because a respondent's exploration of the
political meaning of race can be divorced from a personal identity of diverse ancestral
connections. This proposal is also distinct from OMB Directive No. 15, which advises a
mixed-race person to check the "category which most closely reflects the individual's recog-
nition in his community." Directive No. 15, supra note 9, at 19,269. Unlike OMB Directive
No. 15, this proposal does not overlook the ways in which mixed-race persons are discrimi-
nated against upon revealing their non-White ancestry.
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racial data can more closely correspond with the social dynamic such
data seek to measure. Furthermore, the proposal's disjunction of the
political meaning of race from the cultural approach to race also pre-
serves an individual's ability to assert a varied personal identity. Spe-
cifically, the frank explanation of the reasons for a public inquiry into
political race may assure the respondent that the complex and varied
ways individuals construct and restructure their personal identities are
not being called into question or challenged by the Census Bureau.
In addition to having the current racial classifications accurately
reflect the sociopolitical meaning of racial hierarchy, this proposal
also effectuates the erosion of the White transparency that fosters
White privilege,376 because Whites will have to confront their white-
ness as a race under this Article's proposal.3 77 Because the proposal
takes a sociopolitical approach to race, persons who identify as White
cannot check a box without acknowledging the social benefits that
accompany White status.378 When whiteness must be confronted as a
race like any other, it undennines its presumed superiority as the
norm.
3 7 9
Although the proposal would be administratively simple to imple-
ment,3 10 there are those who might be concerned with the ability of
respondents to comprehend and utilize the stated explanations. Yet,
its complexity stems not from presenting respondents with detailed
census instructions, but from the difficulty of confronting the reality
of the meaning of race and the benefits or hardships such political
376. See Flagg, supra note 102, at 957 (determining that White transparency is an obsta-
cle that must be addressed in racial justice efforts).
377. Accord STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE
UNDERMINES AMERICA 180 (1996):
[O]ne small way to give up white privilege is to stop pretending that race does not
matter, even though our aspiration continues to be that it should not matter. If
we stop pretending that race does not permeate our daily life, our classrooms,
and the affairs of government, perhaps we will start to see the operation of white
privilege, and other privileges, more clearly.
378. This would be a productive "direct engagement with white supremacy" by Whites,
which otherwise rarely occurs. Lawrence, supra note 56, at 838.
379. See Gordon, supra note 41, at 389 ("[W]hen white is spoken of as a race, many
whites experience discomfort for good reason; it violates their place in the social order.");
cf DELGADO, supra note 256, at 32 (positing that White supremacy could be more effec-
tively undermined if Whites became "race traitors" by consistently challenging race-based
allocation of privilege).
380. Implementation of the proposal would only entail the following: (1) the inclusion
of an explanation of the purpose of collecting racial data, and (2) the definition of socio-
political race. Inasmuch as the categories and the single-box-checking system are retained,
the Census Bureau would not incur any additional administrative costs in the tabulation of
the census data. In addition, the proposal's retention of the single-race-category system
permits the collection of comparative data to measure racial disparity across time.
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meaning can impose."8 ' For instance, "[n] ot all black people know
what races are, but they know what hatred of black people is." '82 This
is the sociopolitical significance of blackness known to many people
irrespective of educational background.383 The instant proposal is
forthright about the reality of this complexity and encourages society
as a whole to take on the important task of grappling with the discom-
fort of acknowledging racial prejudice and disadvantage.
CONCLUSION
No form of a mixed-race census count will be an effective mecha-
nism for achieving the MCM's stated goal of overcoming racism. The
multiracial discourse that supports the MCM promotes color-blind-
ness by asserting a cultural approach to race, which negates its socio-
political import. Furthermore, the MCM employs a color-blind
assessment of the effects of a mixed-race census count when it over-
looks the historical uses of mixed-race, middle-tier buffers for pur-
poses of subordination in Latin America and apartheid South Africa.
The MCM's promulgation of color-blind theory reinforces the current
jurisprudential shift of negating the experiences of racial discrimina-
tion against persons of color, and in the process, maintains systems of
race-based privilege. 8 4 The danger that the MCM will be co-opted by
the larger society as a mechanism for constructing a buffer class to
maintain White privilege, in the midst of a growing concern with the
demographic decline of White U.S. residents,38 5 further calls into
question the soundness of implementing a mixed-race census count.
Even without such a calculated appropriation of the MCM, a mixed-
race census count is not advisable, because it would not accurately
reflect the racial caste system as it exists in the United States. 386 Main-
taining caste-conscious racial classifications permits us, as a nation, to
acknowledge openly the existence of our racial hierarchy in order to
381. See HARLON L. DALTON, RACIAL HEALING: CONFRONTING THE FEAR BETWEEN BLAcKS
AND WHIrrsS 31 (1995) ("[I]t is small wonder that true engagement is so rare. Usually, no
one wants to take the initiative. Talking honestly about race feels risky. We aren't quite
sure how to do it or where it will lead."); Vincent Di Lorenzo, Complexity and Legislative
Signatures: Lending Discrimination Laws as a Test Case, 12J.L. & POL. 637, 639 (1996) (advo-
cating a recognition of complexity by legislatures).
382. Gordon, supra note 41, at 388.
383. See id. ("Similarly, children learn about groups to hate, although they have no clue
of what races are.").
384. See Harris, supra note 63, at 1734-35 (acknowledging that whiteness is valued for,
among other things, its granting of property rights).
385. See supra notes 176-185 and accompanying text.
386. See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
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work toward substantively eradicating it and countermanding the neg-
ative implications of multiracial discourse.38 7
The most critical aspect of multiracial discourse, which this Arti-
cle's race-conscious classification proposal addresses, is its characteri-
zation of race as too fluid to be adequately reflected by "monoracial"
categories, as if the birth of mixed-race persons alone would under-
mine the existence of race-based privilege. 88 The perception of
mixed-race persons as ambassadors of racial harmony, indicative of
multiracial discourse, resonates with the failed Brazilian race-mixture-
as-"racial-democracy" approach to race relations.3"9 The confluence
of multiracial discourse with discredited Latin American perspectives
on race is especially alarming given its potential for furthering the
course of color-blind jurisprudence. Civil rights efforts to rectify the
color-blind jurisprudence premise that race should never be taken
into account may be severely hampered by the use of multiracial dis-
course to assert that race is "too nebulous" to be utilized in govern-
mental efforts to eradicate racism.39 0 This is the enduring legacy of
the MCM-the facility for multiracial discourse to further a color-
blind jurisprudential dismantling of civil rights, irrespective of admin-
istrative decisions about whether and how to conduct a mixed-race
census count. At the same time, the MCM has also provided an inval-
uable opportunity to have a public discussion about the meaning of
race and the need for a more concrete understanding of race in legal
efforts aimed at addressing racial disparity. It is only with such a frank
discussion of the continuing sociopolitical meaning of race that we as
a society can develop a mechanism for effectively abolishing racial ine-
quality-the ultimate goal of the MCM.
Not until . . .we have faced the full human and personal
consequences of self-serving, historically entrenched social
and legal conventions that in fact undermine the privileged
interests they were designed to protect, will we be in a posi-
387. See Angela P. Harris, The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction, Forward to Symposium, Criti-
cal Race Theory, 82 CAL. L. REV. 741, 743 (1994) (" [C] rafting the correct theory of race and
racism can help lead to enlightenment, empowerment, and finally to emancipation.... .").
388. Rochelle L. Stanfield, Blending of America, 29 NAT'LJ. 1780, 1781 (1997) ("Others
anticipate that the bedroom will accomplish what other catalysts could not. Douglas J.
Besharov, an [American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research] resident scholar,
for example, said in a 1996 article in The New Democrat that the growing numbers of mixed-
race youth represent 'the best hope for the future of American race relations.'").
389. Moffett, supra note 141 ("To those who say racial mixing makes it impossible to
apply quotas in Brazil, [one Afro-Brazilian activist] has a retort, 'Brazilian police have never
had any difficulty distinguishing between black and white.'").
390. See supra note 304 and accompanying text.
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tion to decide whether the very idea of racial classification is
a viable one in the first place.391
391. Piper, supra note 96, at 31.
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